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Addiction is characterised by maladaptive drug-approach behaviours, some of which 
may take place without conscious cognitive control. Through repeated associations 
with a substance, drug related stimuli acquire incentive salience properties via 
Pavlovian reward learning, triggering these responses. 
In order to better understand implicit processes in addiction it is crucial to increase our 
knowledge about unconscious reward mechanisms. Previous literature has failed to 
thoroughly demonstrate the ability of Pavlovian conditioned stimuli to generate 
responses in the absence of stimulus-outcome contingency awareness. Therefore, an 
effort was put to develop novel techniques measuring different aspects of 
conditioning. 
Using an Emotional Attentional Blink, we proved stimuli associated with high 
probabilities of reward (HR) generated increased attentional responses in participants 
Unaware of contingencies. Integrating Conditioned Stimuli (CS) as task-irrelevant 
distractors in a Flanker task we found HR stimuli interfered with cognitive control, 
 
 
again implicitly. A novel methodology, based on Bayesian analyses, allowed us 
determining the unconscious nature of learning, strengthening our findings. 
Conversely, subjective hedonic responses were not modulated by implicit learning, 
highlighting the inadequacy of such measures for the study of implicit conditioning.  
In order to further understand individual differences in the development of 
conditioned responses, we examined the role of interoception, the mental 
representation of internal bodily sensations, in this matter. It was shown that 
interoceptive awareness modulates the development of reward prediction and 
hedonic responses in Pavlovian conditioning. We also examined the effect of a natural 
reward, alcohol, on interoceptive awareness, and found that under acute alcohol 
administration interoceptive awareness facilitates the perception of subjective 
substance effects.  
These findings have important implications for our understanding of basic addictive 
processes. The ability of implicit CS to generate responses supports the existence of 
drug-approach behaviours devoid of conscious awareness. The role of interoception in 
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1 Theoretical overview 
1.1 Introduction 
Substance use disorders and other addictions are defined as ‘a chronic disorder 
characterised by a compulsion to seek and take a drug, loss of control in limiting the 
intake and emergence of a negative emotional state […] reflecting a motivational 
withdrawal syndrome when access to the drug is prevented’ (Koob & Volkow, 2010). 
This pathological process entails aberrant cognitive responses generated by 
dysregulated reward learning mechanisms (Koob & Volkow, 2016), generating long 
term neural adaptations and cognitive impairments (Bates, Pawlak, Tonigan, & 
Buckman, 2006; Goldstein et al., 2009), particularly in executive control (Verdejo-
García, Bechara, Recknor, & Pérez-García, 2006).  
Although the existing cognitive behavioural therapies for addiction provide increasing 
success rates (Hendershot, Witkiewitz, George, & Marlatt, 2011), approaches targeting 
maladaptive cognitive processes could provide novel therapeutic solutions (Cristea, 
Kok, & Cuijpers, 2016; Wiers, Gladwin, Hofmann, Salemink, & Ridderinkhof, 2013).  
Crucial to the understanding of addiction is the clarification of the role of implicit 
responses (Bechara, 2005; Belin, Belin-Rauscent, Murray, & Everitt, 2013) interacting 
with executive functioning  as part of the generation of drug-approach behaviours 
(Stacy & Wiers, 2010). 
Given the relevance of reward processing, and particularly of Pavlovian Conditioning 




examine the implicit components of addiction through the study of appetitive learning 
in the absence of conscious awareness. 
1.2 Reward learning theories 
1.2.1 A historical account of Reinforcement learning 
Early theories of reward learning attribute the formation of long lasting behaviours to 
the direct association between a stimulus and a response (S-R) (Thorndike, 1898; 
Watson, 1913). According to this view, actions followed by positive outcomes have 
more chances to be repeated in the future, whereas those followed by negative 
outcomes are less likely to recur. For example, an animal performing an action (i.e. 
pressing a lever) and subsequently obtaining a reward (i.e. food) would be more likely 
to press the lever again due to the positive characteristics of the reward.  
Stimulus-response and associative learning theories simplified however the 
characterisation of the mechanisms by which learning occurs, disregarding the role of 
hedonic responses and expectancies and assuming that the nature of a reward is 
irrelevant to S-R habituation (Berridge, 2000). For example, it was not specified how 
individuals can engage in specific responses (eating instead of drinking) depending on 
the reward (i.e. food instead of a sweet solution) if the nature of the reward itself is 
irrelevant to the generation of learnt responses. Moreover, the ability of rewards 
pertaining to different categories (i.e. sex, drugs or food) to equally act as reinforcers 
was not explained either, and neither was the generation of complex behavioural 
sequences. Finally, the simple association of a stimulus with an action could not 




behaviours (Bindra, 1978). For example, if someone feels cold, they may put an extra 
layer of clothes on, but also close the window or turn the heater on. This is at odds 
with S-R theories of learning indicating that learning occurs as the consolidation or 
fading of specific sensory-motor connections (Bindra, 1978). This would imply that 
there is a common denominator to rewards that can drive and direct approach 
behaviours.  
These theories were followed by simplified conceptualisations of associative learning, 
reducing them to mere observational accounts (Skinner, 2011). Skinner devised a 
series of valuable procedures for the study of reward learning, however, his refusal to 
further investigate the mechanisms by which learning occurs (perfectly illustrated by 
the title of one of his papers: Are theories of learning necessary?, 1950) gave rise to 
more complex interpretations of learning and behaviour, such as Hullian theories, 
attempting to disentangle the mechanisms underlying response learning.   
Drive reduction theories of learning (Hull, 1943) attempted to explain the stimulus 
specificity on influencing behaviours and the source of reward as a mere reduction of 
drives. When a subject is in a state of hunger, that drives behaviours towards reducing 
it, for example eating. The obtainment of food would decrease the drive, and it is that 
drive reduction that ultimately generates a reinforcement.  
1.2.2 Incentive theories of learning: Bolles – Bindra – Toates   
A series of experimental incongruences, in which responses not directly reinforced 
produced behaviours, constituted the basis for criticisms directed to response 




stereotypies (Breland & Breland, 1961), such as a raccoon washing a token associated 
with food in a similar manner as it would with a fruit, meant that stimuli unable to 
directly decrease drives could still generate responses. This contributed to the rise of 
incentive theories of learning, by which Conditioned Stimuli (CS) acquire the 
motivational properties of rewards (US), dragging attention and orienting or 
generating goal directed behaviours (Berridge, 2000). 
On that same line, Bolles’s (1972) view on learning mechanisms was that 
reinforcement is not established through S-R associations, but by stimulus-stimulus 
and response-stimulus expectancies.  
Bolles argued that animals learn to predict the occurrence of an US (i.e. food pellets) 
after a CS (i.e. a light) due to the concomitant presentation of both. This generates in 
animals the expectancy of a stimulus, be it pleasurable or aversive, in the presence of 
another one. A secondary mechanism extended these associations to the existence of 
R-S contingencies. Animals learn that certain responses in the environment generate 
an outcome, in that case driven by the expectancy of a stimulation after their own 
response (i.e. pressing a lever to obtain food pellets). 
According to Bolles, it is the strength of the CS-US or R-S association that drives the 
generation of increased expectancies, augmenting response probabilities. The value of 
US should as well modulate responses, in part as a function of the internal 
homeostatic state of the subject, reflecting on Hull’s drive theories (Hull, 1943). 
Bindra’s (1978) criticism to response-reinforcement theories (Thorndike, 1911) 




drive theories based on homeostatic processes the role of incentive stimuli. However, 
in opposition to Bolles’s idea, he claimed that learning is not based solely on 
expectancies, but rather that a motivational transfer between US and CS drives the 
generation of learning.  
Within this model, the central motive state (Bindra, 1968) constitutes the main entity 
under which goal-directed actions are processed. When an organismic state, such as 
hunger, coincides with the presence of an incentive stimulus (i.e. food), this generates 
an appetitive central motive state associated with the reward, resulting in approach or 
consummatory behaviours. The central motive state does not only affect behavioural 
outcomes, but also viscero-somatic reactions, producing preparatory responses such 
as salivation. It is also important to note the posited role of viscero-afferent responses 
(termed “sensory inflow” by Bindra) in the perception of organismic states within this 
model. These signals would comprise both exteroceptive and interoceptive 
information. 
A key aspect in this model is that CS acquire the motivational properties of rewards, 
eliciting goal-directed behaviours. Through concomitant CS-US presentations, positive 
contingencies are established, and the occurrence of CS can then excite the central 
representation of US.  
When CS are presented under extinction, that is, once contingencies are established 
but in the absence of reward, CS will also generate a central motive state leading to 
approach behaviours compatible with its own nature, but also to physiological 




Viscerosomatic and instrumental responses in PC appear to be independent from one 
another, particularly when considering CS and US separately (Bindra, 1974). For 
Bindra, responses necessary to approach a stimulus (e.g. walking towards it) and 
preparatory viscerosomatic reactions (e.g. salivation) might be the same for CS and US, 
whereas consummatory responses (e.g. biting or chewing) would not appear in 
relation to the CS (obviating however different instances of sign-tracking in which 
animals attempt for example to bite a light signalling a reward). This indicates that CS 
are not strictly linked to the responses associated with a US, but rather that they can 
act as a source of motivational arousal leading to behaviours adapted to the nature of 
the CS (in the case of humans for example, attentional orientation). 
Drive states regained relevance due to the work of Cabanac (1971, 1979) on 
alliesthesia, linking the perception of the hedonic value of an external stimulus to the 
internal state of a subject. According to this concept, an equally tasty food would elicit 
different subjective sensations or experiences depending on the internal milieu of a 
subject. For example, the consumption of sugar would elicit more pleasurable 
responses if an animal is hungry. However, as satiety is achieved, hedonic responses 
would become neutral, and finally negative (Berridge, 1991).  
A crucial distinction between drive reduction theories (Hull, 1943) and alliesthesia 
however is that rewards are not posited to produce reinforcement because they 
satiate or fulfil a drive, but rather that the consumption of a reward under the right 
physiological conditions increases its perceived attractiveness, impacting thereon 




reconciling the expectancy accounts of Bolles and the role of hedonic responses of 
Bindra.  
According to Toates, both the hedonic value of US and the expectancies generated by 
associations can modulate behaviour.  By introducing the alliesthetic component of 
reward appraisal, the value of a reward is not anymore fixed, and changes of 
alliesthetic parameters can determine the generation and retrieval of learnt responses.  
For example, the presentation of rewards in small quantities can awaken physiological 
drives that can then cascade to increase the motivational salience of that same reward 
(Cornell, Rodin, & Weingarten, 1989). Such an effect, known as priming, has been 
studied in rats (i.e. Lê et al., 1998) and humans (i.e. Duka & Townshend, 2004) and can 
generate or reinstate responses towards alcohol cues.  
Furthermore, as CS acquire incentive properties associated with rewards, their mere 
presentation can elicit priming mechanisms similar to those exerted by a small dose of 
alcohol or food (Weingarten, 1983). CS (visual, olfactory or auditory) can therefore 
trigger alliesthetic responses generating physiological states compatible with reward 
consumption, increasing the hedonic value of stimuli. Finally, the effect of CS on 
behavioural outcomes is also dependent on alliesthetic mechanisms, such that the 
incentive value of a stimulus paired with an appetitive reward will decrease under 
conditions of satiety.  
1.2.3 Cognitive expectancy theories 
According to Dickinson’s view (1989), responses to stimuli take place due to the 




causal relationship between R-S contingencies drives and directs behaviours, a concept 
known as outcome-representation. A subject would thus perform an action with the 
conscious expectancy of obtaining a certain reward, and this outcome awareness is not 
driven solely by contingency knowledge, but also by the representation of the hedonic 
value of a reward. Although initial research in this sense studied the role of outcome 
expectancies in animal models (Dickinson & Balleine, 1995), the role of expectancies in 
human behaviour (Shanks, 2007; Shanks & Dickinson, 1988) will be discussed later on.  
1.3 Theories of addiction 
1.3.1 Positive and negative reinforcement 
Reflecting on classifications similar to those of early theories of learning, addictive 
processes, and more specifically drug urges, were originally based either on positive or 
negative reinforcement approaches. 
Withdrawal theories of addiction explain drug cravings and urges as a drive to reduce 
the effects of withdrawal states (Jellinek, 1955). A subject would therefore engage in 
drug consumption to alleviate the negative state generated by the absence of a 
substance. However, drug cravings can appear in subjects long after withdrawal effects 
have faded out (e.g. Mathew, Claghorn, & Largen, 1979), compromising such theory. 
That was accounted for by Wikler (1948), explaining that contexts or situations 
conditioned with withdrawal symptoms can elicit drug cravings and urges long after 
the fading of withdrawal. Another view (Siegel, 1975) held that the development of 
drug cravings occurred through conditioned compensatory mechanisms. Stimuli 




those of the substance (i.e. excitability when facing stimuli related with an opioid, 
sleepiness when observing a stimulus related with caffeine) explaining the generation 
of substance tolerance. Those same compensatory responses could trigger as well 
withdrawal-like effects, generating craving.  
Positive reinforcement theories on the other hand base their explanation of drug urges 
on the hedonic properties of stimulants (Stewart, de Wit, & Eikelboom, 1984; Wise, 
1988). By representing the anticipation of a positive outcome, drug related stimuli 
elicit motivational states compatible with craving, ultimately driving relapses or 
consumption. This positive reinforcement mechanism is not at odds with negative 
reinforcement theories of withdrawal, and both phenomena could interplay in order 
to drive consumption (Baker, Morse, & Sherman, 1986; Roy A Wise & Koob, 2014). 
1.3.2 Automatic and habit theories of addiction 
The occurrence of cravings or urges does not always correlate with behavioural 
outcomes and drug consumption behaviours or with physiological responses to drug 
related stimuli (Tiffany, 1990). Tiffany described the necessity to explore separately 
non-automatic accounts of drug behaviour (such as urge responding) from automatic 
reactions to drug related stimuli (i.e. physiological reactivity). Those automatic 
mechanisms should reflect fast, autonomous, effortless, uncontrollable and 
unconscious processes.  
Through years of drug consumption, addictive responses become engrained in learned 




withdrawal states) or external drug related cues (i.e. a place, smell or visual stimulus) 
are thought to trigger or initiate “drug-use actions plans”.  
Another take on the automaticity of drug-use disorders is that of habitual responses 
(Everitt & Robbins, 2005). The distinction between stimulus driven and goal directed 
responses based on expectancies was illustrated by a series of devaluation 
experiments in rats (Miles, Everitt, & Dickinson, 2003) in which instrumental responses 
were paired with solutions containing either cocaine or sucrose. After outcome 
devaluation, they found that food paired responses were extinguished, whereas 
cocaine related responses resisted outcome devaluation, thus indicating that 
responses towards substances reflect habitual pathways rather than outcome-
contingency expectancies. 
In humans however, evidence for drug approach behaviours being enacted through 
goal-directed mechanisms (Brown, Duka, & Forster, 2018) and the finding that drug 
cues can generate explicit craving responses (Tiffany, Warthen, & Goedeker, 2009) has 
impeded an accurate translation of findings obtained in animals (Hogarth, Dickinson, & 
Duka, 2010). On a devaluation experiment equivalent to that of Miles et al. (2003), 
Hogarth and Chase (2011) paired button presses with either chocolate or tobacco 
outcomes. After devaluating the outcomes via satiety or aversive related messages, 
they found a decrease in responses associated with the devalued outcomes, thus 
implying that traditional mechanisms of S-R associations based on habitual responses 
may not be able to explain drug-related behaviours in humans. The finding that 




overcoming the effect of habitual responses, favoured a shift towards the relevance of 
outcome expectancies and their conscious appraisal.  
1.3.3 Expectancy theories of addiction 
Expectancy theories of addiction posit that the knowledge of outcomes following 
stimulation, such as the prediction of stimulant effects after cocaine consumption, are 
the main drive of drug-approach behaviours (Bolles & Fanselow, 1980; Brandon, 
Herzog, Irvin, & Gwaltney, 2004). From a appetitive conditioning point of view 
(Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, Kouvaraki, & Duka, 2007; Hogarth & Duka, 2006), explicit 
knowledge about stimulus-outcome contingencies seems necessary, for example, for 
nicotine paired stimuli to affect instrumental, attentional and hedonic responses. In a 
series of experiments, Hogarth et al. (2007) paired a geometrical stimulus with 
probabilities of earning tobacco and another stimulus with probabilities of losing it. On 
a second phase, they paired a behavioural response (i.e. key press) with tobacco wins 
and another with loses and finally assessed the motivational influence of CS on 
behavioural outcomes in a process known as Pavlovian to Instrumental Transfer (PIT). 
Importantly, they found that stimuli initially associated with tobacco outcomes 
potentiated behavioural transfer effects, demonstrating the relevance of outcome-
expectancies in reward seeking behaviours. 
In line with that perspective, the dual-process theory of motivation (Dickinson & 
Balleine, 1994) holds that reward approach behaviours can be explained both by 
stimulus-outcome expectancies, resistant to stimulus revaluations, and response-




aforementioned experiment by Hogarth and Chase (2011) on tobacco and chocolate 
devaluation show the importance of expected values on the generation of responses. 
However, they also found that cues associated with rewards elicited responding even 
after devaluation, pointing towards the independence of goal directed responses 
susceptible to devaluation, and more automatic or habitual responses elicited by S-R 
schemes. 
In favour of expectancy accounts of drug-approach behaviours in humans, there is 
little evidence for the occurrence of conditioned responses without contingency 
awareness (CA), and the existing evidence does not necessarily overcome 
methodological criticisms (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002, discussed later on). CA refers to 
the ability to predict a stimulus-outcome contingency, for example, knowing that a 
certain reward is preceded by a certain CS. However, some instances of implicit PC 
effects (i.e. Clark, Manns, & Squire, 2001; Perruchet, 1985, discussed later on) opened 
the possibility for implicitly CS to generate some sort of response (Hogarth & Duka, 
2006; Robinson & Berridge, 2003). Two streams of conditioning, implicit and explicit, 
may mediate drug-cue enhancement of conditioned responses through different 
pathways independent of conscious expectancies.  
1.3.4 Incentive sensitization 
A further take on automatic theories of addiction (Tiffany, 1990), indicates that 
addictive processes are characterised by an over-representation of the rewarding 




salience, attractiveness and motivational properties. These incentive properties are 
then transferred to CS associated with it. 
The most characteristic trait of Robinson and Berridge’s theory is the dissociation 
between hedonic (“liking”) and motivational (“wanting)” aspects of reward learning 
(Berridge & Robinson, 2016).  
Laboratory experiments with dopamine depleted rodents showed for example that 
sweet substances generated hedonic responses, assessed via orofacial expressions, but 
no incentive motivational properties (Berridge & Robinson, 1998). Liking can therefore 
occur in some instances in the absence of motivational drives towards a reward.  
On the other hand, evidence shows that animals can engage in consummatory 
behaviours without presenting the expected hedonic responses (Wyvell & Berridge, 
2000). For example, hypothalamic electric stimulation in rats was seen to generate 
ingestion of a sweet solution in the absence of positive hedonic reactions towards it 
(Berridge & Valenstein, 1991). 
In humans, this same distinction may occur between “liking” and “wanting”. Dopamine 
systems may become sensitized both to substances and drug-related stimuli, 
displaying exaggerated responsiveness towards them. This increased incentive salience 
can then drag for example addicts to consume a substance (i.e. smoke a cigarette) 
even in the absence of positive hedonic responses to the substance itself. The 
distinction between “wanting” and “liking” neural circuits has also been observed in 
humans via imaging (e.g. Evans et al., 2006; Volkow et al., 2002) and pharmacological 




2013) studies, resulting in the consideration of dopaminergic pathways as the basis for 
motivation or desire rather than pleasure (Berridge & Robinson, 2016). 
Importantly, the authors consider that some aspects of both “liking” and “wanting” 
can reflect unconscious processes (Berridge, 1999). Particularly, they claimed that 
emotional responses to rewards can occur in the absence of conscious emotional 
awareness (Berridge & Winkielman, 2003). Using a subliminal emotional priming 
paradigm Winkielman and colleagues (2005) found that happy faces increased the 
value and consumption of a drink in thirsty participants, whereas negative faces 
decreased it. This would bring evidence for an interaction between alliesthetic states 
(Cabanac, 1971) and subliminal or implicit emotional processes, such that under a 
bodily state (thirst) that would per-se increase the value of a reward (water) implicit 
processes can alter further this value.  
1.3.5 Dual process model 
Theories reviewed previously all refer, to a greater or lesser extent, to the existence of 
implicit or automatic processes driving drug approach behaviours or hedonic reactions 
(Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Hogarth & Duka, 2006; Tiffany, 1990).  
Dual process models of addiction (Bechara, 2005; Wiers & Stacy, 2006) explain the 
generation of drug related behaviours as a combination of an implicit or automatic 
system and explicit and controlled mechanisms.  
The impulsive system, based on the automatic appraisal of the hedonic and incentive 
value of drug-related stimuli drives implicit approach tendencies, such as attentional 




The reflective system on the other hand, is based on emotional regulations and explicit 
motivations, supposed to act as a stopper to the occurrence of pernicious drug 
consumption.  
In adolescents for example, these automatic processes (studied using an alcohol 
approach-avoidance task which measures task-irrelevant behavioural tendencies 
towards stimuli) seem to initiate shortly after alcohol drinking starts (Peeters et al., 
2012) and are seen to interact with cognitive functioning to predict the occurrence of 
alcohol consumption (Thush et al., 2008).  
This inability to overcome or control automatic responses is therefore a definitional 
characteristic of addictive processes, and effective decision making and inhibitory 
control is meant to be impaired both by chronic (Bechara & Noel, 2006) and acute 
(Field, Wiers, Christiansen, Fillmore, & Verster, 2010) drug consumption, aggravating 
the pathological loop.  
1.4 Measures of conditioned responses in humans 
The theories presented before all rely their understanding of learning and addictive 
processes on the way individuals interact with reward related stimuli. This section 
presents an outline of the main methods by which hedonic, attentional, behavioural 
and physiological reactions towards appetitive CS are measured, whether associated 
with primary (i.e. food) or secondary (i.e. money) reinforcers, and whether explicitly 
(i.e. pictures of food) or implicitly (i.e. stimuli predicting food without awareness) 





1.4.1 Hedonic responses 
The measurement of hedonic responses independently from behavioural outcomes 
appears to be a relevant aspect of reward learning theories. Robinson and Berridge 
(2001) stress the need to separate motivational and hedonic aspects when examining 
reward related behaviours. From the point of view of expectancy theories of addiction, 
emotional responses are meant to be tied to conscious drug-expectancies as they 
seem to occur only in participants conscious of outcome-contingencies (Hogarth, 
Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers, & Duka, 2006). 
Hedonic responses towards rewards or drug-related stimuli are typically assessed 
using Likert or visual analogue scales in which participants have to indicate their level 
of pleasantness, liking or appreciation towards stimuli (see Pool, Sennwald, 
Delplanque, Brosch, & Sander, 2016 for a detailed review). 
Other measures of hedonic responsiveness towards cues are implicit association tests 
(IAT; Greenwald, Mcghee, & Schwartz, 1998). In this kind of task participants have to 
categorise a target stimulus or picture (e.g. an alcohol or soda picture) according first 
to one criterion (press left if the picture is a bottle of alcohol/right if it is soda). They 
then have to categorise other stimuli, such as valenced words, as positive or negative 
(press left if the word is positive/ right if negative). On the test phase, both categories 
are merged, and in the congruent condition the same response would classify a picture 
as alcohol/positive or soda/negative. In the incongruent condition, a given response 
would correspond to an incongruent category (alcohol/negative or soda/positive). 
Congruent trials should yield shorter reactions times than incongruent ones, and the 




reflected in increased differences in reaction times between both conditions. In case of 
studying hedonic responses, the valence categories could be replaced by “I like – I 
don’t like” (see Tibboel, De Houwer, & Van Bockstaele, 2015 for a review).  
Importantly, hedonic responses have not only been measured towards naturalistic 
stimuli, but also towards abstract stimuli conditioned with other outcomes, such as 
tobacco (Austin & Duka, 2012) or monetary rewards (Austin & Duka, 2010; Jeffs & 
Duka, 2017) using Likert scales; and towards CS in evaluative tasks (Mitchell, Anderson, 
& Lovibond, 2003) using IAT. 
Other techniques, such as effort mobilized or forced choice preferences between two 
cues have been employed in some cases, although they present several limitations in 
their application, mostly due to the difficulty to isolate motivational from hedonic 
components of incentive salience (Pool et al., 2016).  
In that sense, attempts to measure emotional responses with subjective pleasantness 
ratings might not be the most valid approach as they rely on explicitly determined 
subjective ratings to measure an hedonic construct that might be automatic or 
stemming from implicit associations (Berridge, 1999). Criticisms have also been raised 
to the study of emotional responses using IAT (Houben & Wiers, 2006), as they can be 
biased by explicit knowledge about outcome-contingencies even if the corresponding 
stimulus and reward have never been explicitly paired (Jan De Houwer, 2006). 
Furthermore, semantic activation of positive and negative values is necessary for 
performance on the task, as well as a clear observation of the target stimulus and the 




1.4.2 Attentional and behavioural measures 
According to the incentive sensitisation theory (Robinson & Berridge, 1993) stimuli 
predictive of reward or associated with a substance are meant to generate preferential 
attentional responses (Field & Cox, 2008). This preferential reactivity has traditionally 
been studied via dot-probe paradigms (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) regarding a 
variety of substances, such as opiates (Lubman, Peters, Mogg, Bradley, & Deakin, 
2000), alcohol (Townshend & Duka, 2001) or tobacco (Hogarth, Mogg, Bradley, Duka, 
& Dickinson, 2003; Waters, Heishman, Lerman, & Pickworth, 2007). In this kind of task, 
a relevant stimulus or cue appears either on the left or right side of the screen for a 
short period of time, matched on the other side of the screen by a control stimulus. 
Stimulus presentation is followed by a dot or “probe” either congruent or incongruent 
with the location of the prime. Shorter reaction times for trials in which the probe 
replaces the relevant cue indicate an attentional preference towards that stimulus. 
This task has however shown poor reliability in a series of validation experiments 
(Price et al., 2015; Schmukle, 2005). 
Other classic cognitive tasks have been modified to incorporate rewarding stimuli or 
drug cues. An example of this is the Stroop task (1935) which studies the interference 
of semantically irrelevant information in the naming of coloured words. Such an effect 
has been studied using alcohol related words (Bauer & Cox, 1998), tobacco cues (Janes 
et al., 2010), but also reward related associations (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010), 
showing that stimuli paired with rewards increase attentional interference.  
In the Flanker task (Eriksen, 1995) participants have to indicate the direction of an 




incongruent (pointing in opposite direction), providing a measure of executive control. 
By adding task irrelevant alcohol related pictures in the background, Nikolaou, Field 
and Duka (2013) found that such distractors generated increased interferences in 
cognitive control compared to control stimuli. 
Attentional blink tasks consist of the rapid visual serial presentation of stimuli on 
screen, and participants have to detect the presence of a series of stimuli, a target and 
a probe, embedded within the stream of pictures (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). 
In this original example, detection of an initial target impedes recognition of a 
subsequent probe presented later on in the stream. A modified version, in which 
emotional stimuli are embedded in the stream (McHugo, Olatunji, & Zald, 2013) shows 
that aversive stimuli (preceding the probe) can decrease accuracy in probe detection 
even though they are task irrelevant. Such tasks have also been used with aversively 
CS as distractors (Smith, Most, Newsome, & Zald, 2006); or proven that stimuli 
conditioned with monetary outcomes can overcome the interference generated by 
emotional distractors (Yokoyama, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2015). 
Finally, eye-tracking techniques have been used with drug-related stimuli to study 
attentional allocations towards them (e.g. Kang et al., 2012; Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De 
Houwer, 2003). Similar experiments have been conducted with aversive (e.g. Hogarth, 
Dickinson, Austin, Brown, & Duka, 2008) and reward (e.g. Austin & Duka, 2010) CS. 
The occurrence of preferential attentional responses is again hypothesized to be based 
on the explicit knowledge (mental representations) of stimulus-outcome contingencies 




According to these authors, the conscious expectancy of drug availability signalled by 
these stimuli generates Conditioned Responses (CResp) compatible with the stimulus 
presented, in this case attentional reactivity. On top of that, such stimuli can interact 
with craving states. Attentional responses towards drug CS can either generate craving 
responses, or be modulated by subjective craving (Field, Munafò, & Franken, 2009) or 
deprivation states (Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2004). On the other hand, Wiers and Stacy 
(2006) propose that such measures assess implicit processes reflecting “"deeper" 
affective mechanisms that operate outside awareness”. The existence and study of 
those implicit processes can be determinant for the understanding of addiction.  
1.4.3 Physiological responses  
Cue reactivity, understood as the automatic generation of bodily responses towards 
CS, has also been examined assessing a variety of physiological responses towards 
drug-related stimuli (Carter & Tiffany, 1999). In this type of procedure, participants are 
exposed to a cue (e.g. alcohol bottles) whilst they report different variables, such as 
craving states or pleasantness responses. Physiological recordings usually can consist 
of heart-rate responsiveness, showing, for example, that increased heart-rate 
variability in the presence of alcohol stimuli can predict clinical relapse in patients 
suffering from Alcohol use disorders (Garland, Franken, & Howard, 2012). Stimuli 
conditioned with cigarette puffs also were found to generate increased physiological 
reactivity, as measured via skin conductance response (Winkler et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, stimuli associated with pleasant and unpleasant outcomes (i.e. 
emotional pictures) also appear to modulate heart-rate variability (e.g. Lachnit & 




responses has relevance to the understanding of how physiological mechanisms 
underlie the development of conditioned responses (Bindra, 1974), and provide an 
insight into  the relationship between interoceptive processes, the feeling of internal 
bodily states, and addiction (Gray & Critchley, 2007) discussed later on.  
1.5 Implicit learning 
1.5.1 General considerations 
Implicit learning (Reber, 1989) can be defined as a learning task that results in implicit 
knowledge, namely knowledge that one is not aware of possessing. In the case of PC, 
this knowledge consists of stimulus-outcome contingencies subjects integrate without 
conscious awareness.  
The first examples of implicit learning were developed with artificial grammar learning 
paradigms (Reber, 1967). This kind of paradigm starts with a learning phase in which 
participants are presented with a series of non-words, the content of which is based 
on a set of rules determining which letters are contained in each string and their order 
within it. In a test phase participants are told the strings are built according to a set of 
rules, but not told which rules those are. They are then presented with a novel set of 
stimuli of which some strings will respect the original grammar rules and some, that 
although being similar to the original ones, will violate the rules. Their task is then to 
classify each novel string as correct or incorrect based on their prior experience. Above 
chance accuracy on classification indicates the occurrence of learning, and by asking 
participants about their explicit knowledge about the grammar rules, it is possible to 




Another example of a classic implicit learning experiment is sequence learning. 
Participants are presented with a sequence of stimuli on screen that follows a 
structured pattern, for example a dot appearing at different locations within a matrix. 
After a learning phase, participants are presented with bits of the sequence and are 
asked to predict the position of the next stimulus, a task they can perform better than 
at chance levels without being able to explicitly report the structure of the sequence 
(Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998).  
The knowledge being acquired in a conditioning paradigm is that of the contingency 
between the CS and the reward or outcome.  If this can be shown to have been 
acquired without the participant being aware of possessing that knowledge, then 
implicit learning can be said to have occurred.  The implicit nature of this knowledge is 
demonstrated if participants develop preferential responses toward CS, in the form of 
hedonic, attentional or physiological reactivity (see previous section), but are unable to 
consciously predict the reward or outcome.  
1.5.2 Evaluative Conditioning 
In the context of conditioning paradigms, the clearest examples of implicit learning 
have been found within evaluative conditioning.  
Evaluative Conditioning (EC) paradigms are based on the principle that value transfers 
between stimuli presented concurrently (Levey & Martin, 1975). For example, if the 
picture of an abstract shape is presented at the same time as a very pleasant painting, 




awareness) knowledge that a certain stimulus is followed by a pleasant (or unpleasant) 
picture is acquired. 
EC has long been seen as different from PC tasks for a variety of reasons (De Houwer, 
Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). One of the main distinctions is the alleged ability of EC to 
occur in the absence of contingency awareness, that is, for participants to be unable to 
consciously recall the association between pictures as a source of learning (Baeyens, 
Eelen, & Bergh, 1990; De Houwer et al., 2001;  Field, 2000; Hutter, Sweldens, Stahl, 
Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012).  
The tasks employed to measure EC transfer are, among others, IAT (Mitchell et al., 
2003) or pleasantness measurements, which have however been shown to be 
dependent on CA (Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007). Indeed, multiple 
sources of evidence suggest that CA modulates the development of valence transfer 
(De Houwer, 2014; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010) and 
that subliminal priming tasks are not effective at generating EC effects (Högden, 
Hütter, & Unkelbach, 2018; Stahl, Haaf, & Corneille, 2016). It seems therefore that the 
role of CA in EC is still to be clarified and would benefit from a methodological 
improvement.  
Interestingly, the impact of EC effects on implicit and explicit attitudes (De Houwer, 
2014) can have implications for the generation of novel treatments in drug-addiction, 




1.5.3 Pavlovian Conditioning 
1.5.3.1 Against the existence of implicit Pavlovian Conditioning 
A similar debate to the one regarding implicit EC has arisen in PC. Here evidence seems 
to even more strongly support an inability of CS to generate responses in the absence 
of expectancy awareness (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002); even within my own team 
(Hogarth, Dickinson, & Duka, 2005; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Bamborough, et al., 
2006; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers, et al., 2006). 
Lovibond and Shanks (2002) reviewed the existing literature at the time on implicit PC 
and EC, covering subliminal, aversive and autonomous conditioning. They carefully 
rejected most of the evidence in favour of implicit PC, mostly based on the inadequacy 
of CA measurements.  
For example, CA in PC has been assessed using a variety of techniques, such as post-
conditioning assessments, that is, at the end of the conditioning task. Those 
measurements can either be performed using free reports (i.e. asking participants at 
the end of the task to recall the rule or structure underlying the task) or with forced 
choice recognition tasks (e.g. asking them to indicate whether a monetary win or loss 
did follow a series of stimuli).  
Dienes & Berry (1997) already criticized free reports as a measure of explicit 
knowledge due to their unreliability. For example, a subject unable to freely recall an 
element at a given time might be able to do so if given another opportunity (Erdelyi & 
Becker, 1974). Free report may also entail the recollection of large amounts of 




Thus, CA should be assessed with measures sensitive and informative to the task in 
hand, such as cued reports or forced choice tests (Shanks & St John, 1994). Lovibond 
and Shanks (2002) also indicated that successful measures of CA must be based on 
online accounts of US predictability. That is, as post-conditioning or retrospective 
measures of CA appear to be unreliable, participants should be asked during stimulus 
presentation if they can predict the occurrence of US. Finally, those measures should 
be based, when possible, on continuous rating scales rather than forced choice 
dichotomous questions.  
Hogarth et al. (2006) introduced the use of continuous Likert scales to measure CA 
during an appetitive learning task. Most research in the field of implicit learning 
considers the absence of significant structural recollection or visual detection as 
evidence of a lack of conscious awareness. Accordingly, in the above example a 
participant would be deemed Unaware of contingencies if they fail to assign 
significantly higher ratings in the Likert scale for stimuli predicting reward than for 
those not predicting reward. 
However, determining the implicit nature of a phenomenon requires accepting the null 
hypothesis that no knowledge has been developed, and orthodox statistics do not 
provide a means to determine whether results below common significance thresholds 
can be informative against the posited theory or are just insensitive. This can have 
severe implications for the overrepresentation of implicit processes (Shanks, 2016), 




For that reason, it is necessary  to implement Bayesian approaches to clarify the 
unconscious nature of a cognitive process (Dienes, 2015). Bayesian statistics provide a 
tool for examining the sensitivity of non-significant results (Dienes, 2014), it is possible 
therefore to confidently categorise a subject as Unaware of contingencies if the results 
from the Bayesian analysis are sensitively null. Otherwise results are non-sensitive, and 
it is not possible to determine the state of the subject.  
1.5.3.2 Evidence for the existence of Implicit Pavlovian Conditioning 
One of the earliest evaluations of implicit Pavlovian aversive conditioning effects was 
reported by Perruchet (1985). In that experiment, a tone was presented on each trial, 
paired either with an air puff directed to the subject’s eye (S+) or with no outcome (S-) 
on random runs of trials. As a result, participants developed an eye-blink CResp 
(closing their eyes in the presence of a tone). Interestingly, explicit air puff 
expectancies were dissociated from eye-blink CResp. During runs in which a puff was 
delivered after the tone, participants’ expectancy ratings decreased, reflecting an 
anticipation of trial switching towards non-paired tones. These changes in 
expectancies were however accompanied by an increase in eye-blink CResp. The 
opposite response pattern occurred for S- trials, demonstrating that CResp can occur 
in the absence of congruent outcome-contingency expectancies.  
Recently, several instances of appetitive PC in the absence of CA have been published. 
Using a subliminal conditioning task, results supporting implicit PC were reported 
(Bourgeois, Neveu, & Vuilleumier, 2016). Importantly, this task incorporated both 




negative, and results show participants developed selective attention towards 
implicitly rewarded CS.  
However, the experiments presented in this thesis are based on paradigms in which 
stimuli are supraliminally presented, that is, fully accessible to conscious visual 
observation in contrast to subliminally presented stimuli. The generation of 
unconscious processes relies therefore on dual-task distractions and on probabilistic 
manipulations. Anderson and colleagues (2011) used a dual-task paradigm in which 
they presented an array of stimuli composed of differently coloured circles containing 
a line. Participants’ task was to indicate the direction of the line contained within a 
specific target circle. Upon correct detection of the line’s orientation, a particular 
coloured target would predict higher chances of obtaining a reward than others. In a 
test phase, a similar matrix appeared, but this time the task was to detect the 
orientation of the line within a solitary square surrounded by distracting circles. By 
including on 50% of the test trials the previously rewarded target as a task-irrelevant 
distractor, it was found that reward CS can generate value driven attentional 
responses. 
Using a similar paradigm, Anderson found that participants unable to report the 
contingencies still showed signs of appetitive learning indexed by attentional 
interference effects (Anderson, 2015b), although the measurement of CA was based 
on a six-alternative post-conditioning recall, and hence not following the guidelines 




Jeffs and Duka (2017) showed how monetarily rewarded CS in the absence of CA were 
able to generate subjective hedonic responses, albeit the hedonic value generated by 
implicit conditioning was not sufficient to trigger behavioural effects, congruent with 
previous research (Hogarth et al., 2007). However, to our knowledge, neither this 
experiment nor others have evaluated both Type I and Type II knowledge of outcome 
expectancies (explained below) using methodologies outlined in the previous sections. 
The inclusion of such measurements could provide new insights into the 
understanding of implicit PC. 
Finally, using a task irrelevant reward conditioning task, in which pictures of houses or 
buildings  were associated with different probabilities of monetary outcome, 
Yokoyama et al. (2015) found that those CS generated attentional preference on an 
Emotional Attentional Blink task. However, they did not measure CA, preventing an 
examination of the implicit correlates of their findings.  
1.5.4 Signal Detection Theory and metacognition 
Importantly, in the context of implicit processing, the differentiation between 
objective and subjective evaluations is central to the characterisation of learning 
effects, allowing one to determine the presence of metacognitive knowledge, the 
awareness of one’s own mental states (Metcalfe, 1996). Cheesman and Merikle (1984) 
studied the detection of subliminal stimulus presentations and found that participants 
were able to determine whether a stimulus had been presented or not, although they 
were not confidently able to report their detection accuracy. Therefore, a lack of meta-




level, but has no confidence or lacks the ability to discriminate the likely accuracy of 
their different responses. The absence of a correlation between the accuracy of 
individual responses and confidence in those responses indicates a lack of 
metacognitive awareness (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995).  
In the case of outcome-expectancy measures in a conditioning task, objective 
measures determine the ability to predict a reward, e.g. using Likert scales (“How likely 
is X event to occur from 1 to 5”) or dichotomous accounts (“Will X event occur: 
Yes/No”).  
Out of dichotomous measures of expectancy it is possible to extract Type I d’ scores 
using Signal Detection Theory (SDT) analyses (Green & Swets, 1966; Stanislaw & 
Todorov, 1999). In traditional terms, Type I d’ scores provide a measure of sensitivity in 
discriminating a stimulus (indicating it is present when it is actually present – a Hit– or 
that it is absent when in truth it is absent – a Correct Rejection) accounting for 
response biases, i.e. the tendency for a participant to indicate they have seen a 
stimulus or not, regardless of whether it is actually present. The measure is derived 
from a comparison of Hit rates, the probability of being accurate in the presence of a 
stimulus, and False Alarm rates, the probability of reporting the presence of a stimulus 
in its absence. Type I d’ is simply the z-score of the Hit rate minus the z-score of the 
False Alarm rate.  
SDT has also been applied to the study of metacognitive knowledge. Using 
dichotomous confidence responses, Type II d’ scores can be computed to determine 




Seth, 2013). In the case of Type II d’ scores, a Hit is considered as a correct response 
(Type I Hit or Correct Rejection) accompanied by a high confidence rating, whereas a 
False Alarm is a Type I incorrect response rated as high confident. Higher Type II d’ 
scores signal therefore an appropriate relationship between accuracy and confidence, 
denoting conscious awareness of their ability to make accurate discriminations. 
In instances where a continuous variable, rather than a dichotomous variable, is used 
to determine confidence in a response, an Area Under the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curve can provide a measure of metacognitive knowledge. This 
analysis offers an estimate of the relationship between a state variable (e.g. accuracy, 
measured via binary response) and a continuous one (confidence, measured via visual 
analogue or Likert scales). For each detection threshold, Type II Hit vs. False Alarm 
rates are computed, generating an area under the curve which shows the extent to 
which accuracy matches confidence.  
Analyses of metacognition based on Type II SDT offer a measure of metacognition 
independent of confidence biases, that is, the propensity to respond with high or low 
confidence. However, these analyses can be affected by Type I accuracy scores in the 
case of extreme decision thresholds for confidence and accuracy (Barrett et al., 2013), 
and when possible, other measures of metacognition, such as the meta d’ (Fleming & 




1.6 Interoception and the generation of Conditioned responses 
1.6.1 Interoception and emotion 
Interoception is defined as the ability to perceive or detect internal bodily sensations 
(Cameron, 2001; Sherrington, 1948). Interoception not only corresponds to the sensing 
or integrating of physiological bodily states, but also has ties to the motivational needs 
of the subject (Craig, 2009). These processes derive either from basic allostatic and 
homeostatic information (e.g. thirst), from bodily responses (e.g. skin reactivity), or 
from the influence of pleasant or unpleasant external stimuli (e.g. skin touch) (Tsakiris 
& Critchley, 2016). 
Visceral, thermoregulatory and inflammatory signals conform the basis of 
interoceptive signals and are integrated in the insular and orbitofrontal cortices via 
spinothalomocortical pathways (Craig, 2002), constituting the neural hubs in which 
interoceptive information is processed (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 
2004). 
 Early theories of emotion posited that emotional experiences are derived from the 
detection of physiological states induced by stimuli (James, 1884), and as such, arousal 
states can modulate or participate in the development of feelings (Garfinkel & 
Critchley, 2013a; Wiens, 2005). The relationship between interoception and emotional 
processes has been demonstrated using a variety of techniques (Critchley & Garfinkel, 
2017). For example, participants with high interoceptive abilities reported increased 
reactivity towards emotionally laden videos than those with low interoceptive abilities 




development of physiological responses (heart-rate reactivity) and subjective hedonic 
ratings towards emotional stimuli (Pollatos, Herbert, Matthias, & Schandry, 2007), 
impacting recall accuracy on emotional learning tasks (Pfeifer et al., 2017; Pollatos & 
Schandry, 2008). Using an emotional attentional blink, Garfinkel et al. (2014) found 
that the presentation of emotional probes at cardiac systole (marking the ejection of 
blood into arteries and the signalling of cardiac functioning by baroreflexors) facilitates 
the detection of fearful faces. This exemplifies how interoceptive signals amplify the 
emotional salience of stimuli, increasing emotional experience. Finally, from a neuro-
anatomical point of view, it has been shown that interoceptive and emotional 
responses both share common neural substrates in the insula (Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 
2012). As explained later on, the interoceptive correlates of emotional processing can 
be linked to the development of learnt responses, providing an explanation for the 
apparent link between interoception and addiction.  
A series of tasks are employed to measure sensitivity to bodily functions, usually 
focusing on the detection of cardiac responsiveness (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & 
Critchley, 2015). One of these procedures, known as heartbeat tracking or counting 
task (Schandry, 1981) consists of requesting participants to report the number of 
heartbeats they have perceived in different periods of time. The heartbeat 
discrimination task (Katkin, Blascovich, & Goldband, 1981; Whitehead, Drescher, 
Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977) on the other hand requires participants to indicate 
whether a tone is presented in synchrony or not with their own heartbeat.  
These two tasks provide measures of interoceptive accuracy, which can be 




interoceptive sensibility. These two indexes can then be used to compute Type II 
measures of meta-cognitive interoceptive awareness, also known as interoceptive 
insight (Khalsa et al., 2017). 
1.6.2 Interoception, addiction and reward learning 
Much importantly for the field of addiction, interoceptive processes have been found 
to be related with several aspects of substance use disorders (Paulus & Stewart, 2014; 
Verdejo-Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012). Besides lesion studies (Naqvi, Rudrauf, Damasio, 
& Bechara, 2007) showing that insula damage can provoke smoking cessation in 
tobacco addicts, interoceptive processes can also explain the development or 
transition to addictive disorders (Stewart, May, Tapert, & Paulus, 2015). Alcoholics on 
the other hand can show decreases in interoceptive sensibility (Ateş Çöl, Sönmez, & 
Vardar, 2016).  
Particularly linked to reward learning theories of addiction is the evidence for the 
involvement of interoceptive signalling in the development of reward prediction 
(Paulus & Stewart, 2014) and hedonic responses towards incentive stimuli through 
heightened perception of their salience (Paulus, 2007). In that regard, activity of 
certain insular areas correlates with the detection of reward probabilities (Burke & 
Tobler, 2011) and reward learning (Cousijn et al., 2013). Interoceptive abilities also 
seem to correlate with avoidance of loss in a monetary learning task involving risky 
decision making (Sokol-Hessner, Hartley, Hamilton, & Phelps, 2015). The amplification 
of aversive physiological responses generated by reward losses (Sokol-Hessner et al., 




responses in uncertain conditions. In addition, Kandasamy et al. (2016) showed how 
interoceptive abilities explain the performance of traders in London floor, further 
linking reward prediction with the perception of “gut feelings”. Regarding aversive 
conditioning, insular thickness seems to participate in the development of fear 
responses (Hartley, Fischl, & Phelps, 2011); and using a subliminal conditioning task it 
was shown that participants with high interoceptive abilities better learnt aversive 
stimulus-outcome contingencies (Katkin, Wiens, & Ohman, 2001).  
This experimental evidence shows the link between interoception and reward 
prediction or the development of CA. In conjunction with the amplification of 
emotional experiences, the representation of physiological reactions generated by 
rewards (or negative events) in interoceptive hubs could shape the formation of 
conditioned responses. This could occur through several mechanisms, influenced 
primarily by interoceptive abilities (Naqvi & Bechara, 2010). 
For example, the involvement of interoception in emotional experience supports the 
alliesthetic perspective of addiction (Paulus, Tapert, & Schulteis, 2009). According to 
this view, the value of stimuli depends on the subject’s internal states, and 
interoceptive abilities can mediate and amplify the perception of those states. Higher 
ability to perceive internal bodily sensations would facilitate the perception of bowel 
movements, such as emptiness in the stomach. This would promote the generation of 
increased feelings of hunger, which according to alliesthetic theories would determine 
the perceived hedonic value of food, following the views outlined earlier on regarding 
incentive learning (Bindra, 1978; Toates, 1986). Increased perception of the hedonic 
values of stimuli would intensify their incentive salience and therefore foster 




The generation of craving states on the other hand can be understood as a response to 
the appraisal of physiological responses generated by reward conditioned stimuli, 
which activate the mental representations of the stimulus-outcome relationships (Gray 
& Critchley, 2007). 
1.7 Aims of the current thesis 
The literature reviewed shows the growing relevance of implicit processes in addictive 
behaviours. Progressively drawing form early conditioning models to more complex 
expectancy accounts of reward learning, several theories of addiction have mirrored 
advances in the field of PC. Therefore, novel research in the field of implicit reward 
learning could promote innovative perspectives in the field of addiction, particularly in 
the study of automatic correlates.  
On one hand, expectancy theories of addiction suggest that CA is necessary for the 
development of approach behaviours (Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Elbers, et al., 2006), 
following the lack of evidence for implicit PC effects (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Pleyers 
et al., 2007). Although not denying a partial role of implicit components in addiction 
(Hogarth & Duka, 2006), these theories somehow clash with dual process theories that 
assign a high relevance to unconscious cognitions, particularly in the development of 
drug-approach behaviours (Belin et al., 2013; Wiers & Stacy, 2006). Wiers and Stacy 
propose that drug related stimuli can generate approach behaviours in an automatic 
way. However, the role of outcome expectancies in this model has not yet been 
clarified. Studies on automatic processes related with addiction usually employ stimuli 




bottle). In that case, the signalling of drug availability is clear and explicit, and previous 
consumption experiences can affect responses towards them (Wiers et al., 2002). 
In order to tackle that problem, conditioning neutral stimuli with primary or secondary 
reinforcers can provide a window to the generation of truly implicit processes. The lack 
of solid evidence towards implicit accounts of PC (Dedonder, Corneille, Bertinchamps, 
& Yzerbyt, 2013; Le Pelley, Seabrooke, Kennedy, Pearson, & Most, 2017; Lovibond & 
Shanks, 2002; Pleyers et al., 2007) requires a deeper examination of the techniques 
used to detect subjective and objective correlates of learning, and where possible their 
improvement.  
As explained before, providing useful and solid evidence towards the existence of 
implicit processes requires a careful measurement of learning effects (Dienes, 2015; 
Shanks, 2016). In the experiments presented next an effort is made to follow the 
guidelines pointed out by previous authors (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002) in order to limit 
the existence of false negatives (wrongly assuming a participant has no conscious 
knowledge) leading to the overrepresentation of implicit states. 
Previous measurements of learning effects might not have been the most sensitive in 
order to detect implicit processes (Tibboel et al., 2011). IAT for instance can be 
affected by the conscious representation of stimuli (Jan De Houwer, 2006; Houben & 
Wiers, 2006). Moreover, subjective measures of hedonic valence rely on the explicit 
report of pleasantness to assess the existence of an implicit content which might not 
be readily accessible in subjective terms. The following experiments will attempt 




allow the study of implicit PC. Accurate measures of metacognition in learning can 
provide a novel and more complete approach in the study of PC and the role of 
expectancies in reward learning. 
Finally, interoception in its role as a mediator of learning processes, reward prediction 
and hedonic responses, appears to be an important factor in the study of reward 
conditioning and in the integration of physiological responses towards CS and US in 
behavioural outputs. By clarifying the role of interoception in conditioning learning we 
might partly explain also its involvement in drug addiction (Paulus & Stewart, 2014; 
Paulus et al., 2009).  
The following experiments will focus on the study of PC with the subsequent aims: 
1. Providing evidence for the existence of implicit appetitive PC using attentional 
tasks to evaluate conditioned responses, and cognitive interference paradigms 
to assess the interplay between explicit and implicit cognitive control systems 
in reward approach behaviours.  
2. Improving the measurements of CA in PC, contemplating previous 
methodological issues and implementing Bayesian analyses for the 
determination of unconscious knowledge. 
3. Investigating the interoceptive correlates of appetitive PC, both in the 
development of reward prediction and hedonic responses. 
4. Examining the relationship between interoceptive awareness and the 
perception of acute substance (i.e. alcohol) effects.  
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2 Attentional responses to stimuli associated with a reward can occur in the 




Classical conditioning theories of addiction suggest that stimuli associated with 
rewards acquire incentive salience, inducing emotional and attentional conditioned 
responses. It is not clear whether those responses occur without contingency 
awareness (CA), i.e. are based on explicit or implicit learning processes. Examining 
implicit aspects of stimulus-reward associations can improve our understanding of 
addictive behaviours, supporting treatment and prevention strategies. However, the 
acquisition of conditioned responses without CA has yet to be rigorously 
demonstrated, as the existing literature shows a lack of methodological agreement 
regarding the measurement of implicit and explicit processes. 
The purpose of two experiments presented here was to study the emotional value 
acquired by CS through implicit emotional and attentional processes, trying to 
overcome critical methodological issues. 
Experiment 1 (n = 48) paired two stimuli categories (houses/buildings) with high (HR) 
or low (LR) probabilities of monetary reward. An Emotional Attentional Blink revealed 
preferential attention for HR over LR regardless of CA; while pleasantness ratings were 




Experiment 2 (n = 60) replicated the effect of conditioning on the Emotional 
Attentional Blink utilising abstract CS (octagons/squares). In addition, increased 
pleasantness for HR over LR was found significant overall, and marginally significant for 
Aware but not for Unaware participants. Here CA was rigorously determined using a 
signal-detection analysis and metacognitive-awareness measurements. Bayesian 
analyses verified the unconscious nature of the learning. 
These findings demonstrate that attentional conditioned responses can occur without 
CA and advance our understanding of the mechanisms by which implicit conditioning 
can occur and becomes observable. Furthermore, these results can highlight how 
addictive behaviours might develop.  
2.2 Introduction 
Processes related to Classical conditioning have been proven to determine the 
development of addictive behaviours. Stimuli conditioned (CS) with addictive drugs 
acquire hedonic and reinforcing properties associated with the substance [1,2], 
ultimately driving and maintaining drug-seeking behaviours. As part of this process, 
drug-related cues generate preferential attention and emotional ratings in heavy 
drinkers of alcohol, cocaine addicts [3] and smokers [4,5]. Most of the conditioned 
responses occur with subjects’ awareness [6], as substance expectancy generated by 
drug-paired stimuli is responsible for attentional, instrumental and hedonic 
conditioned responses [7]. 
However, conditioned responses may also occur without subjects’ awareness, and 




The study of implicit processes within addiction has gained increasing relevance, as 
pointed by Wiers and Stacy [8], leading to dual process theories of addiction. Dual 
process theories of addiction conceptualize addictive behaviours as the combination of 
automatic appetitive appraisals generated by associations [9] in opposition to 
regulatory executive signals based on propositional knowledge [10]. However, the 
model presented by Wiers and Stacy does not specify the nature (implicit and/or 
explicit) of the associations generating automatic responses, obviating the role implicit 
learning may have in the development of automatic responses towards drug related 
stimuli. 
Determining the extent to which implicitly generated associations can induce 
conditioned responses without awareness could provide a better understanding of 
addictive behaviours. 
Implicit processes in addiction are most commonly studied via attentional bias 
measurements, memory associations or action tendencies [8] using naturalistic stimuli, 
materials conceptually related to a substance. The use of naturalistic stimuli we think 
is a limitation, as the explicit conceptual representation of the substance is necessarily 
bounded to drug-related stimuli, compromising the dissociation between implicit and 
explicit processes even in automatic detection tasks. 
Neutral cues paired with alcoholic drinks or tobacco can also generate attentional and 
autonomous reactions through classical conditioning [11,12]. Furthermore, stimuli 
associated with non-drug rewards can also be conditioned to generate incentive 




this case are originally devoid of any motivational attributes, conditioning paradigms 
can provide an opportunity to investigate the development of implicit (as well as 
explicit) processes through learned associations between such stimuli and rewards in 
the laboratory. 
Within the Evaluative Conditioning (EC) paradigm, the modification or generation of 
emotional responses towards cues paired with positively or negatively valenced stimuli 
[14], has led to confronting viewpoints about the necessity of learning to be conscious 
in order to elicit measurable responses. A meta-analysis [15] showed that pleasantness 
can occur without Contingency Awareness (CA), that is, without conscious knowledge, 
i.e. knowledge that the neutral CS had been associated with a highly emotional 
stimulus. However, opposing views are still prevalent [16,17]. Whether conditioning 
can occur without CA has generated a discussion regarding the methods most 
appropriate to measure implicit [18], or explicit knowledge about contingencies [19]. 
Furthermore, implicit learning in Pavlovian conditioning tasks is most commonly 
demonstrated using direct self-report measurements of liking [20,21]. This type of 
assessment is based on Likert or Visual Analog scales in which participants evaluate the 
pleasantness of a stimulus. De Houwer [22] however, has advocated for the need to 
study emotional reactions in the context of Implicit learning through indirect measures 
of automatic behaviour. 
Attentional processes are strongly affected by the emotional salience of stimuli (see 
Ref. [23] for a review), and attentional correlates of conditioned stimuli have been 




attentional orientation to stimuli associated with a monetary reward versus non-
reward using eye tracking [7], whereas Anderson, Laurent and Yantis [24] showed that 
stimuli paired with high-reward (HR) versus low reward (LR) probabilities were more 
distracting on a visual search task. Automatic attention allocation towards CS has also 
been demonstrated using rapid serial visual presentation tasks (RSVP). In this kind of 
task, also known as Attentional Blink [25], a stream of pictures is presented, and 
participants have to detect a target embedded within the stream. Before the target, a 
distractor is also presented, affecting the accuracy on detection of the target. 
Emotional Attentional Blink (EAB) tasks [26] employ emotional stimuli as distractors 
during the RSVP. 
Conditioned stimuli have been used during RSVP tasks both as distractors during an 
aversive conditioning task [27], and as targets during a task irrelevant Pavlovian 
conditioning procedure [28], providing evidence towards the ability of CS to capture 
attention. However, no measures of CA (see below) were included in this task. Thus, it 
cannot be excluded that the ability of the CS to guide attention is based on explicit 
knowledge about stimulus-outcome contingencies, a matter that will be addressed in 
this paper. 
Measurements of CA in PC are often based on post-hoc ratings, i.e. asking participants 
how stimuli and outcomes were related to each other during learning. Lovibond and 
Shanks [19], proposed as the most valid measures of CA to ask participants on a trial 
by trial basis to anticipate the outcome using Likert or Visual Analogue Scales in the 
presence of CS. Several studies have considered such criteria for measures of 




occur in the absence of CA. Others have appealed to retrospective measurements 
when measuring CA [30]. These differences in terms of CA measurement could in turn 
explain the inconsistencies found in experimental literature related to Implicit 
Conditioning [16]. 
Prior literature in the field of Implicit learning has primarily focused on artificial 
grammar-learning tasks [31,32] and sequence learning [33], but few studies have used 
self-reports in conditioning experiments [34,35]. In these latter studies, however, no 
implicit conditioned responses were found. 
Measures of CA and Implicit learning as previously described respond to the criteria 
set out by classical implicit learning theories [32] in which objective measurements (i.e. 
accuracy on a detection task) are combined with subjective evaluations (i.e. ability to 
report a rule). However, a third layer of measurement can be implemented, testing 
whether participants have developed Metacognitive awareness about their knowledge 
of the set of rules underlying the procedure, that is, whether they can explicitly report 
those rules [36,37]. 
To our knowledge, there are no studies which have successfully incorporated the 
criteria set out by Dienes and Perner [36] for a distinction of explicit from implicit 
knowledge using Metacognitive measures (e.g. [38,39]) within a Pavlovian conditioning 
task. 
The purpose of this paper was to examine if stimuli conditioned to a reward outcome 
would implicitly generate attentional and/or emotional conditioned responses. A task 




CA. An EAB studied the ability of CS to overcome the effect of emotional distractors, 
therefore assessing their ability to generate preferential attention. In this kind of task, 
aversive distractors decrease the accuracy on detection of targets compared to neutral 
distractors. We hypothesize that detection of LR stimuli will decrease when distractors 
are aversive compared to when they are neutral, an effect that should be weaker for 
HR stimuli. This would show HR stimuli develop preferential attention as they are able 
to overcome the effect of negative distractors. 
A novel approach for conditioning learning was employed in Experiment 2 following 
methods originating from the Implicit Learning literature [40], to classify participants in 
different groups according to their awareness level. Three levels of CA were 
hypothesized: complete Unawareness of Contingencies; Partial Awareness, being able 
to predict the nature of an outcome without explicit knowledge about it; and 
Metacognitive Awareness, in which explicit knowledge about the contingencies is 
developed. 
2.3 Experiment 1  
2.3.1 Aims  
The aim of this first experiment was to examine the occurrence of implicitly 
conditioned responses. Particularly, we assessed whether awareness about 
contingencies between CS and its outcome is necessary to develop preferential 
attention towards stimuli predicting higher chances of reward. Another focus of the 
experiment was to investigate whether this preferential attention occurs together with 




2.3.2 Methods  
2.3.2.1 Participants  
Forty-Eight University of Sussex students (28 females), mean age 22.7 years, were 
recruited via an online participant database and compensated for their time financially 
or with course credit. Participants gave written consent before beginning the study, 
with ethical approval being granted by the University of Sussex Life Sciences ethics 
committee. Inclusion criteria were that they were in a state of  
good health, whereas exclusion criteria were that they were currently taking 
prescription medication (excluding the contraceptive pill) or reported having been 
diagnosed with a mental illness.  
2.3.2.2 Apparatus and stimuli  
During the conditioning phase, pictures depicting Buildings or Houses (36 of each 
category) were used as CSs throughout the experiment. Pictures were selected to be 
neutral with regard to pleasantness ratings of a pool of 50 House and 50 Building 
pictures before the experiment. An independent sample (n = 16) rated the 
pleasantness of the pictures via Likert scales (from 1 to 9). From each category, 14 
pictures with the highest deviation in pleasantness ratings from the mean were 
excluded to generate a definitive final list of 72 stimuli as neutral as possible. No 
significant differences in Pleasantness between Houses (5.14, SD = .86) and Buildings 
(5.14, SD = .56), were found p > .538. Pleasantness towards the selected Houses and 




confirm stimuli similarity. No significant differences were found between Houses (5.01, 
SD = .89) and Buildings (4.83, SD = .97) regarding pleasantness, p > .3.  
During the Emotional Attentional Blink stimuli were used as targets among a series of 
picture fillers, composed by 4 × 5 matrices of Houses and Buildings (see Fig. 2 for an 
example). Distractors, aversive and neutral pictures, were obtained from the IAPS 
picture data base [41] with additional matched aversive pictures from the internet.  
Stimuli were presented on a Dell ACPI 64-bit PC, screen refresh rate = 16.6 ms. 
Procedures were performed using E-prime 2. Data analysis was performed using SPSS 
and Matlab.  
During the conditioning phase 10, 20 and 50 p coins were used as tangible reinforcers 
at the end of each block.  
2.3.2.3 Procedure  
Participants following informed consent completed questionnaires regarding their 
demographics and drug use, the AUQ [42] and AUDIT [43] questionnaires measuring 
alcohol consumption, the BIS-11 impulsivity questionnaire [44], the BIS BAS 
questionnaire on approach-avoidance behaviours [45] and the PANAS mood 
questionnaire [46]. Participants also took an Interoception Assessment involving 
Heartbeat measurements [47], not described in this paper. Afterwards, they 
completed Conditioning, Emotional Attentional Blink and Pleasantness measurement 
tasks.  




2.3.2.4 Conditioning task  
A task irrelevant Conditioning procedure was used to pair stimuli belonging to one of 
the categories (Houses vs. Buildings) with high (80%) or low (20%) probabilities of 
obtaining 10p [28]. For half of the participants, High Reward probability (HR) stimuli 
consisted of Houses and Low Reward probability (LR) stimuli consisted of Buildings, 
and vice versa.  
CSs appeared on screen with an overlaid green or yellow square for 2000 ms or until a 
response was recorded (max recorded time 1499 ms). Participants were instructed to 
press a green or yellow key on the keyboard depending on the colour of the square. 
Participants were also informed that from time to time they would obtain money but 
were kept naïve about the nature of stimuli predicting reward or about the 
contingencies between stimuli and reward. As this conditioning procedure was task-
irrelevant, the stimulus category (House or Building) was the only factor predictive of 
reward. Feedback was on screen for 1500 ms indicating whether the participant had 
obtained 10 p or nothing on that particular trial.  
Following correct responses to the yellow or green key participants were asked to 
indicate on a Likert scale from 1 to 9 how likely they were to win 10 p whilst the 
stimulus remained on the screen (measurement of expectancy Awareness (EA)). 
Immediately after the response, they received feedback about the outcome of the trial 







Figure 1: Conditioning task. 	
Each trial consisted of the presentation of a House or a Building with an overlaid 
coloured square. For half of the participants, Buildings were associated with High 
reward (80% probability of wining 10p) and Houses with Low reward (20% probability). 
For the other half of the sample, probabilities were inverted across stimuli categories. 
Participants had to press a key depending on the colour of the square (Green/Yellow) in 
the middle of the picture. Stimuli appeared on screen for 2000 ms or until a response 
was given. After their response participants were informed whether they had won 10p 
or not on that trial. On 25% of the trials, right after their response, participants were 
asked to indicate from 1 = “not at all” to 9 “extremely” how likely they were to win 10p 
(measurement of Expectancy Awareness). Immediately after Expectancy Awareness 





Only in 25% of the Conditioning trials EA was measured as a means to avoid excessive 
priming towards contingency elaboration [19]; EA evaluation was pseudorandomized 
to occur every 3, 4 or 5 trials to prevent participants from establishing rules regarding 
its measurement. Trial order was pseudorandomized so the same kind of CS (HR/LR) or 
the same coloured square could not appear more than 4 times in a row.  
In total 5 blocks of 72 trials were presented. At the end of each block the total amount 
earnt appeared on screen and participants had to grab the equivalent amount in coins 
and transfer it from a Bank box to their earnings box.  
2.3.2.5 Emotional Attentional Blink  
After the Conditioning task, participants took the Emotional Attentional Blink. The 
purpose of this task was to evaluate the ability of CS to overcome the influence of 
aversive distractors.  
Each trial consisted of a RSVP of 17 stimuli. Fillers composed of jittered matrices of 
Houses and Buildings appeared at the beginning of the trial. Aversive or neutral 
distractors appeared on the 4th, 6th or 8th position of the series, followed by another 
filler and the presentation of the target, a HR or LR CS. Such a short lag between 
distractor and target was used as a means to increase the interference of distractors 
[48]. Finally, more fillers were presented to complete the stream of 17 images.  
Participants were notified they would not be able to obtain money any longer and 
instructed to detect the presence in the stream of a House or a Building. At the end of 





The task started with a practice block of 12 trials in which each stimulus appeared on 
screen for 100 ms and feedback about accuracy was presented after each response.  
The main task consisted of 3 blocks of 48 trials. Presentation time of each stimulus was 
83 ms for participants with accuracy on detection above 75% on the practice block, 
and 100 ms for those less accurate (Fig. 2).  
The amount of trials displaying aversive or neutral distractors was equally distributed 
among target type and no feedback was displayed during the task.  
 
 
Figure 2: Emotional Attentional Blink. 	
Seventeen stimuli were presented in each trial on a RSVP stream for 83–100 ms each. 
The stimuli presented were a series of Fillers composed by jittered pictures of Houses 




the series. After the distractor, a Filler was presented followed by a target consisting of 
a House or a Building. Finally, more fillers appeared to complete the 17 stimuli 
sequence. Participants’ task was to indicate the detection of a House or a Building by 
pressing one of two keys at the end of the trial.  
 
2.3.2.6 Pleasantness measurement  
At the end of the experiment CS pleasantness was measured via Likert scale. Eighteen 
House pictures and 18 Building pictures from the stimuli presented during conditioning 
appeared in random sequence on screen and participants had to indicate from 1 to 9 
how pleasant each of them was. Each of the pictures remained on screen until 
response.  
2.3.3 Data analysis 
2.3.3.1 Expectancy evaluation.  
First, participants were categorized as Aware or Unaware of the contingencies 
associated with CS depending on their responses to the EA assessment. One sample t-
test comparisons were performed both for the 4th and 5th block of trials (9 ratings per 
stimulus per block). Participants were deemed to be Aware if their expectancy ratings 
were significantly above 5 for the HR and below 5 for the LR stimuli on one of these 
blocks of trials; 5 was the rating denoting “I don’t know”. On the basis of this approach 
only 4 participants were classified as aware. Therefore data only from the Unaware 
participants are presented. Data on pleasantness for Aware participants are presented 




2.3.3.2 Emotional Attentional Blink(EAB).  
Accuracy on detection of targets was the dependent variable for the EAB analysis; a 2-
way Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with CS target (HR vs LR) and 
distractor type (aversive vs. neutral) as within subject factors for Unaware participants. 
Planned post-hoc t-tests will examine the hypothesized detrimental effect of aversive 
distractors on detection of LR and HR targets. Differences between HR and LR targets 
under baseline condition (neutral distractors) were also explored using paired t-test. 
Descriptives for Aware participants are included in Appendix A.  
2.3.3.3  Pleasantness.  
Paired samples t-tests compared pleasantness ratings towards HR and LR stimuli for 
Unaware participants. Descriptives for Aware participants are included in Appendix A.  
2.3.3.4 Supplementary analyses.  
RT towards HR and LR stimuli during conditioning were log transformed in order to 
compare them. Paired samples t-tests were performed for Unaware participants, see 
Appendix A.  
2.3.4  Results  
2.3.4.1 Outcome expectancy measurements  
Out of 48 participants, only five met the two awareness criteria (Blocks 4&5, HR=5.19, 
SD=.78; LR=4.4, SD=1.24) and were classified as Aware. The rest, 43 participants, were 
considered Unaware of the contingencies associated with CS (Blocks 4&5, HR = 5.42, 




2.3.4.2 Emotional Attentional Blink  
There was a significant interaction between target and distractor type for Unaware 
participants, F(1,43) = 6.762, p = .013. Detection of LR stimuli was significantly lower 
when distractors were aversive compared with neutral, t(43) = 2.796, p = .008; this was 
not the case for HR stimuli. Only a marginal effect was found with higher detection for 
HR when distractors were negative compared to neutral, t (43) = 1.821, p = .076. There 
were no significant differences between HR and LR targets under neutral distractors, 
t(43) = 1.085 p = .284, Fig. 3.  
 
Figure 3: Accuracy of target detection (High reward or Low Reward) depending on 




Accuracy on target detection depending on reward associated and distractor type for 
Unaware participants. *Low reward targets under aversive distractors compared to 
neutral distractors, p < 0.01.  
2.3.4.3 Pleasantness measurement  
No significant differences between HR and LR stimuli in terms of pleasantness t(43) = 
.273, p = .786, were found for Unaware participants, see Fig. 4.  
 
Figure 4: Pleasantness ratings depending on stimulus type for contingency Unaware 
participants, Experiment 1. 	
Pleasantness ratings towards High reward and Low reward stimuli for Unaware 





In order to understand the inability of HR stimuli to generate preferential 
pleasantness, an exploratory analysis examined pleasantness development depending 
on stimulus category (Houses vs. Buildings) for Unaware participants. A paired samples 
t-test found that Houses were evaluated as more pleasant than Buildings when they 
were HR stimuli, t (20) = 2.687, p = .014, but also when they were associated with LR, t 
(22) = 2.915, p = .008, see Fig. 5. This might be due to an effect of the intrinsic value of 
CS, which may be higher for stimuli more related to comfort (Houses), than work and 
business (Buildings). No differences in pleasantness ratings were found between the 
two types of stimuli outside the conditioning procedure (see Section 2.2.2 Apparatus 






Figure 5: Pleasantness ratings per stimulus category for Unaware participants, 
Experiment 1. 	
Pleasantness towards High Reward and Low reward CS depending on the stimulus 
(houses or buildings) associated with High reward. (*) Low reward compared to High 
reward when Buildings were High reward, p < .02; * High reward compared to Low 
reward when Houses were High reward, p < .01. Houses were overall more pleasant 
than Buildings (main effect of stimulus type).  
 
2.3.4.4 Questionnaires  
There were no significant differences between the Contingency Aware and Unaware 
groups and questionnaire scores (see Table A.1 in Appendix A).  
2.3.5 Supplementary analyses  
No significant differences were found, see Appendix A.  
2.3.6 Discussion Experiment 1  
The present task irrelevant conditioning procedure induced expectancy awareness in 
only 5 out of 48 participants using probabilities of reward of 80% for HR and 20% for 
LR stimuli. As predicted, when measuring attentional preference towards HR CS 
compared to LR CS, HR stimuli were more resistant to the interference of aversive 
distractors than LR stimuli regardless of expectancy awareness. These results replicate 
those obtained by Yokoyama et al. [28], who did not, however, measure CA. These 




attention, thus providing evidence towards the ability of implicit processes to govern 
the development of conditioned responses.  
Concerning pleasantness, neither Aware nor Unaware participants developed 
preferential subjective pleasantness towards HR stimuli. One reason that Unaware 
participants failed to develop heightened pleasantness towards HR stimuli compared 
to LR might be the nature of the stimuli used during the conditioning task. Despite 
independent measures of pleasantness revealing no differences between Houses and 
Buildings, after the conditioning task Houses were evaluated as more pleasant than 
Buildings overall. It is possible that the intrinsic preference for Houses as a safe and 
comfortable space opposed to Buildings as workspace, in conjunction with the 
monetary conditioning procedure, overrode the development of contingency 
congruent hedonic responses in Unaware participants.  
Importantly the classification of Aware and Unaware participants did not take into 
account metacognitive awareness measures and the criteria used to separate Aware 
from Unaware participants may have been therefore not rigorous.  
In order to tackle these issues, Experiment 2 was designed to replicate Experiment 1 
using abstract geometric shapes devoid of any intrinsic positive meaning and 
confidence ratings of awareness were introduced to classify participants more 




2.4 Experiment 2  
2.4.1 Aims  
The second Experiment addressed some of the limitations of Experiment 1, aiming at 
strengthening evidence towards the existence of implicit emotional and attentional 
conditioned responses.  
By implementing abstract stimuli instead of Houses and Buildings, we tried to come up 
with a Conditioning procedure able to generate Pleasantness towards HR CS together 
with preferential attentional salience on participants Unaware of the contingencies.  
In addition, we aimed to improve our classification of participants to different degrees 
of awareness by incorporating confidence ratings on each EA measurement. With this 
addition we hoped participants could be classified in different levels of CA, from 
unawareness to Metacognitive Contingency Awareness, fulfilling criteria established in 
the Implicit learning literature [49]; Bayesian factors were introduced to determine the 
presence of unconscious processes [50].  
2.4.2 Methods  
2.4.2.1 Participants  
Sixty Sussex University Students (52 females, mean age=20.51, SD = 3.41) took part in 
the experiment. Participation conditions were identical to those of Experiment 1.  
2.4.2.2 Apparatus and stimuli  
Two types of abstract stimuli were used as CS in this experiment, Squares and 




of Octagons or Squares filled with parallel stripes. In order to generate different stimuli 
belonging to the same category (Squares or Octagons), 5 filling patterns were 
developed, differentiated in terms of stripe thickness. Then, each of the patterns was 
rotated multiple times, avoiding vertical and horizontal orientations as well as 
alignment with the edges of the figure contour [51]. This way, 36 Squares unique in 
terms of filling orientation and pattern and 36 matched Octagons were obtained. As 
this conditioning procedure was task-irrelevant, the stimulus category (Squares or 
Octagons) was the only factor predictive of reward.  
The EAB fillers consisted of geometrical figures combining the contour of a Square and 
an Octagon, filled with the same patterns as CS. During all the procedures, geometrical 
shapes were presented superimposed on neutral landscape pictures to match the 
visual characteristics of aversive and neutral distractors. For that purpose, 15 neutral 
pictures were selected from the internet to compose the background on each 
presentation. For examples of fillers and conditioning stimuli see Fig. 6. Distractors 
consisted of the aversive and neutral stimuli as used in Experiment 1. The rest of the 






Figure 6: Stimuli used in Experiment 2 
36 geometrical shapes representing an Octagon (A) and 36 representing a Square (B) 
were designed for this task, including different patterns as filler. 16 Geometrical shapes 
(C1 and C2) were designed as fillers for the Emotional Attentional Blink.  
 
2.4.2.3 Procedure  
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, except for the fact that Pleasantness 
measurements took place after the Conditioning task, and an extra measurement of 
Post-hoc EA was included at the end of the experiment.  
2.4.2.4 Conditioning task  
A task irrelevant conditioning was employed as in Experiment 1, with Squares and 




probability of obtaining 10p after a HR stimulus was raised to 90% and decreased to 
10% for LR.  
EA was measured via a dichotomous question (“Will you get money?” – Yes/No) on 
25% of the trials. After their response participants had to indicate how confident they 
were in their judgment using a 1–5 Likert scale, (1. “completely guessing”, 2. “more or 
less guessing”, 3. “fairly sure”, 4. “almost certain”, 5. “completely certain”). The two 
different types of measurement, dichotomous and Likert, were employed to reduce 
interference between the two responses. The rest of the procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 1.  
2.4.2.5 Pleasantness measurement and Emotional Attentional Blink  
The procedure was equivalent to the one used in Experiment 1, this time using the set 
of stimuli described above. Pleasantness was measured before the EAB.  
2.4.2.6 Post-hoc expectancy measurement  
Expectancy was measured again at the end of the experiment using a 1–9 Likert scale 
to compare dichotomous online expectancy measurements with post-hoc 
assessments. Eighteen CS for each category were presented and participants asked to 
indicate how likely they thought they were to earn money after each of them. With 
this confirmatory analysis we aimed at reducing regression to the mean effects due to 




2.4.3 Data analysis  
2.4.3.1 Bayesian analysis.  
A Bayesian analysis [53,54] allows determining the sensitivity of results obtained and 
extracting scientific conclusions out of non-significant results. A Bayes factor (B) below 
1/3 provides substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e. there is no difference 
between two means) and a B above 3 shows substantial evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis. Results between 1/3 and 3 indicate data are insensitive. These factors will 
be used throughout these analyses as the main source of CA categorization.  
2.4.3.2 Contingency awareness.  
Claiming that learning occurs implicitly requires accepting the null hypothesis that 
participants have not been able to perform above chance level on the task. Orthodox 
statistics based on p-values do not permit the validation of such claims [50]. Therefore, 
a Bayesian approach will be used to establish the existence of unconscious states [55].  
In this experiment CA categorization was performed using Signal Detection Theory 
(SDT) methods [37,56]. In order to compute participants’ accuracy taking into account 
response bias, log Type I d’ (d1’) scores for each participant were computed, using the 
number of individual Hits (H, answering Yes on a HR trial), Correct Rejections (CR, 
answering No on a LR trial), False Alarms (FA, answering Yes on a LR  
trial) and Misses (M, answering No on a HR trial) [57]. Only results from blocks 4 and 5 




In order to run a Bayesian analysis at an individual level for each participant, logistic 
d1’ using Odds ratio (OR) Eq. (1) and Standard Errors (SE) Eq. (2) [58] were computed 





Type II d’ (d2’) scores [59] allow determining metacognitive knowledge using accuracy 
and confidence responses for each participant. Each of the confidence ratings was 
converted from Likert scales (1–5), to a dichotomous variable (confident/not 
confident). Responses equal to or below 2 (“more or less guessing”), were considered 
to be “low confidence”, the rest of the responses were considered as “confident”.  
From a SDT point of view, for log d2’ scores [37,54] H, FA, CR and M are computed as 
follows: accurate responses on expectancy discrimination (Type I Hits or Correct 
rejections) accompanied by a confident response are considered as Hits. Incorrect 
responses (Type I False Alarms or Misses) with high confidence as False Alarms. 
Correct Rejections are incorrect responses rated with low confidence, and Misses are 
accurate responses rated with low confidence.  
Logistic d2’ and SE d2’ were obtained using the same method as previously described.  
A Bayes factor was then computed for each participant on their log d2’, modelling H1 
with a Uniform going from 0 to their own log d1’ as a maximum, given that d2’ rarely 




those with B < 1/ 3 as metacognitively Unaware, and the rest had an undetermined 
metacognitive state.  
The mean log d1's of metacognitively Aware participants was then used as the 
maximum for a Uniform to model H1 for testing each individuals d1's to determine 
their CA, [50]. The interpretation of individual Bs was then used to categorize them as 
contingency Aware, Unaware, or undetermined.  
2.4.3.3 Post-hoc contingency measurement  
Data extracted from Post-hoc contingency measurements was analysed, as in 
Experiment 1, performing independent samples t-tests on HR and LR stimuli compared 
to 5 (rating indicating “I don’t know”).  
2.4.3.4 Emotional Attentional Blink 
For Aware and Unaware participants, a 2-way Repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on accuracy to detect the targets, with CS targets (HR vs LR) and distractor 
type (aversive vs. neutral) as within factors. Sample sizes and variances differed 
between groups and therefore no between group comparisons were performed 
(Levene’s for HR neutral with distractors, F (1,41) = 7.013, p = .011, LR with negative 
distractors, F (1,41)=7.181, p=.011). We hypothesized the same results as in 
Experiment 1, the detection of LR targets would be affected by aversive distractors 
compared to neutral, and detection of HR would not be affected by distractor type. 
We also explored differences between HR and LR targets under baseline condition 





A paired samples t-test compared pleasantness towards HR and LR stimuli for Unaware 
and Aware participants separately. No between group comparisons were performed as 
sample sizes and variances were different between groups, Box M F (3,21531) = 7.071, 
p < .001.  
2.4.3.6 Supplementary analyses 
 RT towards HR and LR stimuli during conditioning were log transformed in order to 
compare them. Paired samples t-tests were performed for Unaware and Aware 
participants. Accuracy towards HR and LR stimuli was compared within Aware and 
Unaware participants as well as Type 2 d’ scores. Results are reported on Appendix B.  
2.4.4 Results  
2.4.4.1 Contingency awareness  
Using the Bayesian approach for metacognitive CA using log d2’ scores, 27 participants 
were deemed sensitively meta-Unaware, 30 didn’t show any sensitive results (3 < B > 
1/3), and 3 participants were categorized as metacognitively Aware. Using the mean 
log d1’ score of metacognitively Aware participants as prior (2.72) to establish CA, 28 
participants had a sensitive null on log d1’ and were effectively contingency Unaware, 
6 of them being metacognitively insensitive. Fifteen participants were deemed as 
contingency Aware, 3 of them belonging to the metacognitive Aware group, 1 of them 
to the metacognitively Unaware group, and 11 having insensitive log d2’ scores.  
Another 17 participants had an insensitive log d1’, their CA could not be established 




will be reported for contingency Aware and Unaware participants, avoiding 
differentiating them in terms of metacognitive knowledge due to the small sample size 
of meta-aware participants and the high number of insensitive ones.  
 
Table 1: 
Contingency table presenting the categorization of participants according to the results 
on their individual Bayes Factors for Type I outcome-Contingency Awareness and on 
Type II tests of Metacognitive Contingency Awareness. (x) participants deemed 
Contingency Aware via post-hoc categorization.  
2.4.4.2 Post-hoc contingency awareness  
Out of 60 participants, 12 were deemed Aware following the procedure on Experiment 
1, eleven of them being Contingency Aware according to Bayesian analyses and one 
having originally an insensitive B. Four participants did not pass the post-hoc 
categorization, implying that some forgetfulness might have occurred over time, but 
generally confirming that the two measurement methods are congruent (see Table 1).  
2.4.4.3 Pleasantness  
Results show that HR stimuli (mean=.55, SD=.17) were more pleasant than LR (mean = 




Aware and Unaware participants, a marginal increase in pleasantness towards HR 
stimuli compared to LR for Aware participants, t(14) = 1.830, p = .089 was found. The 
difference was even weaker for Unaware participants, t (27) = 1.545, p = .134, Fig. 7.  
 
 
Figure 7: Pleasantness ratings depending on stimulus type and contingency awareness, 
Experiment 2. 	
There were no significant differences between High reward and Low reward stimuli in 
either Aware or Unaware participants, ps > .08. However, a significant stimulus effect 





2.4.4.4 Emotional Attentional Blink  
For the Unaware group, there was a main effect of distractor type on accuracy, F(1,27) 
= 8.064, p = .008. No significant interaction between target and distractor type, F(1,27) 
= 1.87, p = .183, was found. However, due to the hypothesized effects and taking into 
account the results obtained on Experiment 1, we performed planned paired samples 
t-tests.  
In the Unaware group aversive distractors decreased detection of LR stimuli, t(27) = 
2.668, p = .013 compared to neutral distractors.  
Distractor type did not have any significant effect on detection of HR stimuli, t(27) = 
.−052, p > .9, see Fig. 8. There were no significant differences between HR and LR 
targets under neutral distractors, t (27) = −.729 p = .472.  
These results show again that stimuli conditioned with HR are less affected by the 
interference of aversive distractors than LR stimuli for Contingency Unaware 
participants.  
For Contingency Aware participants, there was again a main effect of distractor type, 
F(1,14) = 11.760, p = .004 but no significant interaction between stimulus and 
distractors, F(1,14)=2.484, p=.137. Here aversive distractors decreased detection of HR 
compared to neutral distractors, t(14) = 4.185, p = .001. There was no significant effect 
of distractor on LR target detection, t(14)=−.574, p=.575, see Fig. 8. There was finally a 
marginally significant difference between HR and LR targets under neutral distractors, 









Figure 8: Emotional Attentional Blink results for Unaware (A) and Aware (B) 
participants, Experiment 2. 	
Accuracy on target detection depending on reward associated and distractor type for 
Unaware participants. A: * Low reward targets under aversive distractors compared to 
neutral distractors, p < 0.025. B: * High reward targets under aversive distractors 
compared to neutral distractors, p < .001. There was a marginally significant difference 
between HR and LR targets under neutral distractors, p = .069.  
 
2.4.4.5  Questionnaires  
There were no corrected significant differences between Unaware and CA groups in 
the questionnaire scores (see Table B.1 in Appendix B).  
2.4.4.6 Supplementary analyses  
No significant differences were found, see Appendix B.  
2.4.5 Discussion Experiment 2  
Measures of metacognitive awareness incorporated in this experiment gave rise to 3 
distinct groups. As expected, participants were categorized as Unaware of the 
contingencies, as partially Aware, being able to predict the outcomes associated with 
CSs; and metacognitively Aware, having developed metacognitive knowledge about 
contingencies. Bayes factors were used to perform this classification, a vital step when 
determining the existence of unconscious processes. One of the limitations of this 
analysis is the fact that many participants showed insensitive results, and couldn’t 




Importantly, we replicated the results obtained on the EAB in Experiment 1. We failed 
at obtaining heightened emotional responses towards HR stimuli for Unaware and 
Aware participants separately. However, when considering all participants, HR stimuli 
were more pleasant than LR. This finding shows that abstract stimuli can acquire 
emotional salience with conditioning, and partly helped in overcoming the limitations 
of Experiment 1 in relation to the intrinsic nature of stimuli used.  
2.5 General Discussion 
Both experiments showed that expectancy awareness is not necessary to generate 
preferential attention towards CSs. During an EAB task, detection of stimuli associated 
with LR but not HR probabilities decreased in the presence of aversive emotional 
stimuli as distractors. That occurred both in Experiment 1 (all participants were 
unaware) and in Experiment 2 only in participants who were Unaware, and not in 
those who were Aware of the contingencies. Importantly in Experiment 2 awareness 
criteria were more rigorous. The ability of HR stimuli to overcome the interference of 
aversive distractors as opposed to LR stimuli is a proof that attention was 
preferentially allocated towards HR stimuli. These findings taken together provide a 
first strong account of an implicitly conditioned attentional response using an EAB task 
[28].  
In experiment 2 the number of participants with awareness of stimulus-outcome 
contingencies increased allowing us to examine how attention developed in Aware 
participants. During the EAB, Aware participants seemed to allocate more attention to 




attention to HR stimuli was affected by aversive distractors, implying a decrease in 
attention allocation to HR stimuli for those participants. This might be explained by 
differences in the predictive power explicitly obtained by CS.  
According to the Pearce-Hall theory of attention [60], it is possible that the increased 
predictability of HR stimuli in Aware participants leads to a decreased necessity to 
focus attention on HR stimuli [61], in order to perform accurately, leading to a higher 
effect of interference by the salient negative distractors (but also to a marginal higher 
accuracy in the presence of neutral distractors (compared to LR)). On the other hand, 
for Unaware participants, for which knowledge about stimuli paired with reward is 
obviously not sufficient to generate correct predictions, the valence obtained by CS 
through non explicit associations drives their attention preferentially towards HR CS, in 
accordance with Mackintosh’s theory [62] of associative learning. Such an explanation 
could be supported by the fact that Aware and Unaware participants combined 
showed pleasantness towards HR over LR stimuli (main effect of stimulus, p = 0.028), a 
measurement of the emotional value of HR stimuli. However when the two groups 
were separately analysed, both demonstrated a marginal effect, although stronger for 
Aware participants. Of course this explanation should be taken into consideration with 
caution as our data did not demonstrate any effect of contingency awareness between 
HR and LR stimuli; and our data on pleasantness were not as clear for Unaware 
participants. More research on how metacognition about stimuli-reward associations 
and emotional and attentional responses to stimuli associated with reward develops 
may help to integrate both theories [63] and support an understanding on attentional 




During our first experiment, HR CSs were not evaluated as more pleasant than LR 
stimuli, inconsistent with previous research [21]. However, a series of factors could 
have affected the pleasantness ratings. Firstly, stimuli depicting Houses and Buildings 
were used in Experiment 1. Even though independent measures carried out in a pilot 
study had discarded a preferential hedonic appraisal of any of the two categories, after 
conditioning, Houses were evaluated as more pleasant than Buildings, even when the 
latter stimulus type was associated with higher probabilities of obtaining money. In 
previous studies when houses and buildings were used as CSs [28], pleasantness 
ratings were not taken at the end of the conditioning task. During the second 
experiment, abstract geometric stimuli were used as CSs. Those stimuli were 
specifically crafted to prevent them from generating any intrinsic emotional reactions 
[64–66]. This time, stimuli associated with HR were consistently more pleasant than 
those associated with LR if considering the whole sample. These differences highlight 
one of the limitations of stimuli used in experiments evaluating preference towards 
drug cues, as the graphic nature of those stimuli can hinder their ability to generate 
automatic implicitly learned reactions. These findings also point out the importance of 
using neutral stimuli in conditioning paradigms (i.e. stimuli with no possible previous 
value).  
Another reason why Experiment 1 may have failed at generating preferential hedonic 
reactions towards HR stimuli is the fact that pleasantness was measured after the EAB 
task. This means that CSs had been extensively presented under extinction, as during 
EAB trials there was no reward following CS presentation. It is possible that the effects 




of extinction procedure, explaining why the intrinsic value of the images took over 
during the pleasantness evaluation task. On Experiment 2, pleasantness was measured 
between the conditioning and EAB tasks, and thus that may contribute to the task 
generating the expected results.  
Importantly, in Experiment 2 higher pleasantness for HR over LR was found, but not for 
Unaware participants in isolation, failing to support previous findings [21].This is in line 
with previous data showing that CA was necessary for the generation of emotional 
responses [7], but still cannot rule out the ability of Implicitly conditioning to generate 
hedonic responses, as a very marginal effect was seen also in unaware participants and 
as mentioned above a main stimulus effect was highly significant.  
Regarding, the EAB for Unaware participants, we find in both experiments that LR 
stimuli are less detectable in the presence of aversive distractors than neutral, 
whereas HR stimuli were not. However these effects were more pronounced in 
Experiment 1. It is possible that these effects were weaker in Experiment 2 due to 
differences in sample size (n = 43 in experiment 1 and n = 28 in experiment 2) or due 
the fact that EAB was measured later on in the procedure (after the measurements of 
pleasantness) pointing again towards a possible effect of extinction.  
A recent experiment by Le Pelley et al. [67] showed using a RSVP task that distractors 
associated with reward only affect target detection under conditions of CA, results that 
somehow clash with our findings. However, in their task, the conditioning procedure 
was embedded within the RSVP instead of occurring previously and separately. 




suggest that CA is necessary for conditioned stimuli during a learning task to affect 
target detection, whereas our findings suggest that CS paired with high reward 
probabilities can resist the interference of aversive distractors after a conditioning 
task.  
Our procedure used money as reward, which may be considered not as high in value as 
primary reinforcers (e.g. food, drugs etc.). However, as Hogarth et al. [35] already 
posited, conditioning procedures using tobacco or other substance administration as 
reward can lead to reduced reward value by the occurrence of satiety effects. Satiety 
decreases pleasantness attributed towards the substance itself [68]. It is possible that 
this decrease in pleasantness blocks the development of positive attentional responses 
towards CSs under conditions of Contingency Unawareness. Conditioning paradigms 
targeting the generation of implicit conditioned responses should therefore use 
rewards as outcomes for which satiation is difficult to achieve (i.e. money) instead of 
drug substances or food.  
An important aspect of Experiment 2 is that a parsimonious analysis of CA using a 
statistical approach originating in Implicit learning theories [40] and recurring to Bayes 
factors [55] allowed us to classify participants in three different groups: those Unaware 
of the contingencies governing the conditioning task; those able to predict the 
outcomes associated with each CS; and those able to explicitly describe those 
contingencies. Most importantly, the rigorous classification obtained using Bayes 
factors allows determining the true nature of conscious or unconscious processes [50]. 
Post-hoc expectancy measurements using Likert scales were also compared to online 




congruency between both kinds of methodologies was found. Arguments against the 
existence of Implicit conditioning are based often on the types of EA measurements 
used to classify awareness [19]. Our results show that a sensible approach towards EA 
measurements suffices in order to obtain reliable implicit measures.  
This fact suggests that the problem underlying inconsistent results in the implicit 
learning literature [16,19,35] lays more within the kind of conditioning procedure or 
the type of stimuli used, or the measurement of learning by-products (i.e. conditioned 
emotional responses), rather than EA measurements.  
We think that the separation of participants in three groups depending on their CA and 
metacognition is a useful tool to help us understand learning processes, and hence this 
rigorous methodology should be prioritised. In our conditioning the number of Aware 
participants was relatively small to obtain a better differentiation between these 
subgroups. It is possible that the small number of Aware participants is due to the use 
of a task-irrelevant conditioning task that may have impeded explicit learning.  
A high proportion of participants could not definitely be classified as Aware or 
Unaware of contingencies on Experiment 2. Their meta-cognitive state was also 
undetermined due to their Bayes factors for both measurements being insensitive. As 
learning is a progressive phenomenon, initial trials are uninformative of contingency 
knowledge compared to later blocks. In this experiment EA was measured every 4 
trials so as to prevent excessive priming of awareness development [19]. Those two 
factors combined lead to a small amount of trials being used for awareness 




In summary, this paper shows convincing evidence of the occurrence of Implicit 
Pavlovian conditioning whilst presenting a novel approach of CA measurement based 
on Bayes factors. It suggests that appetitive CSs can elicit increased attention in 
conditions of contingency unawareness. The attentional correlates of implicit learning 
appears to match those generated by explicitly learned appetitive CSs as reported in 
the literature. Our data also indicated a development of implicit emotional responses 
albeit not as clearly. These findings therefore highlight a possible role of implicit 
learning in the development of addictive behaviours and support dual process theories 
of addiction. More research needs to address the development of emotional 
responses in implicit conditioning, as results have proven to be inconclusive.  
The utility of the emotional and attentional responses to stimuli associated with 
reward for seeking that reward (i.e. the behavioural response) in the absence of 
awareness remains to be shown.  
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2.9 Appendix A. Supplementary data  
Table A.1             
Data for demographic and questionnaire information for Experiment 1 
depending on Awareness group and statistics for ANOVA comparing 
Contingency Aware and Unaware groups.  
              Unaware n= 44            Aware n=4  
F 
 
p   Mean SD Mean SD 
Age 23.43 7.32 28.00 13.59 1.23 0.27 
Panas positive 2.90 0.79 2.65 1.49 0.32 0.58 
Panas negative 1.52 0.48 1.30 0.42 0.76 0.39 
BIS 2.82 0.32 3.00 0.42 1.09 0.30 
BAS 2.96 0.41 2.90 0.53 0.07 0.80 
BAS Drive 2.74 0.64 2.75 0.74 0.00 0.99 
BAS Reward 3.35 0.44 3.65 0.25 1.80 0.19 
BAS Fun seeking 2.79 0.68 2.31 0.75 1.78 0.19 
Barrat Total 2.15 0.41 1.71 0.26 4.34 0.04 
Barrat 
Attentional 2.24 0.48 1.81 0.33 2.99 0.09 
Barrat Motor 2.04 0.44 1.66 0.33 2.83 0.10 
Barrat 
Nonplanning 2.16 0.52 1.66 0.30 3.54 0.07 
Alcohol Use Total 29.92 24.67 8.45 10.46 2.93 0.09 
Binge score 20.20 17.36 3.38 4.03 3.67 0.06 
Alcohol 
units/week 9.71 9.94 5.08 6.47 0.83 0.37 











Pleasantness for Aware participants 
For the four Aware participants, pleasantness towards HR (mean=6.97, SD=.89) and LR 
(mean= 5.74, SD=1.43) stimuli was computed.  
Emotional Attentional Blink for Aware participants 
For the four Aware participants, accuracy on the EAB was computed. Under neutral 
distractors, HR stimuli had an accuracy of .67 (SD=.08) and under aversive distractors of 
.73 (SD=.09). Under neutral distractors, LR stimuli had an accuracy of .55 (SD=.20) and 
under aversive distractors of .39 (SD=.20).  
RT during the conditioning task 
Results show no significant differences in RT towards HR and LR stimuli for Unaware 
participants, there was only a marginal difference, with increased RT towards HR stimuli 
(mean=2.67, SD=.08) than LR (mean=2.66, SD=.08), t(43)=1.705, p=.095. For Aware 











2.10 Appendix B. Supplementary data  
Table B.1 
Data for demographic and questionnaire information for Experiment 2 depending on 
Awareness group and statistics for ANOVA comparing Contingency Aware and 
Unaware groups. 
 Unaware n= 28 Aware n=15 F p  Mean SD Mean SD 
Age 20.50 4.10 20.60 1.99 .008 .930 
Panas positive 2.76 0.75 3.01 0.65 1.248 .270 
Panas negative 1.44 0.41 1.57 0.52 .770 .385 
BIS 1.60 0.35 1.89 0.44 5.837 .020 
BAS 2.03 0.28 2.05 0.22 .056 .814 
BAS Drive 2.35 0.42 2.32 0.55 .044 .834 
BAS Reward 1.64 0.33 1.60 0.33 .114 .737 
BAS Fun seeking 2.21 0.50 2.35 0.47 .861 .359 
Barrat Total 2.02 0.23 2.11 0.27 1.401 .243 
Barrat Attentional 2.12 0.43 2.09 0.44 .071 .791 
Barrat Motor 1.90 0.30 2.00 0.42 .780 .382 
Barrat Nonplanning 2.06 0.27 2.15 0.42 .773 .385 
Alcohol Use Total 28.40 19.64 32.57 27.28 .335 .566 
Binge score 15.38 11.20 18.73 15.62 .663 .420 
Alcohol units/week 13.02 13.63 13.84 13.39 .036 .851 
AUDIT 6.36 4.35 7.93 5.39 1.085 .304 
 
RT during the conditioning task 
Results show no significant differences in RT towards HR (mean=2.66, SD=.10) and LR 




participants, there was no significant difference between HR (mean=2.70, SD=.09) and 
LR (mean=2.69, SD=.09) stimuli, t(14)=.560, p=.584. 
Accuracy towards HR and LR stimuli 
There were no significant differences in accuracy towards HR and LR stimuli neither for 
Unaware, t(27)=.055, p=.956 (HR=.46, SD=.20; LR=.46, SD=.19), nor for Aware 
participants, t(14)=.760, p=.460 (HR=.89, SD=.15; LR=.85, SD=.18). 
Metacognition towards HR and LR stimuli 
There were no significant differences in d2’ scores towards HR and LR stimuli neither for 
Unaware, t(27)=1.415, p=.169 (HR=-.19, SD=.54; LR=.12, SD=.76), nor for Aware 
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3 Knowledge about the Predictive Value of Reward Conditioned Stimuli Modulates 




Stimuli conditioned with a substance can generate drug approach behaviours due to 
their acquired motivational properties. According to implicit theories of addiction 
these stimuli can decrease cognitive control automatically. The present study (n=49) 
examined whether reward-associated stimuli can interfere with cognitive processes in 
the absence of knowledge about stimulus-outcome contingencies. Abstract 
conditioned stimuli (CS) were paired with High (HR) or Low (LR) probabilities of 
monetary reward using a Pavlovian learning task. Participants were categorised as 
Aware or Unaware of contingencies using a Bayesian analysis. CS were then used as 
task irrelevant distractors in modified Flanker and N-back tasks.  Results show HR CS 
can generate increased interference in the Flanker task for participants Unaware of 
contingencies, contributing further evidence for the existence of implicit Pavlovian 
conditioning. For the N-back task, working memory performance was affected by HR 
CS, albeit only for Aware participants. These results suggest that CS can interfere 
implicitly with cognitive processes in a similar way to drug-related stimuli. Such an 
effect could occur in a stimulus-driven fashion, devoid of top-down goal directedness. 




processes in addiction and highlights the necessity to reconsider the measurement of 
such phenomena.  
3.2 Introduction 
Motivational properties of stimuli associated with substances are known to play a 
crucial role in the development of addictive behaviours. Through repeated associations 
with drug effects, drug related stimuli acquire incentive salience (Berridge & Robinson, 
2003; Goldstein & Volkow, 2002), a quality that ultimately drives and directs 
motivational responses. The instatement of those responses is posited to occur via 
mechanisms similar to that of Pavlovian appetitive conditioning (Stewart et al., 1984).  
 In humans, responsiveness to drug-related stimuli has been evaluated via attentional 
processes (Field & Cox, 2008), and emotional (Pool et al., 2016) or autonomous (Carter 
& Tiffany, 1999) reactivity. Attentional biases towards drug-related stimuli have been 
consistently observed for different substances (Bonson et al., 2002; Bradley et al., 
2008; Field et al., 2013; Garland et al., 2012; Moeller et al., 2009), commonly evaluated 
using dot probe tasks (i.e. Townshend and Duka, 2001) targeting overt attention 
allocation.  
Other techniques assessing biases towards drug-related stimuli consist of eye-gaze 
measurements (Hogarth et al., 2006b) or interference tasks such as the Addiction-
Stroop test (Cox & Fadardi, 2006). Interference by task-irrelevant drug-related stimuli 
has also been evaluated using working memory (WM) tasks (Hester & Garavan, 2009) 




Nikolaou et al. (2013) further examined the mechanisms underlying cue interference in 
cognitive control using a modified Flanker task (Eriksen & Schultz, 1979); they found 
that task-irrelevant alcohol related stimuli increased RT under high cognitive load, thus 
proving the effect of drug-related stimuli in the attenuation of cognitive control 
resources necessary for correct task performance.  
Others have also examined the ability of emotionally salient stimuli to interfere with 
WM using an N-back task (Ladouceur et al., 2009). In this procedure, participants have 
to respond to targets occurring in a sequence of stimuli.  In the case of a 0-back 
condition this simply means responding when a given stimulus appears.  In the case of 
an n-back condition a response is required when a stimulus is the same as one 
appearing n stimuli earlier in the sequence.  As the n increases the cognitive load on 
working memory also increases. Interference on performance resulting from the 
inclusion of drug-related non-target stimuli in the sequence may result from a 
combination of explicit and implicit processes in drug addiction.  
According to the dual process theory of addiction (Wiers & Stacy, 2006), the cascade of 
events leading to drug approach behaviours is supposed to occur implicitly, under the 
influence of stimuli associated with the substance (see also Tiffany, 1990). Explicit 
motives activated in parallel support cognitive control mechanisms and are meant to 
impede or limit such tendencies. This trade-off between an implicit appetitive system 
triggered by drug-related stimuli and an explicit cognitive control system based on 
regulatory executive signals can explain results such as those obtained in the alcohol 




Most experiments have investigated this matter using stimuli explicitly associated with 
a substance (e.g. alcohol bottles or cigarettes) for which the stimulus outcome 
contingency is clearly defined due to their own nature, thus impeding an accurate 
exploration of implicit components of drug-addiction.  Even though the procedures 
themselves, based on task-irrelevant distractor effects, are thought to be implicit, the 
explicit attributes of drug related stimuli generated through prior consumption 
experiences  (Wiers et al., 2002) may affect task outcomes (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 
2018).  Stimuli conditioned with non-drug rewards can generate value-driven 
responses equivalent to those of drug-related stimuli (Anderson et al., 2011), both 
attentional (Hogarth et al., 2006a; Jeffs and Duka, 2017) and emotional (i.e. Austin and 
Duka, 2010).  
However, in seeking to investigate the mechanisms underlying responsiveness towards 
reward-related stimuli, a key question is whether those responses can occur without 
conscious awareness of outcome-contingencies (CA), that is, in the absence of 
predictive knowledge about associations between Conditioned Stimuli (CS) and 
rewards. The ability of implicit reward-CS associations to produce hedonic and 
attentional responses has generated an extensive discussion (Lovibond & Shanks, 
2002), with research showing inconsistent results. Recent findings (Le Pelley et al., 
2017), as well as previous research (i.e. Hogarth et al., 2005, 2006a), appear to show 
that CA is necessary for the development of responses in Pavlovian appetitive 
conditioning. These results may stem from the inadequacy of procedures employed to 
assess learning, both in the measurement of conditioned responses (De Houwer, 2006) 




In a recent series of experiments, in which CA was carefully measured using a novel 
Bayesian approach (Dienes, 2015; Sand & Nilsson, 2016), we found that targets, paired 
with increased probabilities of monetary reward, gathered preferential attention in an 
Emotional Attentional Blink task (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018). Importantly, this 
was observed in participants Unaware of stimulus-reward contingencies. These results 
are in line with the postulate that reward predictive stimuli can modulate attentional 
processes (Failing & Theeuwes, 2017) even in the absence of CA.   
As discussed above, research in the field of drug-addiction has demonstrated 
preferential attentional responses towards task-irrelevant reward-related stimuli; 
made apparent by their influence on cognitive processes (Hester and Garavan, 2009; 
Nikolaou et al., 2013b). Similar results have been obtained using secondary reinforcers. 
For example, using a modified colour-naming Stroop task in which certain task-
relevant colours (e.g. a blue font) were associated with monetary outcomes (Krebs et 
al., 2010), it was found that those colours facilitated task performance. Interestingly, 
the incentive value of rewarded colours subsequently transferred to task-irrelevant 
words associated with rewarded stimuli (e.g. the word “blue”), this time generating 
increased interference. This was considered an example of implicit appetitive learning. 
However, in this case, as in others (i.e. Anderson, 2015), the implicit nature of the 
effect generated by CS can only be postulated as no stringent measures of CA were 
implemented.  
Dual process theories of addiction (Wiers & Stacy, 2006) indicate that the chain of 
events leading to appetitive behaviours is based on implicit processes triggered by 




without conscious knowledge of outcome contingencies, can set off drug-approach 
behaviours (Hogarth et al., 2006a). 
To help clarify this matter we investigated whether CS in the absence of CA can 
generate task-irrelevant interferences in cognitive control, allowing us to draw a 
parallel between cognitive processes associated with drug cues and implicitly CS.   
To make sure that Pavlovian associations would occur in the absence of awareness we 
utilised a task-irrelevant reward learning procedure (Yokoyama et al., 2015), pairing 
stimuli belonging to two different categories with high (HR) or low (LR) probabilities of 
monetary reward. Using task-irrelevant procedures, it is possible to direct the focus of 
attention away from the stimulus-reward outcome, and in this way, delay explicit 
learning of stimulus-reward associations. We measured CA and meta-cognitive 
knowledge about contingencies on a trial-by-trial basis (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 
2018) to determine the explicit knowledge about outcome-contingencies gained by 
participants. Using a Bayesian analysis for this purpose we were able to gather 
sensitive evidence for the existence of non-conscious learning. Finally, emotional 
responses towards CS were measured, and the interference of CS on cognitive 
processes was assessed using modified Flanker and N-back tasks with different 
degrees of cognitive load.  
We hypothesized that CS would have an effect on performance for both the N-back 
and Flanker tasks depending on their value (HR vs. LR) and that the extent to which 







Groups were matched on all baseline indices (i.e. Barrat Impulsiveness scale - BIS, 
Alcohol use disorder identification test - AUDIT, Alcohol use questionnaire -  AUQ, 
Positive and negative affect schedule - PANAS and Bodily perception questionnaire - 
BPQ; p>.2, in all cases) except for Reversed Digit Span, see Table 1. Groups also did not 
differ in the distribution of male and female participants, χ(1, N = 36) = 1.446, p=.229 
(ratio of female/male: 8/20 for Unaware and 10/16 for Aware). 
 Contingency Aware n=16 Contingency Unaware n=20 
 
Between groups comparison       
 Mean SD  Mean SD t(34) p 
Age 20.13 5.39  19.55 1.23 0.165 .870 
BIS-11 63.81 8.20  64.2 5.87 1.136 .264 
AUDIT 7.69 4.70  7.8 5.52 0.886 .382 
Binge Score 25.69 16.45  19.29 17.06 0.486 .630 
AUQ score 41.43 25.53  33.5 27.51 0.983 .333 
PANAS Positive 0.47 0.15  0.44 0.20 0.165 .870 
Porges 2.52 0.50  2.31 0.75 1.136 .264 
 Mean SD  Mean SD Z p 
Reverse Digit 3.21 0.97  4.13 1.26 2.903 .043 





Table 1: Results and descriptives comparing questionnaires and demographic scores 
between Contingency Aware and Unaware participants.  
3.3.2 Pleasantness 
There was a main effect of stimulus-type, F(1,34)= 10.015, p= .003, reflecting, 
irrespective of CA, increased pleasantness ratings towards High Reward (HR) (mean= 
55.29, SD=.16) compared to Low Reward (LR) CS (mean= 43.97, SD= .17).  
This main effect was quantified by a significant CA by stimulus-type interaction, 
F(1,34)= 7.899, p=.008. Thus Aware participants rated HR CS as being more pleasant 
than LR CS, t(15)= 3.182, p= .006, BU(0,0.06)= 3.3998. By contrast, there was no sensitive 
difference in pleasantness ratings between HR and LR CS in the Unaware group, t(19)= 




























Figure 1: Pleasantness towards Conditioned Stimuli. 
Pleasantness ratings towards High Reward and Low Reward stimuli depending on 
Contingency Awareness.  
*Only Aware participants developed preferential emotional responses towards High 
Reward stimuli, t(15)= 3.182, p= .006. 
 
3.3.3 N-back 
3.3.3.1 Accuracy N-back 
For Aware participants, the analysis of the percentage of correct responses showed a 
main effect of load, F(1,45)= 29.307, p< .001, with participants performing less 
accurately in 2-back blocks (mean= 79.43, SD= 8.22) than in 0-back blocks (mean= 
90.10, SD= 7.89). Similarly, Unaware participants also had lower accuracy scores in the 
2-back (mean= 84.65, SD= 7.95) than the 0-back condition (mean=88.49, SD=10.83); 
main effect of load, F(1,54)= 8.006, p= 0.007. There were no other significant main 
effects or interactions neither for Aware nor for Unaware participants when looking at 
the percentage of correct responses, Fs< 0.427, p> .516. 
Analyses of net differences, resulted in no significant main effects or interactions 
neither for Aware, nor for Unaware participants, Fs< 0.935, ps> .338. 
For proportion of correct Hits there were no significant interactions or main effects, 




3.3.3.2 Latencies N-back 
With respect to latencies taking into account all trials, Aware participants were overall 
slower on 2-back trials (mean= 2.76, SD=.13) compared to 0-back trials (mean= 2.74, 
SD= .10); main effect of load, F(1,15)= 5.624, p=.032. There were no other significant 
main effects or interactions in the Aware group, Fs < 2.597, ps > .128. The analysis 
performed in the Unaware group did not result in any statistically significant main 
effect or interaction, Fs< 1.015, ps> .327. 
With respect to latencies on target trials only: The analysis in the Aware group showed 
a marginally significant main effect of stimulus-type, F(1,15)= 3.367, p= .086, indicating 
that latencies to LR targets were faster (mean=2.70, SD=0.07) than to HR targets 
(mean= 2.72, SD= 0.07). In addition, there was a marginally significant stimulus-type by 
load interaction, F(1,15)= 3.875, p=.068. Post-hoc paired samples t-tests showed that 
responses on HR target trials were marginally slower than responses on LR target trials 
in the 2-back block, t(15)= 2.122, p= .051 (see Figure 2). No other simple effect was 
statistically significant, p> .149. Finally, the main effect of load was not statistically 
significant, F(1,15)=0.587, p= .456.  
For Unaware participants, there were no statistically significant main effects or 







Figure 2: Reaction times during the N-back task between Aware and Unaware 
participants for Hits.  
For Aware participants Latencies in the 2-back condition towards High Reward were 
higher than those towards Low Reward, p=.051. 
3.3.4 Flanker Task 
3.3.4.1 Accuracy Flanker  
For Unaware participants there was a main effect of stimulus-type on accuracy, 
F(2,85)= 6.834, p= .002, explained by significantly lower accuracy overall on HR (mean= 
94.90, SD= 3.84) compared to Control trials (mean= 97.07, SD= 2.28), Z= 3.675, p< 
.001, and marginally lower accuracy on LR (mean= 95.68, SD= 3.84) than Control trials, 
Z= 1.945, p=.052. There was no significant difference in accuracy between HR and LR 
























152.970, p< .001, and reflected increased accuracy in general on congruent (mean= 
99.38, SD= 1.05) than incongruent trials (mean= 92.39, SD= 5.03). Both of these main 
effects were quantified by an interaction between stimulus type and congruency in the 
Unaware group, F(2,85)= 6.420, p= .002, due to differences between Control and HR 
stimuli across levels of congruency, χ(1)= 12.807, p= .001. Wilcoxon post-hoc tests 
showed a significant difference between Control and HR trials in the incongruent 
condition, Z= 2.255, p=.024, that did not occur in the congruent condition, Z= .447, p= 
.655, see Table 2.  
Similarly, for Aware participants, there was also a main effect of stimulus-type on 
accuracy, F(2,70)= 7.820, p< .001, explained by overall lower accuracy for HR (mean= 
93.43, SD= 5.39) compared to Control trials (mean= 95.37, SD= 5.98), Z= 3.819, p< 
.001, and lower accuracy on LR (mean=93.06, SD=7.48) compared to Control trials, Z= 
2.111, p= .035. There was no difference in accuracy between HR and LR trials, Z= 
0.175, p= .861. The main effect of congruency was also significant, F(1,70)= 146.051, 
p< .001, and reflected increased accuracy in general on congruent (mean= 99.14, SD= 
1.13) than incongruent trials (mean= 88.77, SD= 11.08). There was however no 
interaction between stimulus-type and congruency, F(2, 70)= 2.360, p= .102. 
 Congruent Incongruent 
 High-reward Low-reward Control High-reward Low-reward Control 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Unaware 99.54 1.07 98.92 2.88 99.69 0.90 90.28 7.70 92.44 5.94 94.44 4.57 





Table 2: Accuracy during the Flanker task. 
Accuracy during the Flanker task depending on contingency awareness, cognitive load 
and stimulus type. 
3.3.4.2 Latencies Flanker 
For Unaware participants there was a main effect of stimulus-type, F(2, 34)= 29.828, 
p< .001, with faster latencies on Control trials (mean= 568.88, SD= 56.62) compared to 
both HR (mean= 594.74, SD= 53.89), p< .001, and LR trials (mean= 596.79, SD= 55.76), 
p< .001. The main effect of congruency was also significant, F(1,17)= 425.936, p< .001, 
with Unaware participants responding faster on congruent (mean= 537.21, SD= 52.71) 
than on incongruent trials (mean= 636.40, SD= 58.15). These main effects were 
quantified by a significant stimulus-type by congruency interaction, F(2,34)= 6.506, p= 
.004. Follow-up tests showed a significant main effect of stimulus-type in the 
congruent condition, F(2,34)= 10.153, p< .001. Latencies were slower on LR trials than 
on both HR, p= .036, and Control trials, p< .001. No significant difference was found 
between HR and Control trials, p= .346. In the incongruent condition, the main effect 
of stimulus type, F(2,34)= 19.017, p< .001, reflected slower latencies on both HR, p< 
.001, and LR trials, p= .002, compared to Control trials. No significant difference was 
found between HR and LR trials, p= .552, see Table 3 for descriptive statistics.  
Aware participants also showed a main effect of stimulus-type, F(2,28)= 11.011, p< 
.001. This was explained by faster latencies on Control trials (mean= 575.03, SD= 
57.84) compared to both HR (mean= 592.39, SD=54.72), p= .005, and LR trials (mean= 




F(1,14)= 268.607, p< .001, with Aware participants also responding slower on 
incongruent (mean= 643.027, SD= 64.47) than on congruent trials (mean= 529.59, SD= 
51.02). However, in this group, the stimulus-type by congruency interaction was not 
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Table 3: Flanker task descriptive statistics for Latencies.  
Latencies for the Flanker task depending on cognitive load, stimulus type and 
Contingency Awareness.   
3.3.4.3 Flanker effect 
Unaware participants showed a main effect of stimulus-type, F(2,34)= 6.506, p= .004. 
HR CS generated more interference than both LR, p= .042, or Control stimuli, p= .006, 
see Figure 3.  







Figure 3: Flanker scores. 
Latency difference-scores for congruent versus incongruent trials in the Flanker task by 
contingency awareness and stimulus type.  For Unaware participants high cognitive 
load generates more interference in high-reward trials compared to low-reward, t(17)= 
2.740, p= .014, and  control stimuli, t(17)= 3.615, p= .002. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The present study set out to examine the extent to which reward CS can interfere with 
cognitive processing and the degree to which this remains true in the absence of CA.  
By using a task-irrelevant Pavlovian conditioning paradigm and setting stringent 
criteria in the determination of CA it was possible to reliably identify implicit 
influences. The use of a Bayesian approach provides a sensitive measurement of the 




criticisms regarding measurements of  implicit learning (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002), due 
to lax determinations of unconscious processes (Shanks, 2016).  
A significant Flanker effect was found in response latencies generated by HR CS, albeit 
only in participants Unaware of the contingencies. On the other hand, in the N-back 
task, under high cognitive load, a higher interference in the presence of HR CS 
compared to LR CS was only found in Aware participants. Subjective hedonic responses 
to HR CS, as measured by pleasantness ratings, were also only seen in participants 
Aware of contingencies; Unaware participants displayed an insensitive response 
pattern.  
The development of hedonic responses congruent with reward signalling only in Aware 
participants clarifies recent findings (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018) suggesting that 
CA is necessary for the development of subjective emotional responses. Previous 
research from our own group had found instances of hedonic responses in the absence 
of CA (Jeffs & Duka, 2017). These incongruent results may again be due to the use of 
less stringent CA categorizations. However, insensitive results, with regard to 
pleasantness for Unaware participants (as shown with Bayesian analyses), indicate that 
we cannot fully discard the development of such responses also in this group. Other 
factors contributing to the development of hedonic conditioned responses, such as 
interoceptive abilities (Pollatos and Schandry, 2008), may ultimately help resolve such 
disparities. However, it seems clear that the assessment of subjective hedonic 





As expected, decreases in performance (accuracy and latencies) were found for the 
Flanker task, in the incongruent compared to the congruent condition; also, as 
expected in the N-back task, accuracy decreased in the 2-back compared to the 0-back 
blocks, showing the suitability of the procedures to generate increased cognitive load. 
Results of the Flanker task are in line with data recently obtained by our group 
(Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018) and by others (i.e. Bourgeois et al., 2016) 
demonstrating the ability of reward CS to grab preferential attention implicitly. HR CS, 
paired with increased probabilities of reward, generated more cognitive interference 
compared to LR CS. Importantly that happened solely for participants Unaware of 
contingencies. These results are relevant enough by themselves as they provide 
further evidence for the existence of implicit Pavlovian conditioning effects. 
Research findings relating to the nature of the attentional processes underlying task 
interference by irrelevant distractors have proven to be inconsistent. On one hand, 
attentional resources are posited to be necessary for task interference (Pessoa & 
Ungerleider, 2004) countering the argument of automaticity of salience effects and 
converging with the interpretation of attentional biases towards drug cues acting as a 
top-down albeit involuntary mechanism (Brown et al., 2018). However, value driven 
attentional capture (Anderson et al., 2011) is also posited to occur involuntarily. In our 
case, as the interference generated by HR CS occurs without conscious awareness of 





The ability of CS to interfere with cognitive control tasks in a stimulus-driven fashion 
has two-fold implications for implicit theories of addiction. On the one hand, this mere 
effect shows that stimuli associated with a reward can generate approach behaviours 
in a non-declarative or explicit way and can interfere with cognitive control 
mechanisms, providing further evidence for the existence of implicit processes in drug-
addiction (Wiers & Stacy, 2006). This implies a need to reconsider how cognitive 
control interference induced by drug-related stimuli implicitly can be tested. Explicit 
drug cues typically utilised in relevant experiments (e.g. pictures of alcohol bottles for 
alcohol related cognitive bias) might not allow implicit mechanisms involved in 
cognitive biases to be revealed.  On the other hand, if we consider that the effects of 
reward associated cues can occur on cognitive interference implicitly, as shown here, 
we can extrapolate and add to our understanding of mechanisms underlying drug-cue 
interference in cognitive control (i.e. on an equivalent Flanker task Nikolaou et al., 
2013b), that drug-cue interference could be affected, at least partially, via implicit and 
involuntary processes detached from goal-directedness (Hester & Garavan, 2009). 
It is puzzling that Aware participants did not show a stronger Flanker effect of HR CS 
compared to LR CS compared to Unaware participants. This might be explained by an 
overall decrease in baseline performance for Aware participants (illustrated by higher 
Flanker effect for Control trials in Aware compared to Unaware participants, 
(t(31)=2.302, p=.028). Such an effect could impede an appropriate interference by HR 
CS. Another possibility is that due to the conscious knowledge about contingencies, 




resources to achieve this), in order to minimize their interference. Such a cognitive 
process could explain the high flanker effect seen also in Control trials for that group.  
 On the N-back task stimulus interference was observed only for Aware participants. 
Under high cognitive load (2-back condition), latencies for Hits in the presence of HR 
CS were longer than towards LR CS. We can assume that this effect is due to the 
increased salience of HR CS. 
It seems therefore that cognitive mechanisms underlying approach to reward related 
stimuli tested by different tasks are influenced differently by CA. CS effects in the 
Flanker task can be explained according to bias competition models (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995) by which under limited attentional resources (such as high cognitive 
load) salient stimuli will grab attention and interfere with the task (Vuilleumier, 2005), 
in our case implicitly. We need however to explain why no effects were found in the N-
back task for Unaware participants. The N-back task differs from the Flanker task as it 
requires less attentional demand (detecting a colour vs. a target arrow embedded in 
distractors) but involves more complex cognitive processes (recalling the colour of a 
previous image to respond, whilst at the same time ignoring target irrelevant 
information vs. overcoming distractors). Previous research found that masked 
presentations of emotional distractors altered N-back performance, albeit not for high 
load trials (Uher et al., 2014). It is possible that interference on the N-back task does 
not directly target attentional mechanisms but rather working memory (WM) and 
inhibitory processes (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003), and that a more conscious 
presentation of distractors, or of their incentive value, is necessary for interference to 




The results obtained in this study are subject to a number of limitations. The effects of 
HR CS on response latencies in the N-back task are observed solely on accurate target 
trials, that is, on relatively few instances, maybe because HR CS only affect trials in 
which the coloured frame matches the 2-back stimulus, interfering with target 
recognition. The observation that interference in the Flanker task was not found for 
Aware participants remains to be fully explained. While it may be possible to provide 
an account of these results based on the effect of conscious knowledge about 
contingencies, it would be informative to compare the effect of emotional stimuli or 
masked distractors with the interference generated by CS on both tasks (Nikolaou et 
al., 2013a).  
In conclusion, Implicit processes play a crucial role in the development of drug 
addiction, particularly in drug-approach behaviours. We observed a clear interference 
in cognitive control by stimuli conditioned with reward in the absence of CA. This 
effect provides further evidence for the existence of implicit Pavlovian conditioning 
and has implications for the understanding of dual-process theories of addiction. 
Uncovering implicit mechanisms of drug-approach behaviours may prove essential for 
the development of novel treatments in substance use disorders. 
3.5 Methods and materials 
3.5.1 Participants 
Forty-nine Psychology students from the University of Sussex completed the 
experiment (mean age= 20.04, SD= 3, 34; 25 females). Exclusion criteria were a history 




All participants were given course credits and £2 for taking part in the study, and the 
study was approved by the University of Sussex Life Sciences ethics committee.  
3.5.2 Measures 
3.5.2.1 Questionnaires 
Reversed Digit Span measurements were used to index working memory capacity 
(Redick & Lindsey, 2013; Wechsler, 2008). 
The Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ; Mehrabian and Russell, 1978) was used to assess  
average weekly alcohol use over the past six months. The questionnaire also provides 
a binge drinking score  based on the speed of alcohol consumption, and the number as 
well as the proportion of times that participants were drunk in the last six months 
(Townshend and Duka, 2002).  
Severity of alcohol use was measured with the 10-item Alcohol Use Disorder 
Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders et al., 1993). 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) was used to 
measure positive and negative mood at the start of the study session. Participants rate 
how they feel at that moment using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “very slightly” – 5 = 
“Extremely”). The questionnaire consists of 10 items per construct. 
The Body Perception Questionnaire (BPQ; Porges, 1993) is a 45-item questionnaire 
evaluating the subjective ability to detect internal bodily sensations. Participants had 
to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “never” – 5 = “always”) the frequency with 




Finally, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Patton et al., 1995) is a 30 item 
questionnaire evaluating different factors contributing to overall impulsiveness, 
namely Attentional, Motor and Non-planning impulsivity. 
3.5.2.2 Conditioning task 
A task-irrelevant conditioning procedure (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018; Yokoyama 
et al., 2015) was implemented in order to train participants to associate high and low 
probabilities of monetary reward with two different categories of CS. Thirty-six 
geometrical stimuli belonging to each CS category (squares vs. octagons) were 
produced with Ink-Scape vector design software2. 
On each trial, a stimulus from one CS category (i.e. a square or an octagon) was 
presented on the computer screen with an overlaid green or yellow coloured square. 
Participants were asked to press a green or yellow key depending on the colour of the 
square. Stimuli remained on screen for 2000ms or until a response was made. If the 
response was correct, participants could win 10p. For HR CS, the probability of winning 
was 90%. For LR CS, the probability was 10%. After a response was recorded feedback 
about the outcome of the trial was provided (“You win 10p” or “You win nothing”) for 
1500ms. Trial outcomes depended solely on the CS presented during the trial and the 
associated probabilities of reward. The stimulus category was counterbalanced across 
participants.  
                                                        
2 see Leganes-Fonteneau et al. 2018 for a detailed description of stimulus 
development, Figure 4-5 for an example, and supplementary materials for the 





On 50% of the HR trials and on 50% of the LR trials, participants had to indicate if they 
thought they would win money (Yes/No expectancy responses). Following the 
expectancy response, they were also asked to rate how confident they were about 
their response on a 5-point Likert Scale (1. “completely guessing”, 2. “more or less 
guessing”, 3. “fairly sure”, 4. “almost certain”, 5. “completely certain”). The 
measurement of accuracy and confidence on reward prediction allowed us to 
determine participants’ metacognitive knowledge about contingencies (Barrett et al., 
2013).  
The conditioning procedure comprised a total of 5 blocks, with 72 trials in each block. 
At the end of each block participants transferred the amount of earned coins from a 
bank box to their “earnings” box. At the end of the final block, they were told how 
much money they had won in total.  
Participants were kept naïve about the contingencies between the CS categories and 
the reward-outcome probabilities, although they were told that they could win money 
at the end of each trial. They were also told that they would be asked a series of 
questions about their expectancy and confidence and that their responses to those 
questions would not affect the outcome of the trial in terms of reward probability.  
3.5.2.3 Pleasantness measurement 
Immediately after the conditioning procedure participants rated the pleasantness 
associated with each category of CS. Eighteen squares and eighteen octagons 




one at a time, and participants were asked to rate how pleasant they found each 
stimulus on a 5-point Likert scale (1- Not pleasant at all / 5-Extremely pleasant).  
3.5.2.4 CS N-back task 
Each trial of the CS N-back task began with a fixation cross in the centre of screen 
(jittered 1-3secs; average 2 secs). This was followed by the Stimulus display for 500ms, 
followed by a response interval for 1000ms.  
The Stimulus display consisted of a CS surrounded by a coloured frame. On 50% of the 
trials, the CS was a HR CS, while on the remainder 50% of the trials it was a LR CS. The 
colour of the frame was either a primary colour (i.e. red, blue, and yellow) or a non-
primary colour (pink, orange, and green).  
The task consisted of two conditions. In the 0-back condition participants were 
instructed to press one button if the colour of the frame was a primary colour (target 
trial) and another button if it was a non-primary colour (control trial) as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. In the 2-back condition, participants had to remember the 
colour of the frame and press one button if the colour of the frame matched the one 
shown 2 trials before (target trial) and another button if the colours did not match (see 






Figure 4: N-back task. 
The task consisted of two different conditions. In the 0-back condition participants 
indicated whether the colour of the frame was a primary or a non-primary colour. In 
the 2-back condition they had to indicate whether the colour of the frame matched the 
one presented two trials before. High and Low Reward conditioned stimuli were task 
irrelevant. 
 
A total of eight blocks (four 0-back and four 2-back) were presented in an ABAB order. 
A 0-back block was always presented first. At the start of each block, a short 
instructions screen (jittered duration 4-8secs, average 6secs) reminded participants 
what they should do in that block.  
Each block consisted of eight control and four target trials. In half of the control trials 
and in half of the target trials the image presented was a HR CS, with the other half 




consisted of primary colours and control trials of non-primary colours regardless of the 
N-back condition. Within blocks, the colours surrounding HR and LR CS were also 
matched.  
In each 2-back block, at least one (maximum two) lure trials were introduced. These 
trials were control trials in which the colour of the frame matched the one presented 
1-back or 1-forward. Lure trials were allocated equally often between HR and LR image 
conditions.  
The percentage of correct responses was calculated for each N-back and stimulus-type 
condition separately. We also computed the proportion of Hits (proportion of accurate 
Target trials), and net differences subtracting False Alarms rates (proportion of “target-
like” responses on Control trials) from the proportion of Hits for each of the 
conditions. Reaction times to correct responses (i.e. latencies) were calculated for each 
N-back and stimulus type condition. Reaction times to correct target trials (i.e. 
latencies for Hits) were also computed separately for each N-back and stimulus type 
condition. 
Finally, participants completed two practice blocks, one for each N-back condition, in 
which a plain grey background was presented as part of the stimulus display. A 
minimum accuracy of 65% in each practice block was required to proceed to the real 
task. Participants not reaching this threshold were given the task instructions again 
and repeated the practice blocks.  
3.5.2.5 CS Flanker task 




Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross for a jittered duration (850-
1150 ms), followed by the stimulus display for 800ms, and a response interval for 
700ms (see Figure 5).  
The stimulus display consisted of a horizontal row of five arrows superimposed on 
either a plain grey background, or on task-unrelated background images that belonged 
to either the high or the low reward CS categories. The central arrow was the target, 
and was surrounded by two distracting arrows (flankers) on either side. Participants 
were instructed to ignore the flankers and press one key if the central arrow was 
pointing to the left, and another key if it was pointing to the right, as quickly and 
accurately as possible. In the congruent condition flankers pointed in the same 
direction as the target (e.g. < < < < <). In the incongruent condition flankers pointed in 
the opposite direction to the target (e.g. > > < > >, bold font added only for 
illustration). There were 4 different flanker and target combinations (target pointing 






Figure 5: Flanker task. 
Participants responded depending on the direction of the central arrow, which could be 
surrounded by congruent or incongruent arrows. High and Low reward conditioned 
stimuli as well as Grey control backgrounds were task irrelevant.  
 
Each of the flanker combinations was superimposed on each of 20 selected HR and LR 
CS images, to generate 80 HR and 80 LR trials (40 in the congruent and 40 in the 
incongruent condition). An additional 40 congruent and 40 incongruent trials with a 
plain grey background (i.e. control trials) were also included to generate a single task 
block of 240 trials in total. Trial order was pseudorandomized to avoid presentation of 
the same background and same congruency condition for more than 3 consecutive 
trials.  
Mean latencies and accuracy scores (% of correct responses) were computed for each 




conditions. The flanker effect was also computed for each image condition separately 
as the difference in average latency in the incongruent condition minus the average 
latency in the congruent condition. 
Participants completed 40 practice trials, 20 congruent and 20 incongruent, with only 
the grey plain background before the main block. A minimum accuracy of 70% was 
required to proceed to the experimental block (achieved by all participants).  
3.5.3 Procedure 
Each participant completed a single testing session. They first gave written informed 
consent that they agreed to take part in the study. This was followed by the 
completion of the AUQ, AUDIT, PANAS, BIS-11, and BPQ. They then completed two 
tasks designed to measure interoceptive awareness (detailed in Garfinkel et al. (2015), 
see supplemental materials for data), followed by the reward conditioning procedure 
and pleasantness evaluation. Finally, they completed the CS N-back and Flanker tasks 
in a counterbalanced order. At the end of the experiment they were debriefed and 
compensated for their participation. 
3.5.4 Data analysis 
3.5.4.1 Bayesian analysis 
Bayesian analyses provide a statistical tool with which the sensitivity of results can be 
determined. This way it is possible to extract conclusions out of non-significant 
findings generated by frequentist statistical approaches (Zoltan Dienes, 2014). A Bayes 
factor (B) of above 3 shows compelling evidence towards the alternative hypothesis 




towards the null hypothesis (i.e. there is no difference between two means). A B 
between 3 and 1/3 implies there is not enough evidence in either direction.  
Bayes factors were used (a) as a tool for sensitive categorization of participants into 
those who were aware of the CS-HR/LR contingencies and those who were not (see 
Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018 for details and below for a summary); and (b) to 
examine the sensitivity of within group comparisons of the pleasantness ratings (see 
“Pleasantness” below).  
3.5.4.2 Contingency Awareness Categorization 
Determining the unconscious nature of a mental process requires evidence of an 
inability or failure to consciously perceive that process. This typically involves asserting 
the null hypothesis that performance on some knowledge related task is no different 
to chance, which cannot be evaluated using traditional frequentist statistical analyses 
(Zoltan Dienes, 2015). Therefore a Bayesian approach (Sand & Nilsson, 2016) was used 
to categorize participants as Aware or Unaware of contingencies using the data 
gathered from the conditioning procedure (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018). 
Using Signal Detection Theory (SDT) methods (Barrett et al., 2013; Stanislaw and 
Todorov, 1999), we computed the number of Type I:  Hits (responding “Yes” on a HR 
trial), Correct Rejections (responding “No” on a LR trial), False Alarms (responding 
“Yes” on a LR trial) and Misses (responding “No” on a HR trial) from blocks 4 and 5 of 
the conditioning task. Type I scores reflect performance accuracy. 
Type II scores, provide an account of the metacognitive knowledge generated during 




et al., 2001). Confidence responses were transformed to a dichotomous variable: 
responses of two or below (i.e. “more or less guessing” or “completely guessing”) were 
classified as “not confident”, and those above two as “highly confident”. Thus, a Type II 
Hit was defined as a Type I Hit or Correct Rejection with high confidence; a Correct 
Rejection as a Type I Miss or False Alarm with low confidence; a False Alarm as a Type I 
Miss or False Alarm with high confidence; and a Miss as a Type I Hit or Correct 
Rejection with low confidence.  
 Logistic d1’(Logd1’) and Standard Error d1’ (SEd1’) scores were calculated for each 
participant as well as Logd2’ and Sed2’ scores. As d2’ scores rarely exceed d1’ scores 
(Zoltan Dienes, 2015), a Bayes factor was calculated for each participant on their 
Logd2’ modelling H1 with a Uniform going from 0 (chance level) to their own Logd1’ as 
a prior. Participants with B<1/3 were categorized as Metacognitively Unaware, 
whereas those with a B>3 were considered Metacognitively Aware, and the rest as 
insensitive.  
The mean Logd1’ score from those participants Metacognitively Aware was used as a 
maximum for a uniform to model H1 in order to test the sensitivity of each participant’s 
Logd1’. Each corresponding B allowed determining their CA as significant (i.e. aware of 
the stimulus-reward contingencies), sensitively null (i.e. unaware of the contingencies) 
or insensitive (neither sensitively aware nor unaware)3.  
                                                        
3 The MatLab script developped to generate this categorization is available online and 





Out of the 49 participants who completed the study, on the basis of Type II scores, 7 
had metacognitive awareness, 12 were definitely Unaware, and 30 showed an 
insensitive result. On the basis of Type I scores, 16 participants were categorized as 
being Aware of contingencies, 20 were Unaware, and 13 had an insensitive Bayes 
factor.  
 
Type I Awareness 
 
  Aware Unaware Insensitive Total 
 
Type II Awareness 
Aware 7 0 0 7 
Unaware 1 11 0 12 
Insensitive 8 9 13 30 
Total 16 20 13 49 
 
Table 4: Distribution of participants between Contingency Awareness and Meta-
cognition groups 
 
Thus, participants could be categorized as Aware, Unaware or Insensitive both on a 
metacognitive and on a contingency awareness level (see Table 4). All analyses 
reported below were performed on the basis of Type I categorization and only with the 
16 Aware and 20 Unaware participants, discarding the 13 participants who showed an 
Insensitive result. 







A series of Independent Samples t-tests compared age and scores on questionnaires 
(BIS, AUDIT, AUQ, PANAS Positive and BPQ) between Aware and Unaware groups. Due 
to violations of normality a Wilcoxon test was performed on PANAS Negative and 
Reverse Digit Span data. A Chi-square was computed to test for differences in gender 
distribution. 
3.5.4.4 Pleasantness 
A 2x2 mixed ANOVA with stimulus-type (HR vs. LR) as the within, and CA (Aware vs. 
Unaware) as the between subjects’ factor examined the effects of contingency 
awareness on pleasantness ratings for HR/LR CS.  
A Bayes factor using significant data from Leganes-Fonteneau et al. (2018) as priors 
was computed for each group separately to quantify differences in pleasantness 
ratings between HR and LR CS.  
3.5.4.5 N-back task 
One participant was excluded from all analyses involving the N-back task due to low 
accuracy in the 2-back condition (<54%). Given the differences in sample size existing 
between Aware and Unaware conditions analyses are conducted separately for each 






For each of the three accuracy indices we computed a 2x2 ANOVA with stimulus-type 
(HR vs. LR) and load (0-back vs. 2-back) as within subjects’ factors. Due to the observed 
violations of normality (Shapiro-Wilk tests, ps<.004) that were non-amendable using 
transformations, these ANOVAs were performed using ARTool non-parametric 
analyses for non-normal distributions in R (Wobbrock et al., 2011).  
3.5.4.7 Latencies 
Due to violations of normality, all latency scores were log transformed and analyses 
were performed on the log transformed data. We examined latencies on all trials as 
well as latencies of target trials only in separate analyses.  These analyses used 2x2 
ANOVAs with stimulus-type (HR vs. LR) and load (0-back vs. 2-back) as within subjects’ 
factors, and significant interactions were explored using paired-samples t-Tests.  
3.5.4.8 Flanker task 
Participants with accuracy deviating by more than 2 SDs from the mean in the 
congruent Control condition were considered to be outliers. Consequently 3 
participants were excluded from all analyses involving Flanker task data. As for the 
analysis of the N-Back task, all analyses described below were computed in each group 
separately. 
3.5.4.9 Accuracy 
Normality was violated for all accuracy scores. Thus, analyses on accuracy data were 




incongruent) and stimulus-type (HR vs. LR vs. Control) as within subjects’ factors. Chi 
Squares were performed on interactions followed by Wilcoxon tests.  
3.5.4.10 Latencies 
Latency and flanker effect scores were normally distributed. Analyses of latency data 
involved 2x2 ANOVAs, with congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and stimulus-type 
(HR vs. LR vs. Control) as within subjects’ factors. Significant main effects of stimulus-
type were followed by post-hoc Bonferroni corrected contrasts. Significant stimulus-
type by congruency interactions were explored by running One-way Repeated 
Measures ANOVAs separately at each level of congruency, and significant effects were 
followed up further with Bonferroni corrected contrasts. In order to examine 
differences in the Flanker effect computed for the Control, LR and HR stimulus-type 
conditions, we used One-way Repeated Measures ANOVAs followed by Bonferroni 
corrected contrasts.  
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4 The role of interoception in appetitive conditioning  
 
 
4.1 Abstract   
Interoception, the perception of internal bodily sensations, modulates the 
development of emotional responses. Two experiments studied the role of 
interoception in appetitive Pavlovian conditioning, particularly in emotional responses 
to reward associated stimuli and the accuracy in reward prediction. Using a reward 
learning task, naturalistic (Experiment 1, n=47) and abstract stimuli (Experiment 2, 
n=59) were paired with high or low probabilities of monetary reward. Both 
experiments demonstrate that individuals with high interoception show elevated 
emotional responsiveness towards stimuli predicting high reward, whereas individuals 
with low interoception do not. Experiment 1 also shows enhanced reward prediction in 
individuals with high versus low interoception, while Experiment 2  did not find an 
effect on metacognitive contingency awareness. Therefore, only participants with high 
interoceptive abilities were able to develop stimulus congruent emotional reactions 
and successfully predict stimulus-outcome contingencies. These findings highlight the 
role of viscero-afferent responses in reward learning models, and their perception 
could foster the development of conditioned responses, potentiating drug related cue-
reactivity. These findings may have implications for the development of strategies for 





The role of viscero-afferent responses in the generation of emotional reactions is 
integral to ‘peripheral’ theories of emotion. These propose a basis for emotional 
feelings in the central representation and perception of changes in bodily physiology 
(James, 1884). Interoception, the ability to perceive internal bodily sensations 
(Cameron, 2001; Sherrington, 1948) emanating from inflammatory, thermoregulatory 
or visceromotor functioning, (e.g. cardiac signalling (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, 
Ohman, & Dolan, 2004)), is found to modulate the generation of emotional responses 
(Dunn et al., 2010) and affective experiences (Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos, Gramann, 
& Schandry, 2007; Wiens, 2005).  
High interoception can also facilitate emotional learning. Interoception modulates 
bodily responses in the presence of emotional stimuli as well as the recall of those 
stimuli (Pollatos & Schandry, 2008). 
The role of interoception on emotional associative learning was also examined by 
Pfeifer et al. (2017) using an emotional face learning task, and again providing 
evidence supporting the ability of highly interoceptive subjects to perform better in 
emotional learning. Furthermore, experimentally directing attention towards bodily 
responses can facilitate the development of  learning (Raes & De Raedt, 2011); 
participants performing a heart beat tracking task developed stronger conditioned 
responses during a subsequent aversive conditioning task compared to their 




Interoception may also support appraisal of emotional stimuli without conscious 
experience. Indeed, during a subliminal aversive conditioning task, participants with 
high interoceptive accuracy were better able to predict the occurrence of an electric 
shock (Katkin et al., 2001). Thus, increased interoception may facilitate the 
development of contingency awareness (CA) during aversive conditioning.  
Emotions can influence addictive behaviour (Verdejo-Garcia, Perez-Garcia, & Bechara, 
2006), thus interoceptive events may also contribute to drug addiction. Indeed, under 
repeated drug exposure, cues associated with the substance acquire reinforcing 
properties and incentive salience generating hedonic, attentional and autonomic 
responses. These processes are equivalent to those observed through appetitive 
Pavlovian conditioning (Stewart, de Wit, & Eikelboom, 1984) and participate in the 
maintenance of drug related behaviours (Wiers & Stacy, 2006). Furthermore the link 
between interoception and drug addiction has been shown using neuro-imaging 
studies (Antonio Verdejo-Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012), lesion studies (Naqvi, Rudrauf, 
Damasio, & Bechara, 2007) and behavioural accounts (Sönmez, Kılıç, Çöl, Görgülü, & 
Çınar, 2016). 
The insula is a brain structure that has been isolated as underlying both interoceptive 
processes and addictive behaviours. The involvement of insula in the processing of 
afferent body signals and interoception has repeatedly been demonstrated (Critchley 
et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2007; Schulz, 2016) as well as the relevance of this brain 
area in emotional responses (Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013; Terasawa, Shibata, 
Moriguchi, & Umeda, 2013). The insula also has a significant role in addictive 




experience and bodily states could explain processes leading to drug use and cravings 
(see Garavan, 2010 for a review), as its ability to represent interoceptive effects of 
substance administration may drive drug seeking behaviours (Naqvi, Gaznick, Tranel, & 
Bechara, 2014) through the pairing of autonomic and visceral reactions elicited by drug 
administration with drug related stimuli (Stewart, May, Tapert, & Paulus, 2015). 
Activation of such autonomic and visceral responses in the presence of drug related 
stimuli can prime the organism to adopt drug seeking behaviour. However, the 
mechanisms by which interoception facilitates addiction are not fully understood.  
The ability of substance-related cues to elicit conditioned hedonic responses has been 
demonstrated in a variety of drugs, including cocaine (i.e. Moeller et al., 2009), 
tobacco (Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003) and alcohol (i.e. Field, Mogg, 
Zetteler, & Bradley, 2004). However, measuring hedonic responses in the laboratory 
towards naturalistic stimuli intrinsically related with the substance can generate 
demand awareness in participants, inflating responses towards drug-related cues. For 
that reason, we have followed appetitive conditioning procedures in the laboratory 
associating abstract neutral stimuli with monetary rewards (Leganes-Fonteneau, Scott, 
& Duka, 2018). This way it is possible to isolate and study the generation of 
conditioned responses without the effect of previous experiences.  
Given that reward conditioned stimuli can generate hedonic reactions (e.g. Jeffs & 
Duka, 2017), and equivalent attentional responses (e.g. Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 
2011; Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018) to naturalistic drug related stimuli, this paper 
set out to examine the role of interoception in the development of appetitive 




extent to which interoception could contribute to the development of conditioned 
emotional responses. 
Participants completed two well established tasks, the heartbeat tracking (Schandry, 
1981) and heartbeat discrimination (Katkin, Reed, & Deroo, 1983; Whitehead, 
Drescher, Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977) tasks measuring different interoceptive abilities. 
Out of these tasks, measures of interoceptive accuracy (behavioural performance on 
these tasks), sensibility (subjective confidence) and metacognitive interoception 
(relationship between confidence and accuracy) are extracted (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, 
Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015).  
For the purpose of this paper we will focus on individual differences in metacognitive 
interoception (Garfinkel, Manassei, et al., 2016) also termed interoceptive awareness 
(Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013; Garfinkel et al., 2015) and “interoceptive insight” (Khalsa 
et al., 2017) as such an approach has been suggested to provide a novel tool in 
examining the role of interoception in emotional processes (Garfinkel & Critchley, 
2013).  Moreover, we hypothesise that meta-cognitive interoception may be 
particularly implicated in the development of contingency awareness as it is the 
dimension of interoception that specifically pertains to the conscious processing of 
interoceptive signals. The common denominator between interoceptive awareness, 
contingency awareness and subjective emotional ratings being consciously perceived 
information, it might be more useful, and appropriate, to investigate this relationship 
at an explicit level.   
An established conditioning procedure was applied (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018; 




low (LR) probabilities of reward. Reward prediction and CA were measured out of this 
task.  
A previously published paper using this data base allowed categorising participants as 
Aware or Unaware of the contingencies (see Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018), which 
could have an effect on the development of hedonic responses. To control for a 
possible such effect we accounted for CA effects in the analyses of pleasantness to 
better isolate the role of interoception. 
Participants were separated according to their levels of metacognitive interoceptive 
ability in both the heartbeat tracking and discrimination tasks. It was hypothesized 
that participants with high metacognitive interoception would develop more 
pleasantness towards stimuli paired with HR compared to those paired with LR.  In 
addition, we examined whether metacognitive interoception could explain the 
development of knowledge of the outcome that the stimuli predict (i.e. CA) in 
Experiment 1, and the ability to explicitly express that knowledge (i.e. metacognitive 
CA) in Experiment 2.  
4.3 Experiment 1 
4.3.1 Aims 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to determine if differences in interoceptive ability affect 
the development of stimulus congruent emotional responses after a conditioning task. 
In addition, we evaluated whether interoception can determine the development of 







Forty-eight University of Sussex students took part in this experiment. Interoceptive 
measurements for two participants were lost due to technical issues, thefore 46 
participants were included in the final analysis (26 females, mean age= 23.85, 
SD=8.06). Participants signed up for the study through an online recruitment system 
and were compensated financially or with compulsory course credits for their 
participation.  
Participants undergoing medical treatment (except contraceptive pill) or with a history 
of mental illness were excluded from the experiment. This study was granted ethical 
approval by the University of Sussex Life Sciences ethics committee.  
4.3.2.2  Apparatus and stimuli 
A Nonin 8000SM finger pulse oximeter and an XPOD transmitter monitored 
participants’ heartbeats during the interoception tasks at a frequency of 75Hz, its input 
was processed by a MatLab script. Pictures of Houses (small unifamiliar edifice) and 
Buildings (multi-story construction) (36 per category) gathered from the internet were 
selected from an original pool of 50 Houses and 50 Buildings so that they matched for 
pleasantness ratings given by an independent sample of participants in a pilot study 
(Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018).  
Stimuli were presented on a Dell ACPI 64-bit PC, screen refresh rate= 16.6ms using E-




phase 10, 20 and 50 pence coins were used as tangible reinforcers at the end of each 
block, located in a bank box. An earnings box was also made available.   
4.3.2.3 Questionnaires 
Participants’ demographic characteristics were assessed at entry to the study. 
Alcohol consumption patterns were assessed with the Alcohol Use Questionnaire 
(AUQ, Mehrabian & Russell, 1978). This questionnaire measures the number of drinks 
consumed per week and the speed of consumption. A Binge Score is also extracted 
using the number of times participants reported being drunk in the last month, the 
amount of drinks per hour and the percentage of times intoxicated (Townshend & 
Duka, 2002).  In addition the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) 
(Saunders et al., 1993) was also administered, this identifies alcohol-related risk 
behaviours through 10 multiple-choice items.  
Impulsivity was also assessed using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) (Patton, 
Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). The BIS-11 provides a 30-item measure of motor, 
attentional and non-planning impulsivity. BIS-11 questionnaire was administered 
together with the Behavioural Inhibition and Activation Systems Questionnaire 
(BIS/BAS) evaluating approach-avoidance behaviours (Carver & White, 1994). The BIS 
is related to negative reward and punishment avoidance, whereas the BAS reflects the 
person’s disposition to engage in goal-directed behaviours. Current mood was 
assessed by  the PANAS mood questionnaire (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) which 
provided a measure of Positive and Negative affects through 10 mood items 




gathered using the Porges Body Perception Questionnaire (BPQ, Porges, 1993). This 
subscale measures bodily sensations (e.g. eye fatigue, muscle tension) through 45 
items. Participants are requested to indicate from 1 to 5 how often they feel each 
sensation.  
4.3.2.4 Interoception measurements 
Interoceptive Accuracy: Two tasks measuring participants’ ability to feel their 
heartbeat, the tracking and the discrimination task, served as a basis to develop the 
interoceptive accuracy measurement. Tasks were always presented in the same order. 
The finger pulse oximeter was placed on the annular finger of the non-dominant hand 
only for interoceptive measurements.  
Heartbeat tracking task: During the heartbeat tracking task (Schandry, 1981) 
participants heard through a set of speakers the word “Start” and were instructed to 
count how many heartbeats they felt until they heard “Stop”. They then had to report 
to the experimenter the number of heartbeats felt. At the beginning of the task 
participants completed a practice trial lasting 20s. The task consisted of 6 trials varying 
in length (25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50s) occurring in random order. Accuracy scores for 
each trial of the tracking task were computed using the formulae: 
(|nbeatsreal  - nbeatsreported|)	÷	((nbeatsreal + nbeatsreported)	÷2)  
to account for the accuracy biases induced by high counts on longer trials (Hart, 





Heartbeat discrimination task: During the heartbeat discrimination task (Katkin et al., 
1983; Whitehead et al., 1977) the emission of ten auditory tones (100 ms, 440Hz) is 
triggered by participants’ heartbeat. The tones sound at the same rate as the 
heartbeat, however, for half of the trials the tones were synchronized with their 
heartbeat and for the other half a phasic delay of 300 ms was inserted between each 
heartbeat and the tone. Therefore, on 50% of trials participants heard 10 tones 
emitted at the same rate as their heartbeat but unsynchronized with it. Participants 
had to indicate at the end of each trial whether they thought the tones were 
synchronous or asynchronous with their heartbeat. The task included 20 sequences 
altogether, fully randomizing the occurrence of synchronised and non-synchronised 
trials.  
For each trial, independent accuracy scores were computed to form average scores for 
each task.  
Participants were instructed to feel their heartbeat within their whole bodies, and 
were precluded from manually feeling their pulse on their chest, neck or wrist.  
Interoceptive Sensibility: After each trial, for both tasks, participants had to indicate 
how confident they were in their responses, from “total guess” to “completely 
confident”, using a Visual Analog Scale (VAS; 0 to100) via Inquisit. Average Confidence 
scores were computed across trials.  
Interoceptive Awareness: Metacognitive interoceptive awareness, the level of insight 
participants have about their ability to detect their own bodily sensations, is evaluated 




This measures thus determines the extent to which participants are aware of their 
accuracy in assessing their own heart timing (see Data Analysis section). 
4.3.2.5 Conditioning task 
Using a task irrelevant conditioning procedure (Yokoyama et al., 2015), stimuli 
belonging to each of the categories (Houses or Buildings) were paired with 80% or 20% 
probabilities of getting a reward, the value of which was always 10p. On the rest of the 
trials participants obtained nothing. The stimulus category paired with High (HR) or 
Low reward (LR) probability was counterbalanced across participants.  
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms followed by the 
presentation of a HR or LR CS with an overlaid green or yellow Square.  
Participants’ were instructed to press a green or yellow key depending on the colour of 
the overlaid Square whilst the stimuli were on screen. Stimuli remained on screen for 
2000 ms or until participants effected a response (max recorded time 1499 ms). 
Inmediately after their response, feedback appeared for 1500 ms indicating whether 
they had earned 10p. or nothing, depending on the stimulus-outcome contingency. 
Trials in which participants pressed the wrong button were automatically awarded 0p. 
Participants were told they would occasionally obtain money but were not informed 
about the nature of stimulus-reward contingencies. Expectancy awareness was 
measured via a Likert scale after responding to the colour of the Square. Participants 
had to press a key, from 1 to 9, to indicate how likely they thought they were to win 
10p. whilst the stimulus compound remained on screen until response. Expectancy 




measurement that would not generate awareness-bias (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). 
After the response, feedback about the outcome of the trial appeared on screen, see 
Figure 1. 
Five blocks of 72 trials (36 HR and 36 LR) were presented. After each block, 
participants received information on screen about the total amount earnt during that 
block. Participants were instructed to grab and count the equivalent amount in 10, 20 
and 50 pence coins from the bank box and transfer it to their earnings box. Finally, 
feedback about the total amount earnt during the conditioning task appeared.  
 
Figure 1: Conditioning procedure used both in experiments 1 and 2. Stimuli depicted 
were used in experiment 1. Using a task irrelevant conditioning task stimuli were 
paired with different probabilities of monetary reward. Expectancy awareness was 





The order of trials was pseudorandomized, and the same category of CS (HR/LR) could 
not appear more than 4 times in a row. The same pseudorandomization was applied to 
the colour of the overlaid Square. A pseudorandomisation was also applied to CA 
evaluations so that it could occur every 3, 4 or 5 trials.  
4.3.2.6 Pleasantness measurement 
Following an Emotional Attentional Blink task (presented elsewhere, (Leganes-
Fonteneau et al., 2018)), pleasantness associated with the stimuli was measured. 
Eighteen pictures of HR and LR from each category were presented in random order 
and participants had to rate how pleasant each of them was from 1 to 9. Stimuli 
remained on screen until a response was recorded.  
4.3.3 Procedure 
After signing the informed consent form, participants completed a series of 
questionnaires (see questionnaire section) and the two tasks measuring heartbeat 
interoceptive awareness. The reward-conditioning task was then applied. An 
Emotional Attentional Blink task was performed at the end of the conditioning in order 
to examine attentional conditioned responses; however the data from the Emotional 
Attentional Blink are described elsewhere (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018).  Finally, 
pleasantness ratings for the stimuli (HR and LR) were taken at the end of the 





4.3.4 Data Analysis 
4.3.4.1 Interoceptive awareness 
Metacognitive measures are generated by computing the relationship between 
accuracy and confidence, separately for each of the two tasks.  
For the heartbeat tracking task, interoceptive awareness was obtained running a 
Pearson’s correlation between accuracy and confidence for each trial as both accuracy 
and confidence were measured using a continuous variable (Garfinkel et al., 2015). 
For the discrimination task, which provides categorical binary values (accurate/not 
accurate) for each trial, a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis (Green 
& Swets, 1966) determined the extent to which confidence responses were related to 
task accuracy (Garfinkel et al., 2015). The ROC curve plots over all possible detection 
thresholds the hit vs. false alarm rate, providing a numerical measure (area under the 
ROC) of interoceptive awareness irrespective of positive or negative confidence biases.  
4.3.4.2 Group categorizations 
As the aim of this experiment was to determine the role of individual differences in 
metacognitive interoceptive awareness on aspects of Pavlovian conditioning, 
participants were classified as high or low in interoceptive awareness using a median 
split (as performed for example on Garfinkel et al., 2015; Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, & 
Seth, 2013; Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez, & Costantini, 2011). Two distinct 
categorizations were created, low meta-trackers (LMT) versus high meta-trackers 




The median score in the tracking task was .318. On the basis of the median score HMT 
(n=23, mean=.66, SD=.20) and LMT (n=23, mean=-.03, SD=.27) groups were generated.  
The median score in the discrimination task was .505. On the basis of the median score 
HMD (n=23, mean=.63, SD=.09) and LMD (n=23, mean=.43, SD=.06) groups were 
created.   
4.3.4.3 Questionnaires and Interoceptive Accuracy and Sensibility 
A series of one-way ANOVAS compared scores on the different questionnaires 
between HMD and LMD groups. That same comparison was carried-out between HMT 
and LMT groups. A Chi-Square test explored the overlap of participants belonging to 
both groups.  
One-way ANOVAS compared interoceptive accuracy and sensibility and heart rate on 
both interoception tasks between the groups regarding tracking (HMT vs. LMT) and 
discrimination (LMD vs. HMD) respectively. 
4.3.4.4 Pleasantness 
Previous analyses using the same dataset (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018) showed 
that stimulus category (Houses vs. Buildings) seems to influence the development of 
pleasantness towards HR stimuli. Houses were consistently evaluated as more pleasant 
than Buildings during the conditioning task, although an independent sample of 
participants who rated the pictures for pleasantness in each category did not find 
differences between them. For that reason, in a Mixed 3-way ANOVA analysing the 
effect of interoceptive awareness on pleasantness ratings, we included stimulus 




discrimination awareness group [(HMD vs. LMD) or (HMT and LMT)] as between 
factors with stimulus type (HR vs. LR) as within factor. Mean heartbeat was included as 
covariate for the between group interactions. Difference scores between expectancy 
towards HR and LR stimuli were included also as a covariate to account for CA effects.  
4.3.4.5 Contingency Awareness 
A Mixed 2-way ANOVA analysed the effect of interoceptive awareness on expectancy 
ratings, with stimulus type (HR vs. LR) as within, and discrimination awareness group 
(HMD vs. LMD) as between subjects’ factors. Mean heartbeat was included as 
covariate for the interaction. An equivalent ANOVA was run for the HMT and LMT 
groups. 
Post-hoc paired samples t-test compared scores towards HR and LR stimuli within 
group when necessary.  
4.3.5 Results 
4.3.5.1 Questionnaires and Interoceptive Accuracy and Sensibility 
The Chi-Square test did not show any significant association between both 
classifications, χ2(1)=0.087, p=.768. See Table 1 for participant distribution between 
groups.  
  Meta-discrimination  
  High Low Total 
Meta-
tracking 
High 12 11 23 
Low 11 12 23 





Table 1: Categorization of participants in different groups depending on their scores on 
meta-tracking and meta-discrimination, Experiment 1.  
 
There were no age or gender differences either between LMT and HMT or LMD and 
HMD. The groups also were not significantly different in terms of their scores on 
alcohol consumption, AUDIT, impulsivity or mood. Only the BAS scores were different 
between LMD and HMD, however this difference did not survive corrections for 
multiple comparisons (see Table 2). 
 
Discrimination task            High-Meta group  n=23        Low- Meta group  n=23  
 Mean SD  Mean  SD F(1,46) p 
One-way ANOVA               
Age 23.04 7.56  24.65 8.63 0.452 .51 
BIS-11 2.04 0.39  2.20 0.44 1.513 .23 
AUDIT 6.57 4.52  9.04 7.28 1.922 .17 
Binge score 18.19 13.48  20.70 20.76 0.236 .63 
AUQ score 25.79 17.32  32.53 30.03 0.87 .36 
PANAS Positive 2.82 0.77  2.87 0.89 0.053 .82 
PANAS Negative 1.53 0.51  1.49 0.45 0.06 .81 
BAS 2.81 0.37  3.07 0.42 4.88 .03 
BIS 2.80 0.32  2.83 0.32 0.107 .75 
 Porges 2.74 0.52  2.76 0.59 0.018 .89 
        
Tracking Task         High-Meta group n=23        Low Meta group  n=23  
 Mean SD  Mean  SD F(1,45) p 
Age  25.43 9.64  22.26 5.89 1.82 .18 
BIS-11 2.05 0.36  2.19 0.46 1.21 .28 
AUDIT 6.78 5.60  8.83 6.57 1.29 .26 
Binge Score 17.98 17.87  20.91 17.10 0.32 .57 




PANAS Positive 2.90 0.84 
 
2.80 0.82 0.17 .69 
PANAS Negative 1.44 0.47 
 
1.57 0.49 0.85 .36 
BAS 2.89 0.44 
 
2.99 0.39 0.72 .40 
BIS 2.83 0.33 
 
2.81 0.31 0.04 .84 
Porges  2.74 0.52   2.76 0.58 0.02 .88 
 
Table 2: Results of questionnaire analyses for median splits on metacognitive 
interoception for discrimination and tracking tasks, Experiment 1. 
There were no significant differences in terms of accuracy, confidence and heart rate 
between high and low meta trackers or discriminators, see Table 3. 
 
   High-meta group    Low-meta group      
  Mean SD  Mean  SD F(1,45) p 
Tracking Accuracy 0.61 .20  0.51 .26 2.109 .154 
 Confidence 0.47 .23  0.40 .20 1.425 .239 
 Heart rate 77.43 10.59  82.07 9.66 2.399 .129 
         F(1,45) p 
Discrimination Accuracy 0.50 0.15  0.48 0.14 0.162 .69 
 Confidence 0.52 0.15  0.53 0.19 0.023 .88 
 Heart rate 78.34 8.79  78.51 9.91 0.004 .95 
 
Table 3: Descriptives and statistics for the comparison of interoceptive accuracy and 
confidence as well as heart-rate between their respective metacognitive groups in 






There was no significant main effect of stimulus type on pleasantness measurements, 
F(1,41)=0.503, p=.482.  
As predicted,  a significant interaction was found between meta-discrimination group 
and stimulus type, F(1,41)=5.000, p=.031, Fig. 2, with HMD experiencing more 
pleasantness towards HR than LR, and LMD showing the opposite pattern (although 
post-hoc paired t-tests comparing HR and LR stimuli within groups were non-significant 
ps>.13).  
There was no significant 3-way interaction between stimulus type, category and meta-
discrimination group, F(1,41)=0.951, p=.335, no main effect of group, F(1,41)=0.175, 
p=.678 and no interaction between stimulus type and the heart rate covariate, 
F(1,41)=0.593, p=.446. 
 
Figure 2: Pleasantness ratings towards High reward and Low reward stimuli depending 




























With regard to the tracking task, contrary to our prediction, there was no significant 
interaction between stimulus type and group (HMT vs LMT; F(1,41)=0.717, p=.402), or 
between stimulus type, group and stimulus category, F(1,41)=0.121, p=.730. No main 
effect of group was found either, F(1,41)=1.223 p=.275, and no interaction between 
stimulus type and the heart rate covariate, F(1,41)=0.858, p=.360. 
As previously reported (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018), there was a Two-way 
interaction between stimulus type and stimulus category, F(1,41)=11.415, p=.002, with 
Houses when paired with high probabilities of reward, HR (mean=6.05, SD=1.47) being 
rated more pleasant than LR (mean=5.02, SD=1.29), t(20)=2.687, p=.014;  Buildings on 
the other hand were rated as marginally less pleasant when paired with high 
probabilities of reward  HR [HR (mean=5.24, SD=1.79), t(26)=-1.933, p=.064 than LR 
(mean=6.00, SD=.335)].  
4.3.5.3 Contingency Awareness 
There was no main effect of stimulus type on expectancy ratings, F(1,43)=0.349, 
p=.558, but   
regarding the tracking split there was a significant interaction between group and 
stimulus type, F(1,43)=4.231, p=.046, with HMT showing higher expectancy ratings for 
HR than for LR, t(22)=2.212, p=.038. LMT showed no significant differences in their 
ratings between HR and LR, t(22)=0.176, p=.862, see Figure 3.  
No main effect of group was found, F(1,43)=0.322, p=.573, and no interaction between 





Figure 3: Expectancy ratings towards HR and LR stimuli depending on meta-tracking 
group. * High meta-trackers show increased expectancy evaluations towards HR 
stimuli compared to LR, t(22)=2.212, p=.038, Experiment 1. 
 
There was no significant interaction between discrimination awareness group and 
stimulus type, F(1,43)=.444, p=.509. There was a marginal main effect of group, 
F(1,43)=3.815, p=.057, and no interaction between stimulus type and the heart rate 
covariate, F(1,43)=0.443, p=.509. 
4.3.6 Discussion Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 shows, in accordance with our predictions, that metacognitive 
interoceptive awareness in the heartbeat discrimination task has a role in the 
development of pleasantness towards the stimulus associated with high reward (HR). 
Contrary to our predictions, such an effect was not found with the metacognitive 




participants with HMT compared to LMT, were better able to discriminate outcome-
contingencies correctly, showing the relevance of interoceptive abilities in reward 
prediction. These findings point to possible differences in interoceptive abilities as 
measured with the heartbeat tracking and discrimination task. 
It is worth noting that the conditioning task itself failed to generate increased 
pleasantness for HR stimuli over LR stimuli. The fact that Houses when associated with 
high reward were found more pleasant compared to LR stimulus may be explained as 
follows: It is possible that pre-existing differences in the intrinsic nature of the stimuli 
(Houses as naturalistic conditioned stimuli may be preferable to Buildings), permitted 
the repeated association of Houses with high reward to increase pleasantness, while 
the lower pre-exiting preference for Buildings prevented the same effect occurring for 
those stimuli.  
4.4 Experiment 2 
4.4.1 Aims 
In order to address the limitations on Experiment 1, specifically the lack of a main 
effect of stimulus type on pleasantness evaluation, the second experiment used 
abstract stimuli instead of Houses and Buildings. Using two different categories of 
geometrical shapes, Squares and Octagons, we aimed to prevent the development of 
pleasantness ratings from being modulated by the intrinsic differential characteristic of 
naturalistic stimuli and thus to more accurately examine the role of interoception in 




Subjective measurements of expectancy assess whether participants have developed 
knowledge about the rules governing stimulus-outcome contingencies. However, 
within this measure, it is not evaluated whether participants have developed conscious 
awareness about those rules. For that purpose, we added confidence ratings after 
each expectancy awareness evaluation to develop a measure of metacognitive 
contingency awareness (Barrett, Dienes, & Seth, 2013; Dienes & Perner, 1999); 
measurements of CA were changed to a dichotomous scale to avoid response transfers 
between confidence and expectancy ratings. The aim was to investigate in detail 
whether interoceptive awareness explains CA development, metacognitive-awareness 
development, or both. Probabilities of reward were changed in order to facilitate the 
development of metacognitive contingency awareness.  
4.4.2 Methods 
4.4.2.1  Participants 
Sixty participants took part in this experiment; however, data from one of the 
participants was discarded due to a failure in interoceptive measurements. A total of 
59 Sussex University Students (52 females, mean age= 22.7, SD= 3.78) were considered 
for data analysis. Participants completed all the questionnaires as in Experiment 1. This 






4.4.2.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
A set of 72 geometrical stimuli belonging to two different categories were developed 
using InkScape software. These geometrical stimuli were created in order to obtain 
stimuli devoid of any intrinsic value properties and hence to maximise the generation 
of emotional reactions congruent solely with the conditioning procedure. Stimuli 
consisted of 36 Squares and 36 Octagons and were filled with different motifs of 
stripes, see Figure 4, for a detailed description of stimuli, see (Leganes-Fonteneau et 
al., 2018). The stimuli appeared overlaid on neutral landscape pictures for all tasks. 
 
 
Figure 4: Stimuli used for the conditioning in experiment 2.  36 Octagons (A) and 36 
Squares (B) were chosen for Experiment 2 to replace the Houses and Buildings used in 
Experiment 1. All stimuli appeared overlaid on a picture showing a neutral landscape. 




during the Emotional Attentional Blink protocol administered between the two 
experiments. 
4.4.3 Procedure 
4.4.3.1 Conditioning task 
A task equal (besides the changes reported) to Experiment 1 was used with 
geometrical stimuli as CS. The probability of obtaining 10p. was increased for HR trials 
from 80% to 90%,  and decreased for LR from 20% to 10%.  
Expectancy awareness evaluation was also modified. A dichotomous question (“Will 
you get money?”, Yes/No) appeared on the same number of trials (25%) as the 
outcome expectancy question in experiment 1. In addition, participants had to indicate 
their level of confidence in their judgment via a Likert scale (1. “completely guessing”, 
2. “more or less guessing”, 3. “fairly sure”, 4. “almost certain”, 5. “completely 
certain”).  Measuring expectancy awareness this way allowed indexes of metacognitive 
contingency awareness to be determined.  
4.4.3.2 Pleasantness measurement 
Pleasantness ratings for HR and LR stimuli were obtained following the same 






4.4.4 Data analysis 
4.4.4.1 Interoceptive Awareness 
Following the procedure of Experiment 1, participants were separated into two groups 
according to their levels of metacognitive interoceptive awareness. Median values 
were comparable to those obtained in Experiment 1. For the heartbeat discrimination 
task, 29 participants were labelled as HMD if their scores were above the median 0.5 
(mean=.63 SD=.098) and 30 as LMD (mean=.36, SD=.108). Using scores from the 
heartbeat tracking task, 28 participants with scores higher than .23 (median) were 
categorized as HMT (mean=.59, SD=.196) and the rest as LMT (mean=-.24, SD=.36).  
4.4.4.2 Questionnaires and  Interoceptive Accuracy and Sensibility 
As in Experiment 1, one-way ANOVAS were applied  to compare the relevant data 
between HMD and LMD as well as between HMT and LMT. 
4.4.4.3 Pleasantness 
The role of interoception on the development of pleasantness was examined using a 2-
way mixed ANOVA with stimulus type (HR vs. LR) as within, and interoceptive-
awareness group (HMT vs. LMT and HMD vs LMD) as between subjects’ factors. Mean 
heartbeat was included as a covariate in the analysis of between group interactions. 
CA, measured with Type I d’ scores (see below), was introduced as a covariate in the 





4.4.4.4 Contingency Awareness 
CA was determined from the overall accuracy on the predictive task; this was 
necessary as, in this experiment, expectancy awareness was measured via a binary 
forced choice test (Yes/No). Type I d’ scores considering the rate of Hits (accurately 
predicting a HR trial), Correct Rejections (accurately predicting a LR trial), False Alarms 
and Misses were calculated for each participant, indicating their ability to anticipate 
trial outcomes accounting for response biases.  
In order to obtain numerical estimates of metacognitive CA levels, ROC scores were 
computed for each participant (Fleming & Lau, 2014). ROC analyses indicate the extent 
to which confidence ratings on expectancy measurements are predictive of accuracy in 
contingency discrimination. These scores were calculated separately for HR and LR 
trials to examine metacognition for both types of stimuli.  
A 2-way ANOVA with stimulus type (HR vs. LR) as within and interoceptive-awareness 
(HMT vs. LMT and HMD vs LMD) as between subjects’ factors examined the 
development of metacognitive awareness of stimulus-outcome contingencies based 
on ROC scores. Furthermore, one-way ANOVAS compared Type I d’ scores between 
interoceptive groups (HMT vs. LMT and HMD vs LMD).   
Mean heartbeat during interoception measurement was included as a covariate for all 






4.4.5.1 Questionnaires and Interoceptive Accuracy and Sensibility 
The Chi-Square test did not show any significant association between both 
classifications, χ2(1)=0.416, p=.519, See table 4 for frequency categorization of each 
group. 
  Meta-discrimination  
  High Low Total 
 High 15 13 28 
Meta-tracking Low 14 17 31 
 Total 29 30 59 
 
Table 4: Categorization of participants in different groups depending on their scores on 
meta-tracking and meta-discrimination, Experiment 2.  
 
There were no significant differences between groups in any of the questionnaire 
scores or on accuracy and confidence ratings in the interoceptive tasks, (see Table 5 










Discrimination task High-Meta group  n=29        Low-Meta group  n=30  
 Mean SD  Mean  SD F(1,58) p 
One-way 
ANOVA 
              
Age 20.38 3.88  20.73 2.97 .156 .69 
BIS-11 2.08 0.28 
 
2.04 0.29 .386 .54 
AUDIT 6.62 4.59 
 
6.30 5.13 .064 .80 
Binge Score 19.13 16.97 
 
17.28 16.21 .104 .67 
AUQ score 30.19 25.14 
 
30.08 25.99 .000 .99 
PANAS Positive 2.75 0.71 
 
3.13 0.83 3.507 .07 
PANAS Negative 1.43 0.43 
 
1.58 0.57 1.296 .26 
BAS 2.07 0.27 
 
2.06 0.32 .001 .98 
BIS 1.63 0.54 
 
1.88 0.51 3.063 .09 
 Porges 2.60 0.72   2.43 0.60 .925 .34 
        
Tracking Task High-Meta group  n=28        Low-Meta group  n=31  
 Mean SD  Mean  SD F(1,58) p 
Age  20.46 2.86   20.65 3.90 .040 .84 
BIS-11 2.01 0.33 
 
2.11 0.23 2.064 .16 
AUDIT 5.50 5.43 
 
7.32 4.13 2.133 .16 
Binge Score 16.89 17.42 
 
19.36 15.77 .327 .57 
AUQ score 26.56 28.20 
 
33.36 22.46 1.059 .31 
PANAS Positive 3.03 0.86 
 
2.86 0.73 .599 .44 
PANAS Negative 1.45 0.50 
 
1.55 0.51 .677 .41 
BAS 2.10 0.25 
 
2.03 0.33 .935 .34 
BIS 1.74 0.66 
 
1.77 0.41 .054 .82 
Porges  2.47 0.73   2.55 0.61 .216 .64 
 
Table 5: Results of questionnaire analyses for median splits on Meta-cognitive 






   High-meta group    Low-meta group      
  Mean SD  Mean  SD F(1,58) p 
Tracking Accuracy .49 .32  0.31 1.03 -.794 .38 
 Confidence 0.41 .19  0.38 .21 .356 .55 
 Heart rate 77.29 14.58  85.52 14.76 4.625 .036 
              F(1,58)  p  
Discrimination Accuracy 0.49 .12  0.52 .15 .704 .41 
 Confidence 0.50 .16  0.52 .18 .083 .78 
 Heart rate 76.83 11.64  79.43 12.69 .728 .40 
 
Table 6: Descriptives and statistics for the comparison of interoceptive accuracy and 
confidence and heart-rate between their respective metacognitive groups in 
Experiment 2.   
 
4.4.5.2 Pleasantness 
There was a main effect of stimulus type on pleasantness development, F(1,56)=5.087, 
p=.028, with HR (mean=.53, SD=.182) rated as more pleasant than LR (mean=.49, 
SD=.187).  There was also a significant interaction between meta-discrimination group 
and stimulus type F(1,55)=5.305, p=.025, with HMD experiencing more pleasantness 
towards HR than LR (post-hoc t-test, t(28)=2.689, p=.012) and LMD showing no 
differential response between HR and LR, t(29)=0.768, p=.449, see Figure 5. There was 
no main effect of discrimination group on overall pleasantness, F(1,55)=.810, p=372 
and no interaction between stimulus type and the heart rate covariate, F(1,55)=0.676, 







Figure 5: Pleasantness evaluations of High reward and Low reward stimuli depending 
on meta-discrimination group. * for High meta-discriminators, High reward stimuli 
were more pleasant than LR, t(28)=2.689, p=.012. 
 
There was no main effect F(1,55)=.786, p=.379 of group, or interaction, F(1,55)=1.507, 
p=.225, involving the meta-tracking groups, and no interaction between stimulus type 
and the heart rate covariate, F(1,55)=0.189, p=.666, or Type 1d’ scores, F(1,55)=0.750, 
p=.390. 
4.4.5.3 Contingency Awareness 
There was no main effect of stimulus type on ROC scores, F(1,56)=0.855, p=.359. There 
was no significant interaction between stimulus type and meta-discrimination, 
F(1,56)=.251, p=.618, no main effect of group, F(1,56)=.052, p=.820, and no interaction 
between stimulus type and HR as a covariate, F(1,56)=.867, p=.356. 
Regarding the meta-tracking categorization, there was no significant interaction 




F(1,56)=.030, p=.862, and no interaction between stimulus type and HR as a covariate, 
F(1,56)=.809, p=.732. 
In addition, comparisons of Type-I d’ scores between groups showed no effect of 
interoceptive categorization according to meta-discrimination, F(1,56)=0.35, p=.852, or 
meta-tracking groups, F(1,56)=0.054, p=.817.  
4.4.6 Discussion Experiment 2 
The finding in the present experiment that HR conditioned stimuli were evaluated as 
more pleasant than LR supports the proposal that abstract stimuli used in a 
conditioning procedure can refine the development of conditioned responses. The 
finding that participants with high scores in metacognitive interoceptive awareness for 
the heartbeat discrimination task experience more pleasantness for HR stimuli 
compared to LR, replicates the finding in Experiment 1 and supports the principle that 
interoceptive awareness can modulate emotional conditioned responses. The lack of 
an effect of metacognitive interoceptive awareness for the heartbeat tracking task on 
pleasantness ratings, as found in Experiment 1, serves as further support that these 
two interceptive tasks may be accessing different aspects of interoceptive functioning, 
subserved by different neural structures (Schulz, 2016). Indeed, in a normative sample 
(n=80) metacognitive performance across these two interoceptive tasks was not found 
to correlate (Garfinkel et al., 2015).  
In the present experiment, interoception did not modulate the development of 
metacognitive contingency awareness;  this could be attributed to the fact that very 




metacognitive contingency awareness, likely due to the use of a task-irrelevant 
conditioning.  
4.5 General Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the role interoception has on 
appetitive Pavlovian conditioning, specifically, to determine how high interoception 
modulates  the development of hedonic responses towards stimuli associated with a 
monetary reward. We also examined how interoceptive abilities facilitate accurate 
predictions of reward. In line with our hypotheses, the current findings highlight the 
relevance of interoception in the development of associative learning and conditioned 
emotional responses.  
Although previous research had investigated the role of interoception in aversive 
conditioning (i.e. Katkin, Wiens, & Ohman, 2001) and emotional learning (i.e. Pfeifer et 
al., 2017; Pollatos & Schandry, 2008) using an implicit approach (Werner, Peres, 
Duschek, & Schandry, 2010), the present report is the first, to our knowledge, that 
examines individual differences in interoception and their relationship to appetitive 
conditioning.  
In both experiments, our findings show that participants with high metacognitive 
interoceptive awareness in the heartbeat discrimination task rate HR stimuli as more 
pleasant compared to LR. This demonstrates the role of interoception in the 
development of emotional responses, in line with our predictions based upon work 
demonstrating the modulation of emotional processing as a function of interoception 




knowledge of contingencies, showing the unique role that  interoception has in the 
development of emotional responses towards CS. 
In addition, participants with high metacognitive interoceptive awareness on the 
tracking task were better able to predict the occurrence of rewards (albeit only in 
Experiment 1 in which reward outcome expectancy was evaluated with a contiunuous 
Likert scale and not with a yes/no dichotomous choice).  Thus, when probing reward 
expectancies using a continuous measure, a more sensitive measure of CA (Lovibond & 
Shanks, 2002), metacognitive interoception on the heartbeat tracking task can be 
shown to modulate reward prediction. This supports previous data documenting that 
interoception is related with enhanced ability to predict the occurrence of aversive 
stimuli (Katkin et al., 2001).  
Our second experiment also investigated the role of interoception in metacognitive CA 
for the outcome predicted by the stimuli. Our results, however, did not bring support 
for this hypothesis. Several factors could account for this. In particular, the levels of 
metacognitive CA may have not been high enough to study the effect of interoception, 
thus a floor effect may have obscured any potential relationship. Previous analyses of 
the data show very low metacognitive CA in participants, irrespective of their ability to 
predict rewards (Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018). 
On the other hand, no effects on Type I d’ scores were found. This may be due to 
changes in the way CA was evaluated, from a Likert scale to a dichotomous ‘yes/no’ 
measurement accompanied by an evaluation of confidence. That factor might have 




probabilities of reward were also more extreme on Experiment 2 than on Experiment 1 
(90-10% instead of 80-20%) making the development of Type I CA much easier 
(Leganes-Fonteneau et al., 2018). The fact that predictions were easier to develop in 
this experiment may decrease the relevance of the interoceptive appraisal of 
autonomous reactions to CS, explaining why in Experiment 2, HMT and LMT groups did 
not differ in their ability to predict rewards. 
Our data suggest that different measures of interoception may correspond with 
different aspects of learning. In this case, metacognitive discrimination modulated the 
development of hedonic responses whereas metacognitive tracking modulated the 
accuracy in reward prediction. The nature of the interoceptive tasks differs, with the 
discrimination task requiring the integration of an external stimulus (the beep) with 
cardiac functioning, whereas the tracking task is self-focused as participants 
concentrate on counting their own heartbeat (Garfinkel, Tiley, et al., 2016; Garfinkel et 
al., 2015). It is possible that assessing whether a stimulus will predict rewards or not 
requires the perception of autonomic states to guide “gut-feelings” (Kandasamy et al., 
2016). Such self-focused attention is augmented during tracking measures. On the 
other hand, evaluating stimulus pleasantness requires observing the stimulus (being 
attentive) and coupling its characteristics with its effects on the autonomic nervous 
system, and this internal-external integration is a core feature of the discrimination 
task. This explanation is supported by recent data indicating a differential effect of 
Oxytocin on the two tasks (Betka et al, 2018). Importantly, the current report 
demonstrates that metacognitive dimensions of interoception play a crucial role in 




Our findings add to previous reports demonstrating the role of interoception in other 
types of emotional responses. For instance, Werner and colleagues (2010) found that 
successful completion of previously presented emotional word stems was enhanced in 
highly interoceptive participants. They also found a correlation between skin 
conductance responses to emotional words and interoceptive accuracy. Furthermore, 
Pollatos and Schandry (2008) showed that interoception modulates bodily responses 
in the presence of emotional stimuli. Thus, during the appetitive conditioning task, 
autonomous responses elicited by reward presentation may generate specific 
physiological states which become associated with CS, and high interoceptive abilities 
would serve to amplify the perception of those physiological changes, hence impacting 
the hedonic attributes of stimuli (Garfinkel et al., 2014; Paulus, Tapert, & Schulteis, 
2009). When stimuli are presented for pleasantness evaluation, those values may be 
retrieved again more easily due to interoceptive amplification (Gray & Critchley, 2007). 
This interpretation goes in line with early learning theories integrating physiological 
responses within the development of hedonic reactions (Bindra, 1978; Toates, 1986).  
Reward learning is capital for the understanding of addictive processes (Berridge, 
2000; Stewart et al., 1984), and numerous research points towards a series of 
interoceptive mechanisms explaining addiction (Paulus & Stewart, 2014; Verdejo-
Garcia et al., 2012).  
It seems therefore that interoception plays a role in the development of conditioned 




maladaptive learning processes, a key characteristic of addiction (Koob & Volkow, 
2016).  
A limitation of our study is that we did not measure the aforementioned physiological 
reactivity in the presence of stimuli. Examining the relationship between 
interoception, autonomic responses generated by CS, and emotional reactivity would 
strengthen and improve our understanding of the role of physiological states in 
appetitive conditioning and their relevance to drug-addiction. Recent research 
(Stewart et al., 2015) shows that individuals who had recently progressed to 
problematic stimulant use presented with increased insular activation during pleasant 
interoceptive stimulation (applying soft touch). This enhanced interoceptive reactivity 
possibly leading to maladaptive learning could partially explain the aetiology and 
maintenance of addictive behaviours.   
Moreover, findings in Experiment 1 also highlight the importance of using neutral 
abstract stimuli (like Octagons and Squares) instead of Houses or Buildings. Neutral 
stimuli devoid of any intrinsic value may prevent uncontrollable associations with 
reward outcomes.  
Interestingly, the described effects were obtained using the metacognitive measure of 
interoception. This is a relatively understudied dimension of interoception (Canales-
Johnson et al., 2015; Forkmann et al., 2016; Garfinkel et al., 2015), though our data 
suggest that it might display a heightened relationship to mechanisms underlying 




The present research adds to our understanding of the interoceptive mechanisms 
underlying emotional appraisals, with a  particular focus on appetitive conditioning; 
supporting further the relationship between interoception and addictive behaviours. 
More research is needed to delineate the exact processes underlying this relationship, 
to better understand the complex interaction between interoception and addiction.  
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5.1 Abstract  
Interoception, the sensing of bodily signals, is related to emotional reactivity and may 
contribute to the pathophysiology of addiction. Evidence is accumulating that 
individuals with alcohol use disorders and other substance-dependences show altered 
interoceptive abilities, however little is known about the acute effects of alcohol on 
interoception and how this may influence the perception of drug induced effects.  
In a double-blind design, fifty (30 females) healthy young participants were given a 
beverage containing either a low (0.4g/kg, n=18) or high (0.6g/kg, n=15) alcohol dose 
or a placebo (n=17). After alcohol administration, participants completed two 
interoceptive paradigms, the heart-beat tracking and heart-beat discrimination tasks, 
both assessing different accuracy and metacognitive measures of interoception. 
Subjective feelings elicited by alcohol administration were also measured.  
Participants under the low alcohol dose had decreased metacognitive interoceptive 
awareness on the discrimination task compared to placebo. Participants under alcohol 
experienced feelings of light-headedness, which were positively associated with 
increased interoceptive awareness in the cardiac discrimination task.  
These findings provide evidence for an interplay between interoceptive processing and 




discrimination was shown to have an independent contribution in the appraisal of 
subjective states generated by alcohol administration, suggesting that interoception 
may play a role in the perception of positive alcohol effects thus contributing to 
alcohol abuse.  
5.2 Introduction  
Interoception refers to the neural and mental representation of internal bodily signals 
(Craig, 2002; Sherrington, 1948). The processing of this information is implicated in the 
formation of emotional responses (Critchley & Garfinkel, 2017; Dunn et al., 2010). 
Internal bodily signals are communicated to the brain via afferent pathways and 
integrated within the insular cortex (Craig, 2002; Critchley & Harrison, 2013; Schulz, 
2016). The insular cortex is associated with addictive processes, as demonstrated using 
a range of techniques including lesion (Naqvi, Rudrauf, Damasio, & Bechara, 2007) and 
imaging studies (Naqvi & Bechara, 2010). 
The role of interoception in addictive behaviours is hypothesized to relate to the 
perception of bodily sensations induced by substance consumption (Paulus, Tapert, & 
Schulteis, 2009), where neural areas subserving interoception may also contribute to 
craving states (Gray & Critchley, 2007). Insula activation reflects the sensing of internal 
bodily states and physiological changes elicited by drug administration (Verdejo-
Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012). This information is then used to extract conscious 
information about the effects of the drug (Garavan, 2010; Naqvi & Bechara, 2010). 
Altered interoceptive processes in the context of emotional appraisals could in turn 




2015). In addition, research shows that individuals with heavy alcohol use disorders 
have impaired interoceptive accuracy compared to a control group, as demonstrated 
using a heartbeat tracking task (Ateş Çöl, Sönmez, & Vardar, 2016). 
Drug effects encompass strong sensory and mood changes, which can be transformed 
into interoceptive cues associated with the rewarding properties of drugs. Drug 
discrimination tasks are used to identify the type of sensations generated by drugs. 
During drug discrimination procedures, participants initially learn to discriminate a 
drug given at a low but effective dose from placebo. Once learning is achieved, 
participants’ ability to generalise this discrimination at lower doses of the same drug is 
tested and the drug effects associated with this ability are evaluated. In an alcohol 
discrimination task (Duka, Stephens, Russell, & Tasker, 1998) it was shown that 
administration of low alcohol doses generates subjective feelings of light-headedness, 
which facilitates the discrimination (and generalisation to lower doses) of the drink 
consumed. The mechanisms by which drug-discrimination is established may therefore 
originate in interoceptive processes (Duka, Jackson, Smith, & Stephens, 1999).  
In fact, it has long been posited that interoception may mediate the detection of 
reward effects (i.e. food, substances) (Paulus et al., 2009), determining their hedonic 
value even in healthy participants (Cabanac, 1979; Toates, 1986), indicating its possible 
involvement in addictive processes. However, the experimental evidence in this regard 
is limited. This study constitutes one of the first examinations of the acute effects of 





Using a double-blind alcohol-placebo experiment we explored the role of interoceptive 
awareness of cardiac functioning (heartbeat) in the appraisal of alcohol effects. 
Interoception was measured using the tracking (Schandry, 1981) and discrimination 
(Katkin, Reed, & Deroo, 1983; Whitehead, Drescher, Heiman, & Blackwell, 1977) tasks, 
which evaluate different facets of interoceptive processing (Garfinkel et al, 2015, 2016; 
Garfinkel and Critchley, 2013); the tracking task testing the perception of a subject’s 
own heartbeat, and the discrimination task testing the ability of the subject to assess 
whether a tone is synchronised or not with their own heartbeat (Betka et al., 2018).  
It seems that these two interoceptive tasks tap into different cognitive processes 
(Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013), with the tracking task being based on the observation of 
internal physiological information, amenable to higher order influences such as 
knowledge about heartrate (Ring & Brener, 1996); and the discrimination task 
requiring coupling information proceeding from exteroceptive (the tone) and 
interoceptive channels (Garfinkel, Tiley, et al., 2016; Garfinkel et al., 2015). Out of 
these two tasks, indexes of interoceptive accuracy and sensibility (confidence on the 
response) were extracted (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Importantly, there is a lack of 
correlation between the measures (Garfinkel et al., 2015; Garfinkel, Manassei, et al., 
2016) and, it seems that not all the information required for an accurate performance 
on the task reaches consciousness (Garfinkel et al., 2015). The study of metacognitive 
interoceptive awareness, also termed interoceptive insight (Khalsa et al., 2017), can 
provide information about conscious interoceptive abilities (Garfinkel et al., 2016). 
Conscious metacognitive interoceptive awareness might constitute a more suitable 




In order to control for subjective interoceptive sensibility, we measured also the 
general ability to perceive bodily functions using the awareness section of the Body 
Perception Questionnaire (BPQ) (Porges, 1993). Alexithymia, the deficit in the 
perception of one’s own emotions, is related to addictive processes (Kopera et al., 
2015; Thorberg, Young, Sullivan, & Lyvers, 2009), partially mediating the relationship 
between interoception and alcohol consumption (Betka et al., 2018), and was 
therefore also assessed. Impulsivity relates also to alcohol consumption and alcohol 
administration can affect impulsivity measures (Caswell, Morgan, & Duka, 2013); for 
that reason impulsivity as a trait was also measured.  
We aimed to observe differences in interoception induced by alcohol administration in 
a low and a high dose compared to a placebo group. We also aimed to observe a dose-
dependent induction of subjective feelings of light-headedness by alcohol, replicating 
previous results (Duka et al., 1998).  We hypothesised that a high ability to consciously 
perceive internal bodily sensations (metacognitive interception) would facilitate the 
detection of subjective drug effects. 
5.3 Materials and methods 
5.3.1 Participants  
Fifty students from the University of Sussex (30 females, age range 18-48, mean age 
21.79) took part in this experiment. Exclusion criteria were: being below the legal 
drinking age, extreme Body Mass Index (BMI < 18 or BMI > 28), symptoms of mental 
illness, current prescribed regular medication and pregnancy or breastfeeding. Asian 




dehydrogenase isoenzyme deficiencies in this population (Wall et al., 1997), which can 
trigger aversive reactions to alcohol intake.  All participants included in the experiment 
consumed more than six units of alcohol a week (1 unit = 8g of alcohol).  
In addition, participants refrained from drinking alcohol for at least 12 hours prior to 
the test session and were breathalysed at the start of the session to ensure a blood 
alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0. They also refrained from taking illicit drugs for at 
least seven days, as well as caffeinated drinks and cigarettes an hour before the test. 
Participants were also required to have a low-fat meal the evening before testing and 
a low-fat breakfast on the day of testing.  
Ethical approval was granted by the BSMS ethics committee at the University of 
Sussex.  
5.3.2 Methods  
5.3.2.1 Questionnaires 
Participants completed the Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ) (Mehrabian & Russell, 
1978) for evaluating drinking habits. The AUQ measures, via 12 items, the amount of 
alcohol consumed per week as well as the frequency and speed of drinking to obtain 
an alcohol Binge score (Townshend & Duka, 2002).  
Impulsivity traits were measured using Barratt’s Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) (Patton, 
Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). This 30-item questionnaire assesses different constructs 
related with impulsivity, namely attentional, motor and non-planning impulsiveness, in 




The awareness subscale of the BPQ (Porges, 1993) measures trait sensitibility to bodily 
changes with 45 items, as ascertained via self-report, by asking participants to rate on 
a Likert scale the extent to which they feel different bodily sensations (i.e. facial 
twitches). 
Finally, the ability to process emotions was assessed using the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (TAS-20) (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994), which measures, via a Likert scale, 
difficulties in describing feelings, difficulty identifying feelings and the propensity to 
engage in externally oriented thinking.  
5.3.2.2 Current affect and subjective alcohol effects 
Affects and subjective alcohol effects were measured using the Positive and Negative 
Affect Scale, (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and Subjective Alcohol-
induced Effects Visual Analogue Scales (Alcohol VAS) (Duka et al., 1998). For the 
PANAS, participants evaluate their positive and negative affect rating 10 words for 
each construct. On the Alcohol VAS, participants had to indicate the extent to which 
they were experiencing a range of states (e.g. ‘light-headed’, ‘stimulated’, ‘alert’, 
‘relaxed’ and ‘contented’).  
5.3.3 Alcohol administration 
Breath alcohol levels we measured using a breathalyser (Lion alcolmeter SD-400, Lion 
Laboratories Ltd., UK). Following baseline measurements, participants were randomly 
allocated to receive either an alcoholic or a non-alcoholic beverage in a double-blind 
design. Two different doses of alcohol were used on this experiment, either a low dose 




alcohol, diluted with sugar-free tonic water (Schweppes, Uxbridge, UK) to make up a 
500ml beverage mixed with 6 drops of Angostura bitters (Garfinkel, Dienes, & Duka, 
2006). The placebo group (n=17, 11 females), was given a beverage consisting of 500 
ml of tonic water mixed with an equivalent measure of Angostura bitters. The drink 
was divided into 10 portions of 50 ml and participants were instructed to consume 
them at 3 min intervals.  
5.3.4 Interoception tasks 
Interoceptive accuracy, operationalized as the objective ability to accurately detect 
internal bodily sensations using behavioural testing, was measured using the heartbeat 
discrimination (Katkin et al., 1983; Whitehead et al., 1977) and tracking (Schandry, 
1981) tasks. For both tasks, participants’ pulse was monitored using an 8000SM finger 
pulse oximeter (Nonin Medical, Inc., Minnesota, USA). 
In the heartbeat tracking task, participants are instructed to count their heartbeats 
within their whole body, without putting their hands on their chest or neck. The task 
started with a practice trial of 20s after which the 6 experimental trials of different 
time-windows (25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50s) occurred in a randomized order. Through a 
set of speakers, participants heard the word “start” and had to count heartbeats until 
they heard “stop”. At the end of each trial, they indicated to the experimenter the 
amount of heartbeats they had felt and completed a computerised visual analogue 
scale to evaluate how confident they are in their responses (0 not confident – 100 




Participants were then administered the heartbeat discrimination task. On each trial, 
ten auditory tones (100 ms, 440Hz) were presented either synchronized or 
asynchronously with the participant’s own heartbeat. On non-synchronized trials, a 
300ms delay was introduced between each heartbeat and the tone. After each trial, 
participants indicated whether tones were synchronized or not with their heartbeat 
and again indicated confidence in their responses using a visual analogue scale. In 
total, 20 trials were presented, randomly allocating synchronised and non-
synchronised trials.  
The order of the tasks was fixed for all participants.  
Three dimensions of interoception, incorporating interoceptive accuracy, sensibility 
and metacognitive awareness, were computed for each task (Garfinkel et al., 2015). 
Interoceptive accuracy is based upon the overall performance on each of the tasks. For 
the discrimination task, interoceptive accuracy is the percentage of correct responses 
(hits and correct rejections). For the tracking task, scores are computed based upon 
the ratio of reported to actual heartbeats, using a formula that accounts for the effect 
of longer trials (Hart et al, 2013):  
 
Interoceptive sensibility is a subjective measure computed from the average 
confidence in responses stated for both tasks. 
For the tracking task, metacognitive awareness was calculated as the relationship 
between confidence and accuracy using Pearsons’ correlations. A high correlation 




implies increased metacognitive awareness. In the discrimination task, an Area Under 
Receiving Operating Curve (AUROC) (Green & Swets, 1966; Hajian-Tilaki, 2013) 
provided a measure of the extent to which confidence predicts accuracy accounting for 
participants’ propensity to indicate high levels of confidence. Both these metacognitive 
measures provide accounts of individual differences in ‘interoceptive insight’ (Khalsa et 
al., 2017).  
5.3.5 Procedure 
Participants came into the lab after 12 pm. Once having read and signed a consent 
form they completed the AUQ, BIS-11, TAS-20 and BPQ questionnaires. Participants 
then filled PANAS and Alcohol VAS at baseline (t0) and were breathalysed. Next, they 
were administered the drink depending on the group they had been assigned to 
(placebo, low or high dose). After a 10-minute resting period, breath alcohol levels 
were measured (t1), together with PANAS and Alcohol VAS. Interoceptive 
measurements (tracking and discrimination tasks) were finally taken followed by a 
measurement of breath alcohol levels (t2). After the experiment, participants were 
debriefed and remained in a calm area within the lab until their breath alcohol level 
had fallen below 0.18mg/L, half the legal driving limit in England. Participants also 






5.4 Data analysis  
5.4.1 Questionnaires, subjective alcohol effects and blood alcohol concentration 
Questionnaire scores were compared between groups (placebo vs. low vs. high dose) 
with a series of One-way ANOVAs. We also compared heartrate scores both during the 
tracking and discrimination tasks between groups. 
Positive and negative affect (PANAS) and Alcohol VAS scores were analysed using Two-
way mixed ANOVAs with time (t0 vs. t1) as a within subjects’ factor and group (placebo 
vs. low vs. high-dose) as a between subjects’ factors.  
Blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was calculated from breath alcohol measurements 
by multiplying breath alcohol levels by 2.3 and dividing them by 10. BAC levels were 
compared between groups (low vs. high-dose) and time (t1 vs. t2) with a Two-way 
ANOVA.  
5.4.2 Interplay between alcohol and interoception on subjective alcohol effects 
For participants who consumed alcohol, a linear regression examined light-headedness 
at t1 as DV, with BAC at t1, metacognitive interoceptive awareness, interoceptive 
accuracy and sensibility on the discrimination task, age and mean heartrate as 
predictors. An equivalent analysis was also performed using the tracking task. The 
regression aimed at providing evidence for the role of  interoception in the perception 




5.4.3 Effects of alcohol on interoception 
A series of One-way ANOVAs examined group differences (placebo vs. low vs. high-
dose) in interoceptive performance after alcohol consumption, incorporating as 
dependent measures metacognitive interoceptive awareness, interoceptive accuracy 
and sensibility for both the discrimination and tracking tasks. Interoceptive awareness 
has been seen to decrease with age (Khalsa, Rudrauf, & Tranel, 2009) and heartrate 
can be affected by alcohol administration (Conrod, Peterson, & Pihl, 2001; Sayette, 
1993), for that reason these variables were included as covariates. Age data for one 
participant was missing and hence not accounted for on the interactions with list-wise 
deletion.  
5.4.4 Exploratory analysis on gender effects 
Data published during the write up of this manuscript indicated that alcohol 
administration decreased accuracy in the tracking task, albeit only in males (Abrams et 
al., 2018).  
A post-hoc analysis explored this with a Two-way ANOVA with gender and group 
(placebo vs. low vs. high-dose) as a between subjects’ factors on tracking accuracy.  
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Questionnaires, subjective alcohol effects and BAC 
Regarding questionnaire scores, there were no significant differences between groups 




In terms of the Alcohol VAS, a significant interaction between group and time was 
observed for ratings of light-headedness, F(2,47)=11.067, p<.001, η²=.320, with 
participants in the low-dose group having lower levels of light-headedness than those 
in the high-dose group, t(20.992)=3.369, p=.003, d=1.47, who were also experiencing 
more light-headedness than the placebo group, t(22.823)=6.489, p<.001, d=2.72, post 
alcohol consumption. As expected there was a dose-dependent effect of alcohol on 
light-headedness. 
The expected main effect of group, F(1,31)=142.086, p<.001, η²=.821 and of time, 
F(1,31)=61.257, p<.001, η²=.664, on BAC was also found.  



















n=17 n=18 n=15 
  
 
  Mean SD Mean  SD Mean  SD    
One-way ANOVA             F(2,49) p  η² 
Age 21.06 1.60 21.06 2.38 23.47 6.15 2.098 .134 .08 
BIS-11 68.12 9.42 74.33 5.81 71.40 15.33 1.502 .233 .06 
Binge score 22.24 14.44 21.28 11.60 29.33 15.85 1.576 .218 .06 
AUQ score 29.35 17.14 30.00 14.43 43.40 22.40 3.045 .057 .11 
Porges 2.79 0.74 2.97 0.70 2.89 0.88 0.240 .788 .01 
TAS-20 49.88 11.82 49.56 8.93 52.93 11.18 0.483 .620 .02 
Tracking HR 73.11 11.77 81.08 15.57 71.11 12.46 2.617 .084 .10 
Discrimination HR 72.47 10.98 79.67 13.41 70.47 12.44 2.608 .084 .10 
          
2-way mixed ANOVA time x group         F(2,47) p η² 
PANAS Positive t0 29.59 8.12 31.56 7.31 28.93 7.76 0.085 .918 .004 
PANAS Positive t1 27.12 7.86 30.11 8.90 26.93 9.19 
 
    
PANAS Negative t0 16.65 4.85 20.78 7.47 15.73 5.50 0.519 .599 .022 
PANAS Negative t1 12.94 3.23 15.61 5.83 12.27 4.45  
          
Light-headedness t0 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.17 11.067 .001 .320 
Light-headedness t1 0.38 0.25 0.52 0.35 0.81 0.11  
Irritability t0 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.451 .640 .019 
Irritability t1 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.13  
Stimulated t0 0.38 0.19 0.37 0.24 0.53 0.20 1.611 .210 .064 
Stimulated t1 0.45 0.24 0.54 0.20 0.54 0.25  
Alertness t0 0.53 0.24 0.45 0.18 0.57 0.19 2.064 .138 .081 
Alertness t1 0.58 0.24 0.52 0.16 0.45 0.26  
Relaxed t0 0.58 0.20 0.60 0.20 0.50 0.21 0.710 .497 .029 
Relaxed t1 0.64 0.25 0.66 0.23 0.65 0.27  
Content t0 0.63 0.24 0.60 0.17 0.51 0.19 1.698 .194 .067 
Content t1 0.64 0.19 0.64 0.22 0.65 0.23  
 F(1,31) p η² 
BAC t1  
 
In % 0.053 0.015 0.094 0.005 0.010 .922 .000 
BAC t2 
 





Table 1: Descriptive statistics and results comparing questionnaire scores between 
groups and state changes due to alcohol administration. The only significant 
interaction was between time and dose in light-headedness, p=.001, n=50. 
 
5.5.2 Interplay between alcohol and interoception on subjective alcohol effects 
The regression examining the factors contributing to subjective ratings of light-
headedness at t1 was significant, R2=.463, F(6,31)=3.805, p=.008, see Table 2.  
Predictor B SE B β t p 
Blood Alcohol Concentration t1 4.65 2.28 0.34 2.04 .052 
Metacognitive Discrimination 0.82 0.29 0.47 2.86 .008 
Accuracy Discrimination 0.32 0.48 0.11 0.67 .507 
Sensibility Discrimination -0.16 0.24 -0.10 -0.65 .522 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.26 .798 
Mean Heart-rate 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.13 .900 
R2=.477. Dependent variable: Light-headedness at t1 
Table 2: Regression table for Light-headedness at t1. Reported light-headedness was 
significantly explained by Metacognitive interoceptive awareness for the 
Discrimination task and marginally by Blood Alcohol Concentration, n=33. 
 
Metacognitive interoceptive awareness for the discrimination task was the best 
predictor of light-headedness following alcohol administration within the model 
accounting for BAC, age, mean heartrate and accuracy and sensibility on the 




with BAC (Figure 1a) and with metacognitive interoceptive awareness for the 
discrimination task (Figure 1b).  
 
Figure 1: Scattergramms depicting the relationship of Unstandardized Predicted Light-
headedness scores at t1 with Blood Alcohol Concentration (a) and Metacognitive 
Interoceptive Awareness for the Discrimination task (b). Increased levels of Blood 
Alcohol Concentration and Metacognitive Discrimination positively correlate with 
feelings of light-headedness, n=33. 
 
The regression using tracking scores was significant, R2=.415, F(6,31)=2.959, p=.025, 
albeit the only significant predictor was BAC, p=.031.  
5.5.3 Effects of alcohol on interoception 
When examining the effect of alcohol on metacognitive interoceptive awareness for 
the discrimination task, a marginal main effect of dose was observed F(2,48)=3.144 
p=.053, η²=.125. Accounting for covariates, metacognitive interoceptive awareness 




F(1,33)=5.479, p=.026, η²=.154, demonstrating a deleterious effect of alcohol that was 
not found in the high-dose group, F(1,31)=0.506, p=.483, η²=.018, see Figure 2(a).  
There were no significant effects of group regarding discrimination accuracy, 
F(2,48)=0.314, p=.732, η²=.014, or sensibility F(2,48)=1.432, p=.250, η²=.061, see 
Figure 2(b-c).  
 
 
Figure 2: Metacognitive Interoceptive awareness (a), accuracy (b) and sensibility (c) 
obtained in the discrimination task across experimental groups (mean scores and 
SEM). *Metacognitive interoceptive awareness was higher for the placebo group than 
for the 0.4ml/kg group, p=.026, n=50. 
 
Regarding the tracking task, there were no significant group effects on metacognitive 
interoceptive awareness, F(2,48)=0.347, p=.709, η²=.016, accuracy, F(2,48)=1.321, 




5.5.4 Exploratory analysis on gender effects 
Post-hoc analyses, including gender, show a marginal Two-way interaction between 
gender and dose for tracking accuracy, F(2,48)=3.186, p=.052, η²=.135. This was 
explained by decreases in accuracy for males (mean=.42, SD=.44) compared to females 
(mean=.72, SD=.16) in the high-dose group, F(1,14)=11.044, p=.007, η²=.501, which 
were not found in the other groups (Fs<0.8, ps>.39). No other effects including gender 
were found, Fs<1, ps>.4. 
5.6 Discussion 
This report assesses the role of interoceptive processes in the appraisal of drug-
induced effects on mood states. Empirical evidence is provided for the effect of acute 
alcohol administration on the perception of internal bodily sensations and their 
relationship to drug effect experiences. 
As predicted, there was a relationship between metacognitive interoceptive 
awareness and the subjective states alcohol induces in participants, specifically light-
headedness. According to previous research, alcohol discrimination at very low doses 
is based on the influence the drink has on subjective light-headedness, an effect 
resembling “high” (Duka et al., 1998).  Our findings demonstrate that metacognitive 
cardiac awareness correlates with higher acuity in the perception of substance-
induced responses, meaning the greater one’s ability to recognise how well they 
perceive their internal bodily sensations, the more they experience substance effects. 
Insight in Interoceptive abilities can therefore constitute the basis of substance 




Such a relationship should play a relevant role in the development of associations 
between stimuli and drug effects supporting conditioning models of addiction (Stewart 
et al, 1984). Furthermore, it is possible that increased interoceptive awareness 
enhances the detection of low-intensity physiological responses, exemplifying again 
the function interoception has on the processing of emotional cues which are not 
explicitly accessible with ease (Damasio, 2000, Leganes-Fonteneau et al, 2018). This 
could be crucial in the understanding of the mechanisms underlying drug 
discrimination (Duka et al., 1999) and alcohol priming effects (Rose & Duka, 2006), as 
well as emotional biases to alcohol related stimuli.  
In the present study, a decrease in metacognitive interoceptive awareness in the 
discrimination task was found for the low-dose group, highlighting that a low dose of 
alcohol may leave interoceptive accuracy and sensibility relatively unimpaired, but 
instead influence the capacity for metacognitive interoceptive insight. This effect was 
revealed after accounting for age differences and heartrate during the tasks.  
It is possible that only the low dose of alcohol impaired interoceptive metacognition as 
participants at that dose did not yet have insight into their own intoxicated state. 
Under this low dose, confidence seemed boosted, in line with general stimulant effects 
of alcohol (Earleywine & Martin, 1993; Ray, McGeary, Marshall, & Hutchison, 2006) 
while performance too had a mild tendency to drop. While neither of these results 
were significant in their own right, it is possible that their modulation at this low dose 
resulted in a disruption of confidence-accuracy mapping, leading to a selective 




It is worth noting as well that acute administration of low alcohol doses affects general 
error monitoring (Ridderinkhof et al., 2002), a type of metacognitive ability, thus 
supporting the deleterious effect of the low dose on metacognitive interoception. Lack 
of such an effect in the high dose may be due to a compensatory mechanism mobilised 
when drug effects are experienced (e.g Marczinski and Fillmore, 2005) or expected 
(Caswell et al, 2013).  
 We did not find significant effects of alcohol administration on overall accuracy or 
sensibility for the discrimination task; or on any of the interoceptive indexes for the 
tracking task. An exploratory analysis did, however, replicate recently published data 
(Abrams et al., 2018). Males had lower accuracy in the tracking task than females, 
albeit results were restricted to the high-dose group. This replication highlights once 
more the role of interoception in addictive processes and brings further evidence 
towards the effects of acute alcohol administration in proprioception and other forms 
of perception (Stock, Mückschel, & Beste, 2017). 
Physiological disparities between males and females could explain the differences 
observed in the tracking task (Ehlers, Mayou, Sprigings, & Birkhead, 2000). In males, 
alcohol administration may have affected interoceptive pathways, leading to the 
effects observed in tracking accuracy, which were not altered in females. Gender 
differences in cardiac functioning, notably in heart-rate variability (Bates et al., 2011; 
Koenig & Thayer, 2016) have already been reported, explaining disparities in emotional 
processing after alcohol administration (Udo et al., 2009). Further research should 
therefore examine the role of interoception in emotional responses and their 




The use of metacognitive measures of interoceptive awareness over simple indices of 
accuracy brings a novel approach towards the study of interoceptive processes 
(Garfinkel, Manassei, et al., 2016; Garfinkel & Critchley, 2013) that is relatively 
unexplored (see Canales-Johnson et al., 2015; Forkmann et al., 2016 and Garfinkel et 
al., 2015 for notable exceptions).The way metacognitive interoceptive awareness is 
computed, particularly using AUROC for the discrimination task, creates a measure 
which is less affected by individuals’ dispositional or situational interoceptive 
sensibility (i.e. confidence) on that particular task (Fleming & Lau, 2014), and thus may 
provide an unbiased account of their interoceptive ability in the metacognitive 
domain. In our case, metacognitive discrimination did not differ between males and 
females but was affected by alcohol administration. Moreover, the predictive power of 
metacognitive interoception on light-headedness was present accounting for accuracy 
and confidence scores, pointing towards the unique role of metacognitive 
interoception in the appraisal of drug effects. Metacognitive indices of interoception 
might therefore constitute a better measure of the interoceptive correlates of 
addiction. 
As explained before, different tasks and measures assessing interoception share 
similar and distinct functional architecture (Schulz, 2016) and reflect different 
cognitive processes (Garfinkel et al., 2016). Although observing alcohol effects on 
interoceptive processing across the whole range of measures would strengthen our 
conclusions, given that each of the tasks and measures evaluates different aspects of 
interoception (Garfinkel et al., 2016) it is not surprising to observe results limited to 




The present results suggest that the effects of alcohol appear to be more sensitive to 
an interoception paradigm that requires internal-external integration of stimuli. 
Interestingly both oxytocin (Betka et al., 2018) and stress (Schulz & Vögele, 2015) also 
selectively affect interoception as measured with the discrimination task, though the 
effects on this task were seen on accuracy rather than on the metacognition of 
interoception.  
5.7 Limitations 
The lack of a baseline measurement of interoception in the present study prevents the 
clear assertion that our findings are solely due to the direct effect of alcohol on 
interoception and not influenced also by individual differences on interoception. A 
baseline measurement of interoception, before the administration of any substance, 
would provide a clearer account of the effects of alcohol on interoception. However 
repeated administrations of the tasks could lead to learning effects, which could be a 
confound for the influence of alcohol. Future research should examine the role of 
interoception as a trait, and not as the result of an experimental manipulation, on 
alcohol discrimination abilities.  
The present study did not directly assess participants’ knowledge about the nature of 
the substance administered (placebo or alcohol) as a single administration does not 
allow sensitive measures of drug-discrimination accounting for chance identifications 
(50% probabilities of being accurate) (Jackson, 2001). We also did not assess 




Future studies should expand and improve  these novel findings by incorporating these 
additional measures.  
5.8 Conclusions 
Taken together, our findings show that alcohol can alter some interoceptive processes. 
Our findings also show that interoceptive abilities can lead to differences in the 
perception of the effects elicited by a substance, ultimately constituting a risk factor in 
substance abuse disorders. Thus, the present study brings further evidence for the 
interplay between interoceptive processing and the perception of drug-induced mood 
changes, and opens a series of pathways for future research. Uncovering the 
interoceptive correlates of alcohol administration could shed light onto the link 
between bodily responses and different phenomena associated with alcohol and 
addiction, the implications of which could shape novel intervention programs.  
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6.1 Summary of results 
6.1.1 Stimuli conditioned with rewards generate preferential responses in the 
absence of outcome-expectancies 
The experiments presented in sections 2 and 3 examined implicit aspects of PC.  
The core focus of this series of experiments was to provide substantial evidence, with 
different samples and paradigms, for the existence of implicit appetitive PC.  
Using task irrelevant conditioning procedures, we were able to associate stimuli with 
different probabilities of reward outcomes.  With the use of Bayes factors, it was 
possible to determine whether participants had gained the ability to predict the 
occurrence of rewards or not.  
Although it seems from our data that CA is necessary to develop explicit CResp (e.g. 
hedonic reactions) towards CS, stimuli associated with HR probabilities generated 
preferential responses compared to LR stimuli in the absence of CA. 
First, these observations were derived using an Emotional Attentional Blink task. 
Participants had to detect the presence of CS in a RSVP stream. Emotional aversive 
distractors were embedded in the stream, decreasing accuracy in the detection of 
target CS. However, for Unaware participants, HR stimuli overcame the effect of the 
distractors, suggesting that the incentive value acquired by the HR CS can direct 
attentional responses in the absence of outcome-expectancies. The way this task was 
designed required participants to engage in goal-directed mental processes as they 




the ability of CS to overcome these distractors, would reflect implicit attentional 
responses towards CS. It is possible therefore that the examination of implicit 
attentional components allows detecting CResp in the absence of outcome-
expectancies.   
Furthermore, using CS as distractors in a Flanker task, we found that HR CS generated 
stronger cognitive interference than LR or control stimuli only for participants 
Unaware of contingencies. This time, CS were completely task irrelevant, devoid of any 
goal directedness, and yet, they interfered in cognitive control in a similar way as other 
incentive salient stimuli (i.e. alcohol pictures (Nikolaou, Field, & Duka, 2013)).  
We have been therefore able to provide evidence that CS can generate preferential 
responses in the absence of CA. Such automatic attentional allocation responses can 
be elicited both in situations where the salient stimulus is a target (requiring a goal-
directed focus of attention), or in situations where it interferes with an irrelevant 
distractor (as in the Flanker task); in both cases the stimulus outcome contingencies 
were not explicitly recognised. 
Interestingly, using an n-back task in which CS were supposed to interfere with 
working memory in a similar way as in the Flanker task, we did not find any effects in 
participants Unaware of contingencies, but only in those Aware, albeit the effect was 
marginal. As discussed on that chapter, such a differential contribution to attentional 
biases by CA may reflect different cognitive processes underlying the two tasks, the 
one being more susceptible to automatic interferences by CS (in the Flanker task) and 




Regarding pleasantness, we hypothesised that Unaware participants would show 
preferential responses towards CS as per recent research (Jeffs & Duka, 2017). 
However, we only found those responses in participants Aware of contingencies. This 
might be partially due to hedonic responses being assessed via explicit pleasantness 
ratings. The fact that these explicit hedonic responses were previously found in 
Unaware participants (Jeffs and Duka, 2017) is difficult to understand. One explanation 
could be that the separation of Aware versus Unaware participants in that study was 
not as rigorous as in the present experiments, leading to an overestimate of learning 
effects in Unaware participants (Shanks, 2016). 
Implicit hedonic reactions might not be readily accessible to conscious observation, 
that is, a subjective measure of pleasantness might not be sensitive to the detection of 
implicit learning, given that the former belongs to the realm of conscious experience 
and the latter is unconscious. On the other hand, attentional responses, reflecting 
automatic reactivity, could better grasp implicit correlates of learning, therefore 
explaining the differences between measurements (De Houwer, 2006).  
A Bayes factor showed that for Unaware participants, results of pleasantness 
evaluations were insensitive, whereas for Aware participants, the increased 
pleasantness towards HR CS compared to LR was fully confirmed. This can, again, 
reflect the insensitivity of subjective measurements when it comes to evaluating 
implicit learning. It is also possible that factors other than outcome-expectancies can 
participate in the development of those responses. The study of interoceptive 




seems to facilitate hedonic responses and reward prediction, key elements in the 
generation of Pavlovian effects. 
6.1.2 Interoceptive awareness facilitates the development of conditioned responses 
and potentiates the perception of subjective alcohol effects 
We designed two experiments targeting different facets of learning and their 
relationship with interoception (sections 4 and 5). Interoceptive processes have been 
seen to participate in different aspects of addiction (Paulus & Stewart, 2014; Verdejo-
Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012), and therefore understanding their relationship with 
reward processing is necessary. 
We measured the development of hedonic responses and outcome-expectancies in an 
appetitive learning task and how interoceptive awareness mediates this process. We 
found that participants with high metacognitive interoceptive awareness developed 
higher hedonic responses towards HR CS. They also had a higher ability to predict the 
occurrence of rewards. Participants with low interoceptive abilities on the other hand 
were not able to develop either of those responses. These results go in line with 
research pointing at the relationship of interoception with emotional processing and 
learning (Critchley & Garfinkel, 2017; Garfinkel et al., 2013; Pfeifer et al., 2017; Pollatos 
& Schandry, 2008); but also with reward prediction (Kandasamy et al., 2016) or 
aversion to monetary losses (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2015).   
A series of possible underlying mechanisms will be discussed later towards a 




understand this matter, we examined as well how interoception shapes the perception 
of substance related rewards (e.g. feelings of high, stimulant effects).  
We administered an acute alcohol dose (0.4ml/kg or 0.6ml/kg) or a control drink to 
participants and measured interoceptive indexes. Our main finding was that high 
interoceptive abilities (as measured with metacognitive discrimination) correlate with 
perceived light-headedness (a feeling of “high”) after alcohol administration, indicating 
that interoception may amplify the perception of drug effects. Additionally, alcohol 
decreased metacognitive interoceptive awareness for the discrimination task in 
participants being administered the low dose. The fact that low (but not high) doses of 
alcohol decreased metacognitive interoception could reflect an impairment in 
metacognitive processing due to the unawareness of substance effects in the low 
dose. In the high dose, the awareness of substance effects may engage compensatory 
mechanisms responsible for maintaining an accurate monitoring of interoceptive 
performance.  
The high dose of alcohol on the other hand decreased accuracy on the tracking task, 
albeit only on male participants, replicating previous results (Abrams et al., 2018). This 
replication of differential effects in gender might reflect differences in the effect of 






6.2 Theoretical implications 
6.2.1 Relationship of implicit conditioning with appetitive learning and addiction 
6.2.1.1 Learning theories 
The main finding of this thesis, that CS can generate attentional responses in the 
absence of outcome-contingencies, has implications for the understanding of incentive 
theories of learning. Bolles (1972) argued that the source of reinforcement was not S-R 
associations, but rather S-R or S-S expectancies. The main determinant of learning then 
would be the strength of the association and the generation or positive or aversive 
expectancies driving behaviour. The results presented in this thesis do not completely 
discredit his hypothesis, but at the very least should nuance the corpus of appetitive 
learning theories based on outcome-expectancies. Dickinson (1989) and Shanks (2007) 
stressed as well the role of expectancies in the development of CResp, which are 
supposed to guide behaviours. 
Without a doubt, outcome-expectancies play a capital role in the development of 
conditioned responses. We found in three different experiments that explicit hedonic 
responses could only occur in participants Aware of stimulus-outcome contingencies. 
However, given Bayesian analyses show insensitive results for Unaware participants, 
we cannot conclude that subjective pleasantness does never develop in the absence of 
CA.. Jeffs and Duka (2017) also found that CA was necessary for CS to guide 
motivational transfer on a PIT task. However, not only us, as reported in Chapters 2 
and 3, but also others (e.g. Anderson, 2015; Bourgeois, Neveu, & Vuilleumier, 2016) 




substantial evidence for the existence of implicit PC, i.e. in the absence of outcome-
expectancies. 
Bindra’s  (1978) view on learning mechanisms can provide a framework, in which these 
results can be integrated. Bindra claimed that the motivational properties of rewards 
are transferred to CS after repeated concomitant presentations. It would be this 
motivational transfer, occurring regardless of outcome-expectancies, that drives 
learning effects observable through approach behaviours towards CS, and not the 
knowledge about outcome-contingencies. In our case, the motivational transfer can be 
observed through the attentional interference and allocation generated by CS in the 
absence of CA.  
Moreover, Bindra (1974) posited that R-S associations were not necessary for learning 
to occur, and that learning can be ultimately derived from S-S pairings. He proposed a 
theoretical procedure by which S-S associations could be separated from the 
corresponding R-S (or in his own words, “isolation of the observation of lever stimuli 
from the lever-pressing response” (Bindra, 1974, p. 207)). In terms of animal 
conditioning, such a procedure might have been difficult to design. However, in 
humans, the use in our experiments of task irrelevant conditioning procedures, for 
which the nature of the response (i.e. pressing a key depending on the colour of an 
irrelevant square) is foreign to the contingencies between CS (Octagons or Squares) 
and rewards, appears to have supported his ideas.  
The perspective embraced by Toates (1986) reflects the importance of both the 




theoretical account of learning that reconciles both views. Results showing on one 
hand that CA is necessary for increased explicit hedonic reactions and behavioural 
motivation, and on the other hand that attentional responses can occur regardless of 
outcome-expectancies would support Toates’s theory. 
6.2.1.2 Addiction theories 
As explained before, many of the advancements in appetitive learning theories have 
been incorporated within addiction perspectives. Our findings, therefore, have 
implications for understanding drug-addiction. For instance, Tiffany's (1990) 
conceptualisation of addictive processes as two discrete mechanisms, based on 
automatic physiological responses or on non-automatic approach behaviours, would 
be supported by our findings. Although we did not evaluate physiological reactivity 
towards CS, the fact that CS can drive automatic attentional responses implicitly but 
not affect behavioural outcomes or explicit hedonic responses would match to some 
extent his proposal. CS in the absence of CA could partly trigger some of the “drug 
(reward in the present experiments)-action plans” mentioned by Tiffany.  
The experiments presented here do not allow an accurate exploration of the role of 
implicitly CS in the establishment of habitual responses (Everitt & Robbins, 2005). This 
theory posits that stimuli associated with a substance can trigger habitual responses, 
and that once those stimuli are presented in extinction they will be more resistant to 
outcome devaluation (in contrast to stimuli associated with a sweet solution for 
instance) (Miles, Everitt, & Dickinson, 2003). Hogarth and Chase (2011) however, 
showed that drug expectancies (or more precisely, the awareness that a CS is no 




discrediting habit theories. It would be possible to integrate our methodologies within 
outcome-devaluations tasks in order to provide some evidence consistent with animal 
research in favour of habit theories. For instance, we could assess whether participants 
are able to develop CResp towards stimuli predicting a reward (i.e. cigarette puffs), 
and whether after extinction participants Unaware of changes in contingencies can 
maintain attentional or behavioural responses towards CS or not. 
Results obtained by Hogarth and colleagues (Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Hogarth, 
Dickinson, Hutton, Bamborough, & Duka, 2006; Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, Kouvaraki, 
& Duka, 2007) represented the adaptation to addiction theories of Dickinson’s 
postulates, that reward processing varies according both to the incentive value of a 
reward and to the generation of outcome-contingencies (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994), 
although Hogarth and colleagues always stressed the importance of CA over implicit 
incentive values. It is therefore possible that two distinct mechanisms associated with 
CS, one requiring explicit knowledge about contingencies and high predictive value, 
and another one, based on implicit associations, can drive drug related behaviours in 
different ways. Implicit associations might generate preparatory or anticipatory 
responses (in the form of attentional or autonomous reactivity) whereas explicit 
learning is necessary for overt behavioural responses.  
 Although the present work did not target the distinction between “wanting” and 
“liking” as conceptualised by Robinson and Berridge (2016), it did indeed examine 
hedonic components of appetitive learning (i.e. pleasantness), finding that the 
occurrence of such phenomenon seems to be dependent on CA. Interestingly, 




regard (Berridge, 1999; Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Winkielman, Berridge, & 
Wilbarger, 2005). Particularly, they posited that motivation (“wanting”), learning, and 
emotion (“liking”) are supported by implicit mechanisms (Berridge & Robinson, 2003), 
and that subjective measures of pleasantness might not be able to reflect implicit 
“liking” effects. This might explain again why we did not find subjective hedonic 
responses in the absence of CA, as pleasantness measurements might be insensitive to 
implicit manifestations of “liking”. The experiments presented here however do not 
allow us to determine whether the attentional responses obtained in the absence of 
CA correspond to implicit correlates of “wanting” or “liking”.  
6.2.1.3 Dual process theories of addiction 
Dual process theories of addiction offer a framework in which CS can drive automatic 
drug approach behaviours and interfere with executive functioning (Wiers & Stacy, 
2006). In this context, it is reasonable to assume that the automaticity of such effects 
can reflect their unconscious nature. Usually, such models consider that these CS are 
stimuli explicitly associated with the substance (e.g. alcohol pictures), and it is true 
that drug-related stimuli can generate automatic interferences when used as 
distractors on cognitive tasks (e.g. Hester & Garavan, 2009; Nikolaou, Field, Critchley, 
& Duka, 2013), fitting the model.  
Our findings support this position, and add further that CS predicting rewards in the 
absence of CA are able to elicit such interferences. It seems that conscious outcome-
expectancies are not a requisite for CS to generate the same kind of behavioural 
response as drug-cues (as shown by the parallel effects on the Flanker task between 




However, even if drug cues can generate automatic responses, they are also providing 
explicit information about their relationship to the outcome (i.e. a bottle of alcohol is 
explicitly associated with the beverage). Thus, an experimental approach using 
automatic responses towards CS without CA allows the examination of the implicit 
correlates of reward processing, detached from explicit associations that might have 
formed between drug-related stimuli and substances through drug consumption 
experiences (Wiers et al., 2002). In our case, the use of abstract shapes associated with 
rewards in the absence of CA provides a “purer” automatic account of reward 
processing. 
Moreover, if implicit CS can generate such behaviours, it would imply that a whole 
range of stimuli not readily accessible to consciousness can trigger addictive processes. 
This would not only apply to drug cues presented subliminally (e.g. Wetherill et al., 
2014), to the influence of implicit emotional stimuli (e.g. Winkielman et al., 2005), or 
to the effect of a substance administered without explicit awareness (e.g. Hart, Ward, 
Haney, Foltin, & Fischman, 2001), but to stimuli predicting a reward and readily 
observable in plain sight. In our conditioning paradigms, CS were always present on 
screen, and the source of contingency Unawareness relied on the cognitive effort 
necessary to perform the dual task and on the uncertainty introduced by reward 
probabilities. It is easy to imagine how in real life scenarios, stimuli belonging to 
different sensory modalities (a sight, smell, place, person or even an interoceptive 
sensation) might have predicted substance effects in the past, remotely from explicit 
drug related cues and without conscious awareness of contingencies. This lack of 




the time of the association (in a way similar to our dual task effect), to forgetfulness, or 
to the unpredictable probabilities of a given stimulus to be paired with a reward. 
Relapse prevention therapies in addiction (Marlatt & Donovan, 2005) are based on 
identifying possible risk situations, such as external or emotional stimuli (e.g. walking 
in front of bar, seeing a pack of cigarettes on a table), towards which individuals have 
conscious access. Based on that, coping strategies are implemented. But if stimuli or 
associations below conscious detection thresholds can trigger risk situations, other 
interventions, aiming at increasing cognitive and emotional control systems (with 
which reward related stimuli interfere), might provide a set of skills adapted to the 
implicit nature of those stimuli.  
6.2.2 Relationship of interoceptive processing with appetitive learning and addiction       
6.2.2.1 Learning theories 
The role of interoception in appetitive learning but also in the way rewarding effects of 
substances are experienced was investigated in this thesis. 
Regarding appetitive learning, our results show the importance of interoceptive 
awareness on emotional reactivity. We found that metacognitive discrimination 
mediates hedonic responses towards HR CS, in a similar way as others (Füstös, 
Gramann, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2013; Pfeifer et al., 2017; Pollatos & Schandry, 2008), 
but also, that CA can be explained by metacognitive tracking, in line with previous 
research pointing to the link between interoception and outcome prediction (Katkin, 
Wiens, & Ohman, 2001). Finally, the value or detection of US effects (as shown by our 




Drive reduction theories already posited the relevance of internal states in the 
establishment of learnt responses (Hull, 1943). Although long discredited, within that 
model interoceptive processes would be necessary to observe the internal bodily 
states generating drives (e.g. hunger) and also to quantify their satiation.  
Bindra (1968) proposed that appetitive states depend on the presence of an incentive 
stimulus (e.g. food) concomitantly with a compatible organismic state (e.g. hunger) 
that can together generate a central motive state able to drive consummatory 
reactions. Here the focus was on incentive stimuli and their hedonic properties, but 
also on the “sensory inflow” (a composite of exteroceptive and interoceptive 
information (Bindra, 1978, p.88)) providing information on the organismic state of the 
subject. That sensory inflow, according to our results, could be determined by 
interoceptive abilities. Higher interoceptive awareness would facilitate the detection 
of physiological states compatible with reward perception and appraisal, fostering a 
central motive state able to explain the development of increased hedonic responses 
towards CS in highly interoceptive participants.  
Toates’s perspective was that both hedonic responses and outcome-expectancies are 
responsible for PC effects. According to our findings, interoceptive awareness would 
be related to both factors, pleasantness and outcome-expectancies, responsible for 
learning effects.  
Regarding the mechanisms by which this occurs, alliesthetic views of learning propose 
that reward values depend on the “internal milieu” of the subject (Cabanac, 1979; 




subject is craving or needing a substance or food, the value of that reward would be 
higher than once satiety is achieved. The administration of small quantities of a 
rewarding stimulus (e.g. food) or the presentation of CS can also trigger alliesthetic 
mechanisms, increasing the value of the reward and hedonic responses. In our case, 
reward CS may have triggered an alliesthetic response, increasing their perceived 
value. This response would be amplified in highly interoceptive participants as shown 
particularly by the heightened emotional reactivity towards HR CS. 
Finally, cognitive expectancy theories (Dickinson, 1989; Dickinson & Balleine, 1995) do 
not particularly stress the role of physiological responses or interoceptive signalling, 
but interoceptive processing and its facilitator effects on reward prediction could be 
integrated in classical outcome-expectancy accounts of learning.  
6.2.2.2 The role of interoception in Addiction  
Theoretical and experimental work has pointed towards the link between 
interoception and addiction (Gray & Critchley, 2007; Paulus & Stewart, 2014; Verdejo-
Garcia et al., 2012), positing that the appraisal of physiological responses plays a role 
at several stages of the aetiology (Naqvi and Bechara, 2010).  
In a similar way as with Hullian drive reduction perspectives, withdrawal theories of 
addiction (Jellinek, 1955) have long been discredited. However, Siegel (1975) 
attributed to compensatory physiological mechanisms the occurrence of drug craving 
and drives. The preparatory responses generated by drug related stimuli (i.e. anxiety in 
the presence of a bottle of alcohol) are meant to generate withdrawal responses. We 




finding that interoceptive awareness correlates with reward prediction, hedonic 
responsiveness and detection of substance effects could support Siegel’s theoretical 
account. In accordance to these ideas, if an individual is better able to perceive 
preparatory responses triggered by reward CS due to increased interoceptive abilities, 
then it would make sense to display heightened responsiveness towards those stimuli 
or towards rewards.  
Perhaps, the most well-grounded hypothesis is the one proposing an alliesthetic role 
of interoception in addiction (Paulus, Tapert, & Schulteis, 2009) reflecting Toates’s 
learning theory. Again, testing such hypothesis would require paradigms targeting 
alliesthetic processes, for example administering small doses of alcohol and measuring 
a possible increase in the expected value of the substance.  
In any case, the finding that metacognitive interoceptive awareness modulates the 
perception of subjective alcohol effects, found in the present thesis, implies that the 
perception of physiological states is a crucial factor in the development of addiction. In 
that sense for example, sensitivity to interoceptive stimulation predicts the transition 
from abuse to dependence in meta-amphetamine addicts (Stewart, May, Tapert, & 
Paulus, 2015). It is possible that being more attuned with one’s bodily sensations 
provides amplified access to the physiological states generated by a substance. This 
higher awareness of substance effects, particularly of those associated with being 
“high”, would intensify reward salience, provoking an increase in conditioned 




Finally, Gray and Critchley (2007) proposed that craving responses or drug urges would 
depend on the detection of physiological reactions elicited by drug-related stimuli. This 
would be supported by our results indicating increased responsiveness towards CS in 
highly interoceptive participants. 
In light of the results obtained and incorporating as well the ideas of Paulus et al. 
(2009) and Gray and Critchley (2007), it is possible to propose a model of interoceptive 
incentive appetitive learning.  
First, interoception facilitates the detection of the physiological effects generated by a 
substance, as shown with alcohol administration and the perception of light-
headedness (a positive effect similar to feeling “high”). The experience of a positive 
response amplifies the salience of rewarding effects, which are then transferred to CS. 
Interoception, as shown in our appetitive PC experiment, also facilitates reward 
prediction, improving outcome-expectancy awareness, which would trigger reward 
approach behaviours (Hogarth et al., 2007). The internal state or milieu of the subject 
will shape alliesthetic effects (Cabanac, 1979; Toates, 1986), together with the 
presentation of CS or the priming by small doses of reward (i.e. alcohol micro-dosing - 
Duka & Townshend, 2004)). These alliesthetic processes will in turn be amplified by 
interoceptive awareness (Paulus, 2009) to determine the value of rewards. 
Once CS acquire the incentive value associated with the reward, their mere 
presentation will trigger in turn physiological responses amplified  by interoceptive 




(Gray & Critchley, 2007), and maybe approach behaviours (e.g. behavioural responses, 
PIT effects or attentional biases) compatible with the nature of CS, see Fig. 1.  
Figure 1: theoretical model describing the role of interoceptive awareness in 
appetitive learning. 
This model of appetitive learning is based on the results obtained in our experiments, 
also integrating interoceptive models of alliesthesia and craving. Substance 
administration generates physiological responses deriving into subjective effects. These 
effects are amplified in highly interoceptive participants, increasing the perception of 
the hedonic value of rewards and the transfer of incentive values to conditioned 
stimuli. Interoception, by mediating reward prediction, could also participate in reward 
approach behaviours. The hedonic component of rewards is also modulated by 
alliesthetic mechanisms susceptible to interoceptive amplification. This alliesthetic 
process will be contingent to the internal state of the subject, but can also be primed 
either by small doses of a reward or by the physiological reactions elicited by 






conditioned stimuli will finally drive approach behaviours and drug seeking, hedonic 
evaluations of conditioned stimuli, and drug urges.  
 
This hypothesized model represents our results, but more evidence is necessary in 
order to strengthen it. A further discussion on that respect will be found in the 
limitations section.  
6.3 Advances in implicit learning and conditioning 
6.3.1 Measures of explicit knowledge 
Our experiments had to overcome the existing criticisms in the field of implicit 
learning, and particularly in PC regarding measurements of stimulus-outcome 
contingency knowledge (CA) (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). The first experiment carried 
out used a simpler methodology in that regard. Participants were categorised as Aware 
or Unaware of contingencies based on t-tests comparing expectancy ratings towards 
HR and LR stimuli to chance level. With that methodology, yielding a high number of 
Unaware participants, we were able to obtain results showing implicit PC effects. 
Nevertheless, the overrepresentation of implicit states due to lax measurements of 
awareness is a problem pointed out in the implicit literature (Dienes, 2015), as more 
participants might be categorised as Unaware of contingencies than there actually are. 
We therefore improved the methodology used to measure CA, including 
measurements of metacognitive knowledge. We also performed a two-step Bayesian 
analysis, with which we could determine the sensitivity of metacognitive states (or 




used the mean Type I d’ scores of metacognitively aware participants as a prior to 
determine the individual sensitivity of Type I d’ scores of the rest of participants. This 
allowed us to successfully categorise participants as Aware or Unaware of outcome-
contingencies based on sensitive evidence (Dienes, 2014, 2015). The rest of the 
participants, yielding insensitive results, were not considered. Our approach didn’t 
completely solve Shanks’s concerns about post-hoc categorisations of consciousness 
(2016), but at least considered his recommendation of using Bayes factors in a 
participant-by-participant basis.  
This statistical approach can be applied to other paradigms used in the field of implicit 
learning, but also to the study of consciousness in general, for example to ascertain the 
ability or inability to detect subliminal stimuli, offering a more reliable account of 
unconscious processes. 
6.3.2 Measures of implicit knowledge 
The main rationale for including attentional paradigms, such as the Flanker task, 
Emotional Attentional Blink or n-back task, was to examine implicit learning with 
different procedures able to evaluate automatic responses. We assumed from the 
beginning that pleasantness measurements, reflecting explicit appraisals, might not be 
the most sensitive way to measure implicit learning, and we were right. We only 
managed to obtain significant increases in pleasantness towards HR stimuli in Aware 
participants. For Unaware participants, all evidence was insensitive, as shown with 




These differential findings exemplify how important it is to use measures of learning 
sensitive to the kind of information or construct targeted (Houwer, 2006). We were 
able to find preferential attentional responses towards implicitly CS in two tasks, one 
based on goal-directed target detection and the effect of implicit values of CS 
(Emotional Attentional Blink - Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), and another one on 
task irrelevant cognitive interferences by CS (Flanker task - Eriksen, 1995). This implies 
that different paradigms need to be used to study attentional reactivity in implicit 
learning (see also Anderson, 2015). Further clarification of how implicit attentional 
biases are generated might be obtained by the use of other kinds of tasks.  
6.4 Limitations and future directions 
Although the experiments presented in this thesis apply innovative solutions, allowing 
the attainment of novel results, they also indicate the need for improvements to be 
addressed in future studies.  
For example, we found that interoception mediates hedonic reactions, subjective 
substance effects and reward prediction. However, we did not report physiological 
responses during any of these procedures at any point. Having done so would have 
allowed us to better understand the relationship between interoception and 
physiological responses towards reward CS. Classical experiments on interoception 
and emotion show that heart-rate changes depend on interoceptive abilities (e.g. 
Pollatos, Herbert, Matthias, & Schandry, 2007). Replicating those results in the context 
of PC would increase our understanding of the three-way relationship between 




That same problem is present in our experiments examining implicit learning. The 
addition of any physiological measures (heart-rate, skin conductance or pupilometry) 
would have provided us with a supplementary measure of automatic reactivity, 
independently from explicit learning measures.  
Future studies should examine learning effects in a PC task in parallel with eye-gaze 
and pupilometry measurements so that objective physiological state changes 
accompanying learning can be assessed. We have carried out such a study (also 
another one measuring heart rate changes), which are still undergoing data analysis.   
Bayesian analyses, included in our CA evaluations, provided a much more reliable 
awareness categorisation technique, although this implied that a large proportion of 
the sample was discarded due to their results being insensitive. We attempted to 
tackle that problem by increasing the amount of expectancy measurements taken, but 
without success. Maybe a more sensitive way to measure Type I expectancies and 
confidence (using visual analogue or Likert scales) would solve the matter, however, 
this would make it very difficult to obtain categorical measures of accuracy or 
confidence. On the positive side, mean differences or effect sizes obtained in previous 
experiments can also be introduced as priors on Bayesian analyses. Now that 
significant results are available using this paradigm, future experiments might not 
need complicated two-step Bayesian categorisations using meta-cognitive awareness, 
but could just use the scores obtained previously as priors for new categorisations 
based on continuous or Likert scale expectancy ratings, respecting one of the main 




The results obtained in the n-back task, showing that CA was necessary for CS to 
interfere with cognitive control, and the results of the Emotional Attentional Blink, in 
which Aware participants seemed to pay preferential attention to LR CS compared to 
HR, are puzzling. Moreover, on the Flanker task, Aware participants did not show any 
learning effects. We attempted to provide a series of explanations for both cases, but 
their theoretical or experimental support is limited. If anything, the fact that we were 
able to obtain in three instances very clear learning effects in Unaware participants, 
and somewhat weaker results in Aware, supports the necessity to explore automatic 
learning processes with implicitly CS rather than with stimuli explicitly related to a 
reward.  
Perhaps the most daunting piece of evidence that needs clarification is the role of 
attentional responses in implicit PC. If implicit PC cannot generate subjective hedonic 
responses or behavioural effects (i.e. PIT), why would CS trigger such attentional 
biases? And what could be the particular role they might play in driving addiction? One 
possibility is that they participate in the generation of preparatory responses. In that 
case, the link between attention, physiological responses and reward appraisal or 
effects should be observed. Maybe a more careful examination of implicit learning 
effects in PIT paradigms could bring evidence supporting the role of CS in overt 
consumption behaviours. Another possibility is that CS could drive attention 
depending on the development of CA. If a participant is not explicitly aware of 
contingencies, an implicit mechanism based on the transfer of incentive values would 
drive attentional responses towards CS predicting rewards until outcome-




CS and reward). This possibility was outlined in our first experiments and would 
reconcile the views of Pearce and Mackintosh (2010) on associative learning. Pearce 
and Hall (1980) posited that attention towards a stimulus is only required whilst still 
learning about its consequences, afterwards attention would be allocated towards 
other stimuli in search for novel contingencies. Mackintosh (1974) proposed on the 
other hand that stimuli predicting rewards will always drag more attention. In our 
Emotional Attentional Blink, we found that Unaware participants paid more attention 
to HR CS, following Mackintosh’s idea. On the contrary, Aware participants showed 
preferential responses towards LR CS, disregarding CS predicting high probabilities of 
reward, in accordance to Pearce and Hall. This might point towards the role of CA in 
the allocation of attention in associative learning, but such an idea requires further 
examination.  
As much as the conclusions extracted from the alcohol administration experiment 
were interesting, the results regarding subjective light-headedness and interoception 
could benefit from the examination of the awareness subjects had of the type of drink 
consumed, something impossible to achieve reliably with a single trial (one drink 
administration). For that reason, we did not obtain this measure. Getting to know 
whether interoception can facilitate the discrimination of alcohol drinks compared to 
placebo would provide us with a mechanism explaining substance discrimination 
abilities. Light-headedness is the main factor explaining alcohol discrimination in social 
drinkers (Duka, Stephens, Russell, & Tasker, 1998), the hypotheses seems to make 
sense, but an experimental demonstration would involve lengthy procedures, 




We found discrepancies between the different measures of interoceptive awareness 
and the way the interacted with learning or alcohol administration. Meta-cognitive 
discrimination explained emotional reactivity towards CS and light-headedness during 
alcohol administration, meta-cognitive tracking on the other hand explained reward 
prediction. Alcohol administration also decreased meta-cognitive discrimination and 
tracking accuracy only for males. These inconsistencies follow the lack of evidence for 
a correlation between interoceptive factors (Garfinkel et al., 2016; Garfinkel, Seth, 
Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015) added to recent criticisms to the use of tracking 
tasks (Zamariola, Maurage, Luminet, & Corneille, 2018). Further experiments should 
seek either for control tasks capable of overcoming some of the limitations related to 
interoceptive measurements, or for novel techniques able to measure interoceptive 
awareness in a more consistent way.  
Finally, although the model of interoceptive appetitive learning is partly supported by 
our results and previous theoretical accounts, more evidence regarding the effects of 
CS and micro-dosing in alliesthesia and their link to addiction mediated by 
interoception is necessary. That could be studied by administering very low doses of 
alcohol to social drinkers, assessing the effect of that priming on craving and 
attentional biases (i.e. Schoenmakers, Wiers, & Field, 2008), and evaluating the 
mediator effect of interoception. It would be relevant as well to test Gray and 
Critchley’s (2007) hypothesis concerning drug cravings and to examine the role of 





The research presented here aimed at disentangling the implicit correlates of 
appetitive PC. For that purpose, we developed a series of novel techniques able to 
measure both subjective and objective learning in a sensitive manner. Our main 
finding, that implicit CS can generate responses, is a novel characterisation of PC, but 
has also multiple implications for the field of addiction. Using the methodologies 
designed here we can achieve a better understanding of the implicit correlates of 
addictive processes, which we may ultimately be able to translate to addiction 
therapies.  
The examination of interoceptive correlates of appetitive learning also has important 
implications. Our results provide some evidence for the role of bodily sensations in 
appetitive learning; such a finding can be integrated in learning theories and provide a 
more novel conceptualisation of addiction.  
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